Opinion
4:23-CV-1200 NCC
09-26-2023
FREDERICK WESTBROOK, Plaintiff, v. BHUMI PATEL, et al, Defendants.
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of self-represented plaintiff Frederick Westbrook for leave to commence this action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint, plaintiff will be required to amend his complaint on a court-provided form.
Initial Partial Filing Fee
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court a certified prison account statement. As a result, the Court will require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances.”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his certified prison account statement in support of his claim.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).
Criminal Case in State Court
On July 1, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff in St. Louis County Court charging plaintiff with sodomy in the second degree and rape in the second degree. See State v. Westbrook, No. 21SL-CR002804 (21st Jud. Cir., St. Louis County). Plaintiff was served with a warrant for his arrest on July 6, 2021, and he was given a $50,000 cash bond.
A grand jury indictment was filed on August 4, 2021, with the same charges as the criminal complaint. See State v. Westbrook, No. 21SL-CR002804-01 (21st Jud. Cir., St. Louis County). Plaintiff was arraigned on August 18, 2021. It appears that plaintiff has been represented by four Missouri State Public Defenders at various times in his criminal action, and counsel has sought two psychological examinations on his behalf. No trial date has yet been set according to Missouri.Case.Net.
Complaint
Plaintiff Frederick Westbrook, an inmate at St. Louis County Justice Center, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names as defendants the Judge in his Missouri State criminal action, Judge Kristine Kerr, as well as the prosecutor, John Schlesinger, and his public defender, Bhumi Patel. Plaintiff also seeks to sue the State of Missouri.
Plaintiff states that defendants have “exploited and harassed” him by giving information about the plaintiff's close friends and family “by way of mentioning their names through legal mail. The Court assumes plaintiff is referring to the discovery process in his criminal action.
He complains that his public defender, Bhumi Patel, has been ineffective in arguing on behalf of pro se motion to dismiss the indictment because she “allowed the State of Missouri to use an outdated statute [that was] revised [in] 2018 to deny the plaintiff's motion for dismissal.” He also asserts that Patel was ineffective because she failed to share with him purported “mitigating evidence,” although he is unable to remember the substance of the alleged mitigating evidence.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Patel will not provide him access to the FBI or a Detective to complain that he has noticed, through court documents, that he “might be being harassed” by the alleged victim in his rape case. Plaintiff fails to state what the perceived harassment is as it pertains to him.
Furthermore, plaintiff complains that Patel has submitted him for mental examinations. He claims that the psychological evaluator, a man named Stephen Peterson, misinterpreted “how plaintiff quoted the Book of Revelations. . .”
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in an amount of five million dollars, as well as punitive damages in an amount of $500,000.
Discussion
As currently pled, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Nonetheless, because plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court will allow plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint. In amending his pleading, plaintiff should keep the following in mind.
Prosecutors are immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability so long as the actions complained of appear to be within the scope of prosecutorial duties. Price v. Moody, 677 F.2d 676, 677 (8thCir. 1982). See also Keating v. Martin, 638 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir. 1980). Moreover, judicial immunity provides judges with immunity from suit, allowing them to exercise the authority with which they are vested, and to act upon their own convictions. See Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”). Accordingly, plaintiff is unable to bring claims for relief against either Judge Kerr or defendant John Schlesinger in his amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Additionally, “[s]ection 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person' for a violation, under color of law, of another's civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Accordingly, the State of Missouri is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Furthermore, “[s]overeign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer sovereign immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state's own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court”); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”).
Last, most plaintiff's claims are against his current public defender, Bhumi Patel, for what he calls ineffective assistance of counsel. Because his state criminal case is currently ongoing and involves judgments made by Judge Kerr, this Court will decline to interfere in the State criminal action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over actions seeking review of, or relief from, judgments in state court. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005). To the extent plaintiff is seeking review of a Missouri state court judgment, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court decisions Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). Federal review of state court decisions may only be had in the Supreme Court. Id. For these reasons, and for those stated in footnote 2, plaintiff cannot state a claim against his defense counsel under § 1983.
“The essential elements of a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim are: (1) that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right.” Green v. Byrd, 972 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2020). However, a defense attorney, whether appointed or retained, does not act under color of state law, and thus cannot be liable for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (stating that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”); Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 750 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that attorneys who represented plaintiff, “whether appointed or retained, did not act under color of state law and, thus, are not subject to suit under section 1983”); Christian v. Crawford, 907 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Eighth Circuit “has repeatedly held that both retained and appointed attorneys are not liable for deprivations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that they do not act under color of state law”); and Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Public defenders do not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional functions of defense counsel”).
The name of this doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); and Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Nonetheless, as noted above, the Court will allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff will be provided twenty-one (21) days to do so. His failure to follow the instructions set forth below, and file his amended complaint in a timely manner, on a court-provided form, will result of a dismissal of this action, without prejudice.
Instructions for Amending the Complaint
Plaintiff is advised that the filing of an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint and all supplements, and so it must include all claims plaintiff wishes to bring. See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect”). Any claims from the original complaint or any supplements that are not included in the amended complaint will be deemed abandoned and will not be considered. Id. Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court-provided prisoner civil rights complaint form, and the amended complaint must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require litigants to formulate their pleadings in an organized and comprehensible manner. Even self-represented litigants are obligated to abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to plead specific facts as to each named defendant. See U.S. v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff is required to set out his alleged claims in a simple, concise, and direct manner, and also the facts supporting his claims as to each named defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (complaint should contain short and plain statement of claims); 8(d)(1) (each claim shall be simple, concise, and direct); 10(b) (parties are to separate their claims within their pleadings and the contents of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances). Plaintiff should fill out the complaint form in its entirety.
In the “Caption” section of the complaint form, plaintiff must state the first and last name, to the extent he knows it, of the defendant or defendants he wants to sue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”). If there is not enough room in the caption, plaintiff may add additional sheets of paper. However, all the defendants must be clearly listed. plaintiff should also indicate whether he intends to sue each defendant in his or her individual capacity, official capacity, or both. Plaintiff should avoid naming anyone as a defendant unless that person is directly related to his claim(s).
In the “Statement of Claim” section, plaintiff should begin by writing a defendant's name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, plaintiff should write the specific facts supporting his claim or claims against that defendant. If plaintiff is suing more than one defendant, he should proceed in the same manner with each one, separately writing each individual defendant's name and, under that name, in numbered paragraphs, the factual allegations supporting his claim or claims against that defendant. plaintiff should only include claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or simply put, claims that are related to each other. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). Alternatively, plaintiff may choose a single defendant, and set forth as many claims as he has against him or her. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a). Plaintiff's failure to make specific factual allegations against any defendant will result in that defendant's dismissal. Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that the “Statement of Claim” requires more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017).
If plaintiff is suing a defendant in an individual capacity, he is required to allege facts demonstrating the personal responsibility of the defendant for harming him. Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). It is not enough for plaintiff to refer to a group of defendants and make general allegations against them. Instead, plaintiff must explain the role of each defendant so that each defendant will have notice of what he or she is accused of doing or failing to do. See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim.”).
If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided form within twenty-one (21) days in accordance with the instructions set forth herein, the Court may dismiss this action without prejudice and without further notice to plaintiff.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. [ECF No. 4]. The appointment of counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil matter lies within the discretion of the Court. Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006). There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1004 (8th Cir. 1984). Once the plaintiff has alleged a prima facie claim, the Court must determine the plaintiff's need for counsel to effectively litigate his claim. In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1986). The standard for appointment of counsel in a civil case is whether both the plaintiff and the Court would benefit from the assistance of counsel. Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2005). This determination involves the consideration of several relevant criteria, including “the factual complexity of the issues, the ability of the indigent person to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, the ability of the indigent person to present the claims, and the complexity of the legal arguments.” Phillips, 437 F.3d at 794 (citing Edgington, 52 F.3d at 780).
In this matter, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time. The action appears to involve straightforward questions of fact rather than complex questions of law. Further, the request for counsel is premature, as plaintiff is required to amend his pleading in this matter. The Court concludes that the appointment of counsel would not be of sufficient benefit to the Court or to plaintiff at this time, and will deny plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, without prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to pay the initial partial filing fee within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, then this case will be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mail plaintiff a blank copy of the Court's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the Court-provided form and in compliance with the Court's instructions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 3] is DENIED at this time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon submission of the amended complaint, the Court shall again review this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff's failure to timely comply with this Order shall result in the dismissal of this action, without prejudice and without further notice.