) By using different language in section 259, subdivision (a), the Legislature has made clear that it did not intend to limit a commissioner's authority under subdivision (a) in the manner that it is limited in other subdivisions. (See West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85, 89, 42 Cal.Rptr. 603 [in subdivision giving commissioners the authority to “ ‘hear, report on, and determine’ ” uncontested actions, “the Legislature intended to give the commissioners power to determine the matters coming within it, because in a situation where the Legislature merely wanted the commissioners to report their determinations to the court, it knew exactly how to express itself”].) .Section 259 provides in full: “Subject to the supervision of the court, every court commissioner shall have power to do all of the following:
(11) Although this language permits the court to require the commissioner to hear and report on an uncontested matter without determining it, it also allows the court to order a commissioner to hear and determine the matter prior to making any report. ( West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85, 89 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 603] .) See footnote 7, supra, for the text of section 259a and citation of statutory provisions determining the courts to which it applies.
(17) In hearing uncontested actions and proceedings, commissioners have the power to determine important and complex matters. ( People v. Lucas (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 47, 50 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 235]; West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 603].) There has, however, been some suggestion that there are rights so fundamental that their determination can never be considered a subordinate judicial duty, even in an uncontested proceeding.
The Rooney case expressly held ". . . that section 259a, subdivision 6, providing for assignment to court commissioners of certain judicial duties with respect to uncontested matters, falls squarely within the scope of the legislative authority conferred by article VI, section 22. . . ." (10 Cal.3d at p. 366.) An illustration of the importance and complexity of the matters which a commissioner may lawfully decide is found in West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 603]. There the Court of Appeal upheld the power of a commissioner sitting in a default case under Code of Civil Procedure section 259a, subdivision 6, to reform a note and enjoin the foreclosure of the trust deed which secured the note.
In view of the noncompliance with the constitutional requirement of a stipulation of the parties litigant, the commissioner had no more power to act under subdivision 6 than he had to act under subdivision 4 of section 259a Neither West v. U.L.C. Corp., 232 Cal.App.2d 85 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 603], upholding the constitutionality of subdivision 6 otherwise, nor People v. Superior Court, 239 Cal.App.2d 99 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 445], explaining the subdivision, considered this point. It should be noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 259a applies to some counties other than Los Angeles.
(Id. at pp. 1544-1546 [reversible error to summarily adjudicate issues of fact where defendants had moved only for summary judgment and Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f) requires notice that summary adjudication is sought].) The long-established principle is that a demand for relief in a complaint necessarily includes a prayer for lesser relief. (See West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85, 89 ["The greater relief demanded necessarily included a prayer to carry lesser relief into effect"]; Hurt v. Pico Inv. Co. (1932) 127 Cal.App. 106, 114 [" '[T]here is no rule that would prevent the court from granting less relief than that demanded' "].) This principle applies here, and there is no basis for us to conclude that the trial court erred in awarding evidentiary and issue sanctions in lieu of finding the landlords to be in default.
The Government Code empowers a commissioner to conduct arraignment proceedings. Section 259a of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes him 1) 'To hear and determine ex parte motions,' and 6) '* * * to hear, report on and determine all uncontested actions and proceedings.' Ex parte orders within subdivision (1) have been held to include an order requiring a judgment debtor to appear and answer concerning his property (Lewis v. Neblett (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 290, 10 Cal.Rptr. 441), and an order approving a probate claim (Estate of Roberts (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 71), while uncontested actions and proceedings within subdivision (6) have been held to embrace default cases (West v. U.L.C. Corp. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 85, 42 Cal.Rptr. 603), trials wherein a party absents himself and the trial proceeds pursuant to section 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Bill Benson Motors, Inc. v. MacMorris Sales Corp. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d Supp. 937, 48 Cal.Rptr. 123 and judgments upon stipulation (People v. Superior Court (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 99, 48 Cal.Rptr. 445). We regard the forfeiture of bail of a nonappearing defendant in a criminal case as an ex parte order.
Even if we be in error in holding Commissioner Hargrave a duly constituted judge pro tempore, nevertheless as a Commissioner of the Municipal Court he had the legal power to render and enter the judgment in this case in his capacity as a commissioner. (West v. U. L. C. Corp. (1965) 232 A.C.A. 120, 124-126, 42 Cal.Rptr. 603.) Even though we preserve the distinction between default cases and uncontested cases, there can be no doubt that the hearing or trial held in this case was an uncontested hearing so far as appellants are concerned.