Opinion
A-13435
12-08-2021
RYAN W. WEST, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court No. 1JU-11-01085 CR, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael L. Wolverton, Judge.
Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Ryan W. West pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide as part of a plea agreement. The court sentenced West to 9 years with 3 years suspended (6 years to serve), and 10 years' probation. West was released on probation in September 2015. From August 2016 to July 2017, the State filed three petitions to revoke West's probation, which resulted in suspended time from his sentence being imposed. 1
AS 11.41.130(a).
The State filed a fourth petition to revoke probation in September 2018. The basis for the petition to revoke was a residential burglary where West stole over $ 100, 000 worth of property. West gave notice that he was exercising his right to refuse probation and be re-sentenced to a flat-time sentence. The court accepted West's refusal of probation. The court then concluded that deterrence and community condemnation were the paramount sentencing considerations. West had approximately 33 months of suspended time remaining on his sentence. The court imposed 24 months and terminated further probation.
West was entitled under Alaska law to have the probation proceedings postponed until after the new criminal case involving the burglary charges was resolved. See McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980). But he specifically asked that the disposition hearing proceed despite the fact that the criminal case was pending.
West raises two issues on appeal. First, West argues that the court erred when it failed to discuss, on the record, the seriousness of his underlying offense, his criminal history, and his overall conduct on probation, and instead appeared to rely primarily on the burglary charge to justify its sentence.
See Jeter v. State, 393 P.3d438, 441 (Alaska App. 2017); DeMario v. State, 933 P.2d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 1997).
West is correct that the court's sentencing remarks were brief. But West offers no support for the conclusion that the court did not consider the seriousness of his underlying offense, his criminal history, and his overall conduct on probation. The court had the presentence report for the original offense, the three petitions to revoke West's probation, and a letter from West's probation officer discussing West's conduct on probation. These documents provided sufficient information for the court to consider the seriousness of West's underlying offense, criminal history, and overall conduct on 2 probation. In the absence of information to the contrary, we presume that the court considered these documents and appropriately weighed the information within them.
See Smith v. State, 484 P.3d 610, 617 (Alaska App. 2021).
The fact that the sentencing court did not discuss all of these matters in detail and focused on the conduct underlying the probation revocation is analogous to a selective discussion of the Chaney factors. As a general matter, sentencing courts are not required to discuss each Chaney factor on the record in order for a sentence to be valid. "[I]t is only in instances where the court's remarks afford no insight to its reasons for sentencing or where they affirmatively indicate that its sentence was not properly grounded on the Chaney goals that failure to address the goals expressly will require a remand." Here, the court clearly articulated that it was emphasizing deterrence and community condemnation, and its reasons for the sentence are apparent from the larger context. Accordingly, we find no reason to remand for further explanation.
State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970).
Smith v. State, 691 P.2d 293, 295 (Alaska App. 1984).
Id.
Second, West claims that the court imposed an excessive sentence. We review an excessive sentence claim under the "clearly mistaken" standard of review, which recognizes that "reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, can and will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence."
Galindo v. State, 481 P.3d 686, 689-90 (Alaska App. 2021) (quoting Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997)).
Here, West had prior convictions for second-degree theft and failure to render aid after an accident, based on a drug deal gone bad where West drove away with a woman clinging to his truck, severely injuring the woman. West also had a long string 3 of serious probation violations in his criminally negligent homicide case, many of them involving drugs and thefts to obtain money for drugs. While he was on probation, West had new convictions for trespass, criminal mischief, theft, and resisting arrest. And on appeal, West agrees that the court could consider the nature of the recent criminal charges - a residential burglary and theft of over $100,000 in property. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the sentence imposed was "clearly mistaken."
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. 4