West v. Rock Hill Sch. Dist. Three

Full title: Lauren Massey West, Plaintiff, v. Rock Hill School District Three…

Court: United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Aiken Division

Date published: Dec 17, 2021

C. A. 20-01952-JMC-KDW (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2021)

Opinion

C. A. 20-01952-JMC-KDW

12-17-2021

Lauren Massey West, Plaintiff, v. Rock Hill School District Three, Defendant.

Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Lauren Massey West (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against her now-former employer, Defendant Rock Hill School District Three (“Defendant” or “District”), alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a report and recommendation (“Report”) regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. Having reviewed the Motion and accompanying materials, ECF Nos. 29, 29-1 through 29-14; Plaintiff's Response, ECF Nos. 35, 35-1 through 35-10; and Defendant's Reply, ECF No. 39; and applicable law, the undersigned recommends Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 29, be granted.

I. Factual Background¹

1 As it must, the court considers the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. These facts are derived from Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Response thereto, and Defendant's Reply. To the extent necessary, additional facts are set out in relevant portions of this Report.

A. Plaintiff's employment

Plaintiff, a female, was employed by Defendant from July 2011 until September 13, 2019, as the Athletic Director (“AD”) for Northwestern High School (NWHS”). Pl. Dep. 27, ECF No. 29-3 at 208, Vacancy Notice; ECF No. 29-3 at 217, Contract for Employment; ECF No. 29-3 at 303, Letter of Superintendent. According to the Vacancy Notice, as the AD for NWHS, Plaintiff administered all athletic policies and procedures as well as the rules and by-laws of the South Carolina High School League; assisted the principal in the evaluation and employment of all coaching positions; developed all interscholastic athletic schedules; worked with head coaches to prepare athletic budgets; prepared and submitted the annual fiscal report and budget requests to the principal; maintained eligibility requirements for all student athletes; provided adequate supervision for all athletic events; employed and supervised support staff for all athletic events; served as the athletic representative for the athletic booster club; and assisted the principal with supervision and implementation for athletic disciplinary policies. ECF No. 29-3, Vacancy Notice.

James Blake, the former NWHS Principal, was Plaintiff's supervisor when she began in 2011. Pl. Dep. 30; Contract for Employment, ECF No. 29-3. While Mr. Blake was her supervisor, Plaintiff met with him yearly during “self-reflections” to discuss her performance. Pl. Dep. 31-32. According to Plaintiff, some years Mr. Blake provided Plaintiff with a formal/written evaluation, but some years the evaluation was just a conversation. Pl. Dep. 31-32. Overall, Plaintiff had a positive relationship with Mr. Blake. Id. at 33. They were in close communication and met weekly while Mr. Blake served as principal and her supervisor. Id. at 34. Plaintiff informed Kim Parrish, the administrative assistant for athletics, when she had off-campus meetings or activities. Id. at 34-35.

In her role as AD, Plaintiff supervised the coaching staff that was comprised of between 50-60 individuals. Pl. Dep. 30-31.² When Plaintiff was hired, her husband was already working for Defendant as an athletic trainer. Id. at 27. Because of the District's nepotism rules, Plaintiff could not supervise her husband. Id. at 28. So, upon Plaintiff's hiring, her husband moved into a teaching position because an athletic trainer or member of the coaching staff would fall under the AD's supervision. Id. at 28-29. This hiring condition was noted in Rock Hill School Board minutes from July 22, 2011. ECF No. 29-3. Specifically, the Board minutes indicated the understanding that “Jim West, her spouse, will be replaced as the current athletic trainer as soon as possible.” Id. Plaintiff acknowledged the nepotism policy and her inability to supervise her husband in her deposition testimony. Pl. Dep. 28-30.

2 Plaintiff testified she has never taught high school students in either public or private school and does not hold a teaching certification. Pl. Dep. 31.

In 2015, Plaintiff discussed the nepotism policy with Mr. Blake after a school board meeting when members questioned a trip Plaintiff's husband took with the school's football coach. Pl. Dep. 35-36; 38. Mr. Blake authored a letter to Dr. Kelly Pew, the former Superintendent for the District, dated September 28, 2015, after the inquiries were made. See ECF No. 29-3 at 218, Blake Letter. Therein, Mr. Blake explained the hiring history for the Wests and the school's procedure for decisions made concerning the athletic program. Id. In a separate letter to Dr. Pew, the District's outside counsel, Kathryn Mahoney, offered legal opinions and quoted certain policies concerning nepotism. ECF No. 29-3 at 219-221, Attorney Letter. The November 6, 2015 letter indicates that Dr. Pew requested advice on a “potential ethical or legal issue” concerning a husband and wife working at NWHS. Id. The letter quotes several school board policies and South Carolina statutes concerning nepotism that indicate the District is not to place an employee in a position wherein the employee will discipline or exercise authority over a family member. Id. Additionally, the letter indicates that Plaintiff's husband “teaches strength and conditioning classes for several of the school's athletic programs.” Id. at 220. The letter further indicates that “the principal would need to authorize any payments of any kind to the husband whether for travel approval, travel reimbursement, or any other payments of any kind.” Id.

Mr. Blake wrote another letter to Dr. Pew on January 20, 2016, confirming that Plaintiff was made aware of the nepotism policies, specifically the Board Policy GBEA (Staff Ethics/Conflict of Interest) (hereinafter “GBEA policy”), when she was hired as AD. ECF No. 29-3 at 222, Blake Letter 2. Further, Mr. Blake confirmed that he and the Wests had a “conversation” about their respective supervisors and assigned roles. Id. Mr. Blake again ensured that Plaintiff had no supervision over her husband. Id. He confirmed that “all requested purchases related to the acquisition of services and/or equipment needed for the training of our students is directed through NWHS's PE Department chair and [Mr. Blake].” Id. Plaintiff signed a letter dated February 1, 2016 indicating her awareness of the GBEA policy and her continued willingness to comply with it. ECF No. 29-3 at 308, Plaintiff 2016 Letter.

Mr. Blake retired in 2018, and the District hired Hezekiah Massey as the NWHS principal. Pl. Dep. at 32, 46-47. When Mr. Massey became principal, Plaintiff requested that they have weekly meetings, but in her deposition testimony Plaintiff testified he would often cancel scheduled meetings with her. Id. at 52. A few weeks after Mr. Massey because principal, he asked that Plaintiff report to him her whereabouts via text message. Id. at 67. Later into the school year, in March of 2019, Mr. Massey revised his request to ask that Plaintiff let him know by email where she was and when she would be there “so we can better gauge how to access you to address needs on campus.” Id.

During the 2018-2019 school year, James Martin was the football coach, after having served in an interim capacity during the previous school year when the prior football coach resigned mid-season. Id. at 56-57. In hiring Coach Martin, NWHS did not go through an interview process because a teaching position to go along with the coaching position was unavailable. Id. at 56. So, as Plaintiff explained in her testimony, the school needed to hire the football coach from within the teaching staff. Id. Plaintiff testified: “Our primary choice for that did not want to accept the position, so we were kind of forced to offer it to James Martin since we didn't have a teaching opening to hire coaches.” Id.

Plaintiff took issue with several incidents from an October 2018 football game against Clover High School-Plaintiff cited to specific instances of unsportsmanlike conduct and testified that players were “really not representing Northwestern in a positive manner.” Id. at 62. Once the team returned to school, Plaintiff asked to meet with the football coaches about what she witnessed at the Clover game. Id. At the meeting, Plaintiff stood in the middle of the coaches and asked what was going on and why was the team acting like this. Id. Plaintiff testified that several coaches at the team meeting vocalized their opinions that Northwestern must do better or “represent ourselves better.” Id. Plaintiff indicated that she had received several complaints from fans and numerous emails about the players' behavior. Id. at 62-63.

According to her deposition testimony, Assistant Football Coach David Surratt “became belligerent after the Clover game” when she left the meeting. Id. at 78-79. She represents that Surratt commented something to the effect of: “Who the hell does she think she is coming down here running her mouth” or “who does that bitch think she is coming down here running her mouth?” Id. Plaintiff indicates that her husband was present when Surratt made these comments, and there was a verbal altercation. Id. Further, Plaintiff felt like Mr. Massey took Surratt's side rather than hers during this conflict. Id. After the team meeting, there was a “fallout” between Plaintiff and Coach Martin-their relationship deteriorated greatly. Id. at 63. As a result, Plaintiff represents that Coach Martin was then allowed to circumvent her as AD and communicate directly with Principal Massey. Id. at 61; 63.

In November of 2018, at the end of football season, Plaintiff prepared a “year-end evaluation of the football program” for Mr. Massey. Id. at 80-82. In the evaluation, that Plaintiff sent to Mr. Massey only, she cited several concerns about the program. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff testified she raised the following concerns:

There were academic concerns. Our football team had gone from having very high academic achievements to kids struggling to be eligible. Again, there were issues as far as kids being treated or seen by the athletic trainer. There were issues with Coach Martin and other coaches. He and the head boys basketball coach had issues as far as sharing the athletes. Calvin Hudgins, the head track coach, had come to me as far as the football coaches supporting those kids that wanted to go run track. So there were personnel issues. And there were performance issues. I would say that overall our football team was not performing to the level that they should have been, to the expectations that had been set by the program.

Id. at 81-82. Plaintiff did not share the evaluation with Coach Martin, but it is her position that Mr. Massey shared the review with Coach Martin without her involvement. Id. at 80-81. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Massey did not respond to the evaluation, and his disclosure of it to Coach Martin hurt her working relationship with Coach Martin. Id. at 81.

In the spring of 2019, a set of parents complained that certain weight-lifting techniques or power cleans were being performed improperly, and kids were getting hurt. Id. at 71. After Plaintiff received an email from a concerned parent, ³ she emailed Mr. Massey and asked if they were going to meet about complaints. Id. at 72. Plaintiff represents she then learned that Coach Martin and Mr. Massey had been meeting about the issue prior to Plaintiff learning there was an issue. Id. at 72-73. Laura Wilson, an athletic trainer, expressed concern over the practices to Plaintiff and relayed to Plaintiff what a student told Wilson. Id. at 74. Plaintiff spoke to the student and then pulled and viewed camera footage of the weight room. Id. at 73-75. She further testified that she learned from the video that what Coach Martin had indicated to Mr. Massey as what happened, “in fact, did not happen.” Id. at 74. Plaintiff, Coach Martin, and Mr. Massey met about the incident and complaints on March 6, 2019. Id. at 74. After this meeting, Plaintiff wrote a memo addressing the weightlifting. Id. at 73; ECF No. 29-3 at 251-55, Plaintiff's Memo. In essence, Plaintiff's March 8, 2019 memo indicated that NWHS was not following “best practices” for weightlifting; that the practices were “excessive;” and, in Plaintiff's opinion, these practices caused a student's injury. Id. The memo outlines actions taken by Coach Martin, particularly his involvement in “knowingly and intentionally provid[ing] medical advice, circumventing and undermining Laura Wilson's care and treatment of football participants.” See Memo at 255. The memo was directed to the attention of Dr. Luanne Kokolis, the District's Chief of Strategic Planning, Engagement, and Program Support including District athletics, and Mr. Massey. See Id. The District conducted an investigation and addressed each of the parents' concerns in a letter. Pl. Dep. at 82, ECF No. 29-3 at 260-61, Letter from Rock Hill Schools.

3 The email from the concerned parent was also sent to the school board and other district officials. Id. at 73.

After frustrations with certain issues concerning Mr. Massey and Coach Martin, Plaintiff reached out to Dr. Tanya Campbell, District Chief of Personnel, via telephone. Pl. Dep. at 77-78. After getting “no resolve, ” on March 26, 2019, Plaintiff sent a detailed email to Dr. Campbell after she became concerned with the manner in which Mr. Massey was treating her on campus. Id. at 75-76. Plaintiff was concerned with various aspects of the football program, and she was particularly concerned that Mr. Massey and Coach Martin had eliminated her from the chain of command. Id.; ECF No. 29-3 at 256-58, March 26, 2019 Email. Plaintiff's email expressed that her experience and knowledge as an AD was not valued during the investigation of the football program and that Massey had “removed [her] from the chain of command with regards to Coach Martin and N[W]HS football program.” Id.; see also ECF No. 29-4; Deposition of Tanya Campbell (hereinafter “Campbell Dep.”) at 15-16. Plaintiff testified that she never received a response from Dr. Campbell after the March 26, 2019 email. Pl. Dep. at 117.

Additionally, Plaintiff indicated that she had asked Mr. Massey to give her a midyear evaluation, but he never complied until Plaintiff involved Tanya Campbell. Pl. Dep. at 110. Plaintiff testified that after she contacted Dr. Campbell, Mr. Massey scheduled a meeting with her on March 29, 2019, and went over “quite a bit of expectations.” Id. Plaintiff represents that in her March 2019 meeting with Mr. Massey, she explained why there were negative account balances in the athletic programs. Id. Specifically, she testified: “I explained to him that the accounts looked bad at this point but we wait until the end of the school year, it's been our practice we wait until toward the end of the school year. . . .to move funds around, and once the funds are moved around that the accounts will come out of the red.” Id. at 110-111. Plaintiff agreed that she allows several sports accounts to have negative balances until the end of the year. Id. at 111.

On April 22, 2019, Coach Martin submitted his resignation as head coach of the NWHS football team. Pl. Dep. at 85, ECF No. 29-3 at 262, Resignation Letter. In Martin's resignation letter, he expressed concerns about NWHS's football program, and indicated:

I remain very concerned about the deterioration of the program and the low morale of the coaches and the players, especially after losing two head coaches in the span of a year and a half. My prayers will be with the coaching staff who have to continue to endure the hostile work environment that has been created by the Athletic Director. I also pray that the coaches and players can withstand the internal erosion that the Athletic Director has brought to this program.

Id. Toward the end of his letter, Coach Martin stated: “I am evermore grateful that you led an investigation with dignity and stood by my side with your findings.” Id.

After Coach Martin resigned, a hiring committee was formed to find the new football coach. Pl. Dep. at 91. Community members and school personnel, including Plaintiff and Mr. Massey, were on the hiring committee. Id. at 91-92. Plaintiff testified that she and Mr. Massey “slated the committee based on individuals that were supporters, involved parents.” Id. at 94-95. The committee posted the open position for several weeks and then slated candidates for interviews. Id. at 91. Plaintiff met with Mr. Massey and Dr. Kokolis to make sure candidates were eligible for the position. Id. at 92. During the process Mr. Massey forwarded candidates' resumes to Plaintiff for review. Id. at 93; ECF No. 29-3 at 263-279, Emails regarding candidates. Plaintiff testified that the timing of the hiring created some unrest because they entered the spring ball season without a coach. Id. On May 13, 2019, the committee narrowed down the candidate pool to ten applicants. Id. at 94, ECF No. 280, Email. Plaintiff followed up with the candidates to ensure they had all the proper paperwork on file with the district so that they could be considered and interviewed upon Mr. Massey's request. Id., ECF No. 281, Email.

The committee interviewed approximately five applicants, ranked them, and sent the top candidates to Dr. Cook for him to review. Id. at 95. Plaintiff testified that they called in a candidate and made him an offer, but he did not accept. Id. at 95-96. Plaintiff recalled that former NWHS Athletic Director Jimmy Wallace was asked to apply for the position and was interested in it but also ultimately decided not to accept the job. Id. at 96-97. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Wallace “was set to take the position, met with [Dr.] Cook. . . .[but] then at some point there wasn't a follow-up, and so Coach Wallace reached out to [Plaintiff].” Id. at 96. According to her deposition testimony, Mr. Wallace met with Mr. Massey and Plaintiff separately. Id. at 97. Plaintiff testified that Wallace relayed to her that Mr. Massey was throwing up a smoke screen and “sabotaging the [football coach] interview process.” Id. She further testified Mr. Massey “ma[de] sure the candidate knew that he wasn't Massey's choice.” Id. Another candidate turned down the job, who Plaintiff described as “absolutely phenomenal.” Id. at 97-98. After two candidates turned down the position, Plaintiff contacted a former NWHS assistant football coach Page Wofford and convinced him to interview for the head football coaching job in June of 2019.⁴ Id. at 99. She communicated to Mr. Massey that if they can get Coach Page they “need to lock [him] down.” Id. Ultimately Page interviewed with the committee who recommended him, immediately met with Bill Cook, and was hired as the next head football coach. Id. at 101; 103. Plaintiff acknowledges he is “doing very well.” Id. at 101. However, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Massey had a different plan for the program that involved hiring others which was an “example of [Mr.] Massey saying one thing up front when people are listening but when nobody is watching or he thinks nobody is watching he is doing shady stuff.” Id.

4 Plaintiff testified she heard through rumors that the Northwestern basketball coach, John Bramlett, offered to take the football position. Pl. Dep. at 98. In response to learning this information, Plaintiff texted Mr. Massey that this was “not the way to go.” Id. She testified she “c[a]me to find out” that Mr. Massey was trying to convince Coach Bramlett to take the position in name only, and Jarvis Davis was actually going to be the head coach, but because Davis was not certified, Bramlett was going to have to take it in name only until Davis could get through the non-traditional certification program. Id. at 98-99. Plaintiff testified that Page later told her he got a call from someone telling Page of Mr. Massey's plans with Bramlett and Davis. Id. at 100.

On July 23, 2019, Plaintiff met with Mr. Massey, and he presented her with his performance evaluation for the 2018-2019 school year. Pl. Dep. 105, ECF No. 29-3 at 282-86, Athletic Director Evaluation. Plaintiff testified that Tanya Campbell and Luanne Kokolis were also at the meeting “without [her] knowledge ahead of time.” Id. Regarding discussions about Plaintiff's evaluation, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Massey “basically just read my evaluation to me.” Id. The previous year, Plaintiff had a “self-reflection” review with the former principal, Mr. Blake. Id. In the spring of 2018-2019, Dr. Kokolis developed the formal evaluation tool for the District's athletic directors. Id. at 105-06. Plaintiff testified that Dr. Kokolis sent an email in May of 2019 indicating that the tool would be used “moving forward, and in the meantime [they would] use the self-reflection, that she would be meeting with the principals and the ADs to review this document, and that actually never happened prior to July 23rd.” Id. at 106. The Athletic Evaluation had six categories, and there were three ratings available to assign to each category, with “needs improvement” being the lowest rating. Id. Mr. Massey gave Plaintiff the following ratings in each performance standard: Vision (Proficient); Effective Management (Improvement Needed); Climate (Needs Improvement); School/Community Relations (Needs Improvement); Ethical Behavior (Needs Improvement); Interpersonal Skills (Needs Improvement). Id. at 282-86. In the “Rationale” section of the review form, Mr. Massey gave each section detailed comments. Id. Plaintiff indicated that she had asked Mr. Massey to give her a midyear evaluation, but he never complied until Plaintiff involved Tanya Campbell. Pl. Dep. at 110. Plaintiff disagreed with many comments on her evaluation and testified that it was “just a complete fabrication to justify giving me a needs improvement to justify termination.” Id. at 128.

After reviewing the evaluation with Mr. Massey, Dr. Campbell and Dr. Kokolis indicated to Plaintiff that they were not there for the evaluation “yet they sat through the entire evaluation [and] actively participated in the evaluation. . . .” Id. at 128. Plaintiff was told they had come to discuss the findings of an internal audit. Id. at 129. During the July 23 meeting, Plaintiff was questioned about hiring her daughter and husband to work NWHS athletic events; how their pay was determined; cash in NWHS buildings; and paying in cash. Id. at 131.

During the meeting, Plaintiff admitted that her family members were paid staffers at sporting events when she was the administrator on duty. Id. The Audit Summary indicates that Plaintiff served as the administrator on duty or supervisor to her husband and child during the 2018-19 school year when they worked in various roles at athletic events. ECF No. 29-3 at 287, Audit Summary. The audit indicates that Plaintiff approved payments for their work during the events, and payments to her husband and child were inconsistent with payments paid to other individuals for similar and exact events. Id. The audit also indicated that on several occasions workers were paid in cash. Id. at 288. The internal auditor specifically noted in her report that “Lauren West, Athletic Director, authorized payments and acted in a supervisory role over her immediate family members, which is a violation of District Policy GBEA, Staff Ethics/Conflict of Interest.” Id. at 289, Internal Audit Memo. According to testimony from Dr. Campbell, the District HR Director, the District was concerned about the practice because “[d]uring athletic events, the administrator in charge, the AD, is the supervisor of that event. Any event staffer that is working those events falls under the supervision of the AD.” Campbell Dep. 86, ECF No. 29-4 at 87. Plaintiff testified that at times she paid workers in cash, was unaware of the Business Procedures Manual 3.5, and did not know paying in cash was not authorized. Pl. Dep. at 133.

After the July 23 meeting, Plaintiff followed-up with Mr. Massey and Dr. Campbell in an email and further explained her answers to questions posed during the meeting and “inconsistencies” in her evaluation. Pl. Dep. at 132; 138. Specifically, Plaintiff sent the email on July 30, 2019, and indicated: “I believe that I'm being held to a different standard that others similarly situated and have been disparately treated because of my gender and my marital status to James West a former coach at [NWHS].” ECF No. 29-3 at 295, July 30, 2019 Email. Further, Plaintiff represents: “I have found it necessary to speak with an employment attorney who tells me that my rights have likely been violated and that I may have been discriminated against on several basis including gender, and possible race discrimination.” Id.

On July 31, 2019, Plaintiff again met with Dr. Kokolis and Dr. Campbell at the District Office, and they gave Plaintiff the opportunity to resign or to be placed on administrative leave. Pl. Dep. 141. Plaintiff, not wanting to resign, was placed on administrative leave. Id. at 142. She testified that Dr. Campbell explained that according to policies and state statute violations, “[s]he had only that choice to recommend termination. . . .” Id. Plaintiff did not wish to resign because she felt like her evaluation was not indicative of her true performance as an AD. Id. A July 31, 2019 letter from Dr. Campbell confirmed the decision that Plaintiff be placed on administrative leave. ECF No. 29-3 at 297, Leave Letter. The letter indicated that the action was taken because of “concerns related to violation of policies GBEA and DM.” Id. On August 5, 2019, Dr. Campbell sent Plaintiff a letter to confirm that she was recommending Plaintiff be terminated. ECF No. 29-3 at 298. The results of her 2018-2019 evaluation and the recent audit findings were cited as reasons to support the recommendation. Id. Specifically, the letter indicated: “[S]ome serious concerns arose with respect to your authorizing or approving school and/or District funds to be paid to your husband and your daughter.” Id. According to the letter, Plaintiff's daughter had been paid a total of $775 for working events during the audited period, and her husband was paid $2,160 for working events. Id. Additionally, according to the letter, “a separate concern was raised in the audit about cash payments being paid to other staff members for services rendered from monies collected from concessions during athletic events, which is a violation of procedure.” Id. Further, the letter indicated Plaintiff's actions were particularly concerning “given the significant efforts the District administration made to ensure that [Plaintiff] conducted [herself] at all time consistent with State law and Board Policy GBEA (Staff Code of Ethics).” Id. at 299.

On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff had a pre-termination hearing with Dr. Cook at the District Office. Pl. Dep. at 145, ECF No. 29-3 at 300, August 21 Letter Upholding Recommendation. Plaintiff, Dr. Cook, Dr. Campbell, Mr. Massey, and Plaintiff's attorney were all present for the meeting. Id. Plaintiff “expressed to the room [her] concerns about how [she] had been treated, about the inaccuracies in [her] evaluation.” Id. She disputed the results of her performance evaluation, but she did not dispute the results of the audit. Id. at 145-46. However, Plaintiff testified that she disputed “the communication regarding [her] understanding of the board policy.” Id. at 146.

On August 21, 2019, Dr. Cook upheld the recommendation that Plaintiff's employment be terminated. ECF No. 29-3 at 300-301. Plaintiff was notified that she could appeal the decision to the School Board. Id. at 301. Plaintiff appealed the termination decision through her lawyer, and the District School Board upheld the termination by letter dated September 11, 2019. Pl. Dep. 148-49, ECF No. 29-3 at 302. Plaintiff was notified by letter dated September 12, 2019, that her termination from employment with the District would be effective September 13, 2019. ECF No. 29-3 at 303, September 12, 2019 Letter. Plaintiff filed an administrative charge of discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (“SHAC”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 4, 2019, and received by the EEOC on September 9, 2019. Pl. Dep. 150, EEOC Charge, ECF No. 29-3 at 304-07. The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue on April 8, 2020. Pl. Dep. 150-51; Right to Sue Letter, ECF No. 29-3 at 308. Plaintiff timely filed the instant action herein on April 22, 2020, and Defendant removed it to this court on May 21, 2020.

II. Standard of Review

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own affidavit or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact). In discrimination cases, a party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable jury could rule in the non-moving party's favor. Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002) (Title VII). The court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, but the court should examine uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence offered by the moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court must determine whether a party's offered evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of discrimination and look at the strength of a party's case on its own terms. See Id. at 148 (stating that “[c]ertainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational fact-finder could conclude that the action was discriminatory”).

B. Burden of proof in Title VII claims

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may demonstrate a violation of Title VII through direct or circumstantial evidence. When direct evidence is lacking, a plaintiff may produce circumstantial evidence and proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Plaintiff argues she can survive summary judgment by utilizing the mixed-motive framework through direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination and under the burden-shifting framework, see Pl.'s Mem. 18-35, so the court will consider her claims under both frameworks.

Under the burden-shifting, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of a violation of Title VII, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight, 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010). If the defendant meets the burden to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was “not its true reason[ ], but [was] a pretext.” Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

While intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuasion that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (“The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that ‘the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason . . . is correct.'”) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). Nonetheless, in considering an employee's pretext argument, there is nothing in the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that says ‘a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149)). “To the extent that the evidence supporting a plaintiff's prima facie case also undermines the employer's non-retaliatory justification, that evidence may be called upon by the trier of fact in determining whether or not the proffered justification is pretextual.” Id. at 220. The court is ever mindful, too, that inquiry which is “meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence.” Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 515-16 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988)).

Direct evidence of discrimination is “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly on the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Cassity v. Geren, 749 F.Supp.2d 380, 402 (D.S.C. 2010) (citing Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, (2003)). To evaluate whether a “nexus” exists between discriminatory statements and an adverse employment action, “[c]ourts have considered the context of the statement, its temporal proximity to the adverse employment action, and the status of the person making the statement.” E.E.O.C. v. CTI Global Solutions, Inc., 815 F.Supp.2d 897, 906 (D. Md. 2011). An adverse employment action in the discrimination context is one that adversely effects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment. James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis

A. Title VII sex-discrimination claim

Defendant first argues it is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim, arguing she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, even if she could, she has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext. Def. Mem. 10-19; Reply 2-9. Plaintiff argues she can survive summary judgment by utilizing the mixed-motive framework through direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination and under the burden-shifting framework. See Pl.'s Mem. 18-35. The undersigned will begin by examining Plaintiff's claims under the burden-shifting framework using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

1. Prima Facie Case

Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Ennis, 53 F.3d at 58 (noting the exact standard to be used in establishing a prima facie case is flexible depending on the factual situation and the claim alleged). Under some circumstances, the fourth element can be established by presenting evidence raising an inference of discrimination. See Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 486-87 (4th Cir. 2005). “The burden of establishing a prima facie case [] is not onerous.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Of course, once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. In the event that burden of production is satisfied by the employer, the burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate the reason given for the adverse action was not the real reason, but was a sham to hide unlawful discriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

Plaintiff, a female, is unquestionably is a member of a protected group, and Plaintiff's termination from employment is an adverse employment action. Defendant only opposes the second and fourth prongs of Plaintiff's prima facie case-whether her job performance was satisfactory and whether similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment. Def. Mem. 13. Based on the reasoning below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination by meeting the four prongs above.

a) Satisfactory Job Performance

Here, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot show satisfactory job performance based on her 2018-2019 performance review. Def. Mem. 13-15. Further, Defendant represents that Plaintiff's management and leadership concerning NWHS's football program was lacking. Id. at 14. Additionally, Defendant maintains Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to dispute Mr. Massey's negative performance review other than her own opinions. Id. at 15. Plaintiff argues she had a satisfactory work performance and in support of her position, she cites to the deposition of Mr. Blake, her previous principal. Pl. Br. 19-20. Plaintiff briefly references her 2018-2019 job performance, arguing: “Mr. Massey was Plaintiff's supervisor for a single year, the 2018/19 school year, which was also his first year as a principal.” Id. at 20. Plaintiff elaborates extensively on her review in the pretext section of her brief. See Id. at 28-35.

In her 2018-2019 performance review, Plaintiff received a poor evaluation. As described above, Plaintiff met with her supervisor, Principal Massey, on July 23, 2019, and he presented her with his performance evaluation for the 2018-2019 school year. Pl. Dep. 105, ECF No. 29-3 at 282-86, Athletic Director Evaluation. Notably, this is the first formal performance review Plaintiff received while she was the AD at NWHS. See Pl. Dep. 31-32. The previous years, Plaintiff had a “self-reflection” review with the former principal, Mr. Blake. Id. The Athletic Evaluation, as developed by Dr. Kokolis, had six categories, and there were three ratings available to assign to each category. Id. The following were the available ratings and their respective definitions:

Exemplary-Characterized by consistently demonstrating performance indicators. Proficient-Characterized by typically, generally, or usually demonstrating the performance indicators with few exceptions.

Improvement needed-Characterized by inconsistently or seldom exhibiting performance indicators.

Id. at 282. Mr. Massey gave Plaintiff the following ratings in each performance standard: Vision (Proficient); Effective Management (Improvement Needed); Climate (Needs Improvement); School/Community Relations (Needs Improvement); Ethical Behavior (Needs Improvement); Interpersonal Skills (Needs Improvement). Id. at 282-86. In the “Rationale” section of the review form, Mr. Massey gave each section detailed comments. Id. Thus, Plaintiff received the lowest available rating in five of the six categories.

In her Response, Plaintiff argues she had satisfactory work performance and met or exceeded Defendant's expectations. Pl. Br. 19-20. In support of her position, Plaintiff cites to her own deposition testimony and to the testimony and opinions of other colleagues. Id. at 19-20, 29. Specifically, Plaintiff references: the testimony of her former principal, Mr. Blake; an affidavit of Bobby Page, NWHS's Director of Guidance during her tenure as well as two other NWHS colleagues; deposition testimony of Bettina Feaster, an internal auditor for the District; and an athletic director from another Rock Hill High School. Id. at 19.

In determining whether Plaintiff performed her job satisfactorily, “[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of [Plaintiff].” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff's own assessment “cannot establish a genuine issue as to whether [she] was meeting [her employer's] expectations.” King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, Plaintiff must also show that her job performance was satisfactory “at the time of the adverse employment action.” Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007). To establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was performing adequately, Plaintiff need only counter this evidence with evidence of her own demonstrating that Mr. Massey's assessment was wrong. See King, 328 F.3d at 150.

Given the Fourth Circuit's very recent guidance regarding the “reasonable expectations” prong of a similar Title VII employment-discrimination prima facie test, the undersigned finds the record includes evidence from which Plaintiff has at least raised an issue of fact as to whether her performance was satisfactory and calling into question whether Defendant's stated expectations were genuine. See Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., No. 20-2245, 2021 WL 5750450, at *3-4 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2021) (noting that, at prima facie stage, the inquiry regarding performance is not necessarily confined to the employer's perception of the employee's performance; finding an employee may establish this prong of her prima facie case by introducing evidence that raises a question of fact as to whether the employer's expectations were legitimate or genuine by pointing to positive reviews or events that took place near the time of the adverse action). Here, Plaintiff presented evidence that a performance evaluation tool, that she was emailed in May of 2019, was used during her July 2019 evaluation. Plaintiff's Dep. at 106. Further, Plaintiff testified that the email concerning the new performance review indicated that supervisors would use the tool in the forthcoming school year rather than the school year that had already passed. Id. Therefore, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that a reasonable jury could find that the performance tool used to measure Plaintiff's performance did not contain legitimate performance expectations-at least the expectations known to her during the performance of her job as AD for the 2018-2019 school year. Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the undersigned will next consider whether Plaintiff can also meet the final prong.

b) Similarly-Situated Employees

Defendant also argues Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case: that similarly-situated employees outside her protected class received more favorable treatment. Def. Mem. 15-17. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff “has not identified nor presented any evidence that the male [ADs] at the District's two other high schools were informed of the District nepotism policy because of their spouses working at their same school and still violated the policy despite that information, as Plaintiff did.” Id. at 15. Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented evidence that a male AD “received a poor performance review, had been repeatedly informed of the District nepotism policy, and later violated that policy.” Id. at 17. In response, Plaintiff argues that similarly-situated male counterparts outside her protected class received more favorable treatment because of their sex. Pl. Br. 35 at 20-21. She maintains that her male counterparts did not face the adverse employment actions that she faced. Id. Plaintiff then identifies specific actions taken by male ADs within the District for which no adverse actions were taken by the District in response. Id. Plaintiff also points to other administrators at NWHS who were directly supervised by Mr. Massey, and she identifies alleged disparate given by Mr. Massey to them. Id. at 24. However, at this point in the analysis, the undersigned need not address the arguments concerning similarly-situated employees because, as Plaintiff indicates, her position was filled by someone outside her protected class.

Details regarding would-be comparators are not necessarily required when, as here, Plaintiff has demonstrated that her position was filled by someone outside her protected class. See Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 486 (4th Cir. 2005) (“It is thus clear that the law in this circuit is that, as a general rule, Title VII plaintiffs must show that they were replaced by someone outside their protected class in order to make out a prima facie case.”); Alexander v. Carolina Fire Control Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 340, 352 (M.D. N.C. 2015) (considering whether Plaintiff demonstrated she was replaced by someone outside her protected class under the final prong of the McDonnell Douglas); Shourds v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CIV 2:16-3300-DCN-BM, 2018 WL 10716531, at *8 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-CV-3300 DCN, 2018 WL 10716532 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2018) (“Plaintiff has also failed to provide any evidence to show that female employees were treated more favorably than he was, that he was replaced by someone from outside of his protected class, or some other evidence giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”). Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has shown an inference of discrimination and thus satisfied the fourth and final prong of the prima facie case. See Ellis, 2017 WL 4349212, at *9; Kelly v. QVC, No. 5:17-CV-2858-RBH-KDW, 2018 WL 4560571, at *7 n.9 (D.S.C. May 7, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-02858-RBH, 2018 WL 3322970 (D.S.C. July 6, 2018) (noting that “a Title VII plaintiff ‘[is] not required as a matter of law to point to a similarly situated comparator in order to prevail on a discrimination claim”).

2. Legitimate/Non-discriminatory Reason for Defendant's actions

Once a plaintiff “establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to [the defendant] to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Kinser v. United Methodist Agency for the Retarded-Western North Carolina, 613 F.App'x. 209, 211, 2015 WL 3397056, at *2 (4th Cir. May 27, 2015) (citing Hill, 354 F.3d at 285); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). This is merely a burden of production, not of persuasion. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's violation of its nepotism policy and her unfavorable performance review are sufficient non-discriminatory reasons for her termination. Def. Br. 29-1 at 17-18. Therefore, the undersigned must return to and examine the purported non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination.

Defendant cites the District's 2019 audit as one of the two non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Def. Br. 29-1 at 15-16. The audit unquestionably revealed that Plaintiff made monetary payments to her husband and daughter and served as the administrator on duty during athletic events. ECF No. 29-3 at 287, Audit Summary; Plaintiff Dep. at 129-131. In the job posting for Plaintiff's position, under minimum qualifications, it indicates the AD “employs and supervises support staff for all athletic events.” ECF No. 29-3 at 208, Vacancy Notice. As indicated in the fact section above, upon Plaintiff's hiring, Plaintiff's husband moved into a teaching position so that he would not be supervised by Plaintiff. Pl. Dep. at 28-29. Thus, in citing to the results of the District's internal audit, Defendant has offered one legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff.

Next, Defendant cites to Plaintiff's 2018-2019 performance review as its other legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. In addressing Plaintiff's job performance, Defendant argues that one of Plaintiff's main roles as AD was management of all sports, particularly football. Def. Br. 29-1 at 14. Defendant represents that the NWHS football program had many issues, including a losing 2018 season. Id. Additionally, Defendant points to Coach Martin's resignation and his “citing Plaintiff's hostility as one factor for his departure.” Id. Because Defendants have set forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, Plaintiff must show Defendant's reason is pretextual.

3. Pretext

Under the burden shifting test, once the defendant meets the burden of demonstrating legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for taking its adverse action, all presumptions of discrimination disappear, and the plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reason is in actuality mere pretext for intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, Hill, 354 F.3d 277, 285. A plaintiff may satisfy this burden by producing evidence indicating that the defendant's reason was “‘unworthy of credence' or was a cover-up for unlawful discrimination.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 211 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). However, “Title VII is not a vehicle for substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer.” Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1995). Courts do not sit as “super personnel departments second guessing an employer's perceptions of an employee's qualifications.” Malghan v. Evans, 118 F.App'x. 731 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. University of N. Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 346 (4th Cir. 1980)). In fact, “the law does not require an employer to make, in the first instance, employment choices that are wise, rational, or even well-considered, as long as they are nondiscriminatory. Id. (citing Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (2d Cir. 1978)). The court's only concern is: whether the reason for which the defendant discharged the plaintiff was discriminatory. Thus, when an employer articulates a reason for discharging the plaintiff not forbidden by law, it is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiff's termination. DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court must evaluate “the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 148-49.

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's purported non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions are pretext for discrimination. Pl. Br. at 28. In her argument concerning pretext, Plaintiff again references the opinions of her colleagues in support of her assertion that her 2018-2019 performance evaluation was “baseless.” Pl. Br. at 29. Thereafter, Plaintiff offers evidence to dispute the rating she received in each of the categories of her performance review. Id. Turning to the results of the internal audit, Plaintiff argues that certain evidence shows the targeted nature of how Defendant used the audits solely to fire Plaintiff and no one else. Id. at 34. In Reply, Defendant argues that the Audit completed at NWHS was part of a district-wide audit of athletics and was not “targeted.” Def. Rep. at 6, ECF No. 39.

a) Internal Audit

In her response to Defendant's argument that results of the audit were at least one legitimate reason to terminate Plaintiff, Plaintiff argues that though the 2019 audit revealed violations at each high school, she was the only AD who was terminated. Pl. Br. at 21. Defendant acknowledges that Bill Warren, another District AD, allowed his spouse to work at three sporting events over the course of two years. Def. Br. at 16. However, Defendant argues the two situations are distinguishable because there were prior communications with Plaintiff specifically about the nepotism policy prior to the audit, including their hiring Plaintiff on the condition she followed policy. Id. Further, Defendant argues that once the nepotism policy was discussed with Warren, the other AD, he discontinued the practice of having his wife work at athletic events. Id. The undersigned agrees with Defendant and finds the two situations distinguishable, given Plaintiff's history with documenting her understanding of the District's nepotism policy. Moreover, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's cited distinction of Plaintiff (and not the other ADs) having previous communications to ensure understanding of the policy.

In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff insists that her understanding of the nepotism policy was that she could not evaluate or supervise her husband in his capacity as a teacher or a coach. Id. at 38. Questions over Plaintiff's understanding of the nepotism policy resurfaced in 2015, and several letters confirmed that efforts were taken by the District and Mr. Blake to ensure compliance with the policy. See ECF No. 29-3 at 218, Letter; ECF No. 29-3 at 219-221, Legal Opinion Letter. The November 6, 2015 letter containing legal opinions from the District's counsel references Board Policy GBEA and indicates: “The District will not place an employee in a position wherein an employee will exercise direct administrative or supervisory authority over a member of his/her family.” Id. at 219. Further, the opinion letter cites South Carolina Code Section 8-13-700 (B) that provides: No. . .public employee may knowingly use his official membership or employment to obtain an economic interest for himself, a family member, an individual with whom he is associated, or a business with which he is associated. . . .” Id. at 220. The letter further indicates that “the principal would need to authorize any payments of any kind to the husband whether for travel approval, travel reimbursement, or any other payments of any kind.” Id.

In response to the opinion letter, Mr. Blake wrote another letter to Dr. Pew on January 20, 2016, confirming that Plaintiff was made aware of the nepotism policies, specifically the Board Policy GBEA (Staff Ethics/Conflict of Interest) (hereinafter “GBEA policy”), when she was hired as AD. ECF No. 29-3 at 222. Further, Mr. Blake confirmed that “all requested purchases related to the acquisition of services and/or equipment needed for the training of our students is directed through NWHS's PE Department chair and [Mr. Blake].” Id. Plaintiff signed a letter dated February 1, 2016 indicating her awareness of the GBEA policy and her continued willingness to comply with it. ECF No. 29-3 at 308, Letter. In her arguments to the court and in her deposition testimony, Plaintiff insists that her understanding of the nepotism policy was that she could not evaluate or supervise her husband in his capacity as a teacher or a coach. Id. at 38. However, the February 1, 2016 letter she authored to Dr. Pew indicates that she was “aware of the Rock Hill School District Board of Education Policy GBEA.” ECF No. 29-3 at 308, Letter. Further, she indicated she had and would “continue to comply with this policy.” Id. Plaintiff's express representations to the District in this letter indicate that she understood the GBEA in its entirety and not simply her purported understanding of it as it was conveyed to her by Mr. Blake. Id. The GBEA expressly states that the District will not place an employee in a position wherein an employee will exercise direct administrative or supervisory authority over a member of his/her family.” ECF No. 29-3 at 223, GBEA Policy. Further, the policy provides that a public employee may not use his/her position to obtain an economic interest for him/herself, a family member, or an individual or business associate.” Id. at 224. Given Plaintiff's extensive history with the District concerning the nepotism policy, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to rebut the District's reasoning regarding why she faced a different consequence from the District's internal audit than those her male counterparts faced.

b) Plaintiff's Performance

Plaintiff maintains that her July 2019 evaluation “grasps at straws with inaccurate critiques.” Pl. Br. at 27. In addressing Plaintiff's job performance, Defendant argues that many problems existed in several sports programs under Plaintiff's leadership, particularly the football program. Def. Br. 29-1 at 14. Plaintiff argues there was not “abandonment” of the NWHS football program, and she went “above and beyond to make the program attractive to new recruits by installing a game room solely for the football team.” Pl. Br. 35 at 11. The undersigned has already addressed that the formal evaluation review tool was not sent to Plaintiff until May of 2019, at least according to Plaintiff. However, certain assessment categories were certainly under the umbrella of an AD's role, including effective management and supervision of coaching staff.

Regardless of Plaintiff's opinions or those of certain colleagues, it is clear that Coach Martin believed that Plaintiff had created a “hostile work environment.” ECF No. 29-3 at 262. In his letter of resignation, Coach Martin went so far as to express:

I remain very concerned about the deterioration of the program and the low morale of the coaches and the players, especially after losing two head coaches in the span of a year and a half. My prayers will be with the coaching staff who have to continue to endure the hostile work environment that has been created by the Athletic Director. I also pray that the coaches and players can withstand the internal erosion that the Athletic Director has brought to this program. In my 22 years of coaching, my career and my intentions have never been questioned. It is appalling to me that there are people in this world who would stoop to false accusations and bullying to remove coaches for no other reason except that they just don't like them anymore or they simply didn't win enough games to be successful in their eyes. It is unfortunate that Northwestern has become splintered and unhealthy due to these false accusations and missions to destroy my career and reputation. I pray with this resignation, I can help to save what dignity is left in the program and my career.

Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that her working relationship with Coach Martin deteriorated after the October football game against Clover and the post-game discussion in the locker room. ECF No. 29-3 at 64. Plaintiff's actions after the Clover game were discussed in her review, and by a colleague. In her review, Mr. Massey noted: “there has been a lack of consistent advocation, support and relationship development with coaches from all programs.” ECF No. 29-3 at 284, Performance Review. Mr. Massey noted the game against Clover was NWHS's first win of the season, and both the players and coaches fought hard. Id. He further expressed:

After the game [Plaintiff's] actions included a confrontational and critical discussion with coaches only minutes after arriving back to our locker room. [Plaintiff] insulted coaches' efforts, dedication and ability level by explaining to them that she was embarrassed by the performance on the field. Admittedly, [Plaintiff] broke a rule she espouses too [sic] for all coaches after events which holds that such criticism and critique of team performance should wait a minimum of 24 hrs. after the conclusion of competition to allow for emotions to settle. This critical meeting resulted in several coaches considering resignation.

Id. Mr. Massey continues by stating: “Several coaches who have departed have informed me that [Plaintiff] has rarely communicate[d] with them and has done nothing to foster positive relationships with them.” Id. Bobby Page, the NWHS guidance counselor who prepared an affidavit on Plaintiff's behalf, noted the timing of Plaintiff's post-game conference in his representations to the court. See ECF No. 35-1 at ¶¶ 28-29. He averred that he initiated a conversation with Plaintiff and suggested to her “that if future situations of that nature arise, she should consider allowing a brief period of time for all emotions to subside before having any conversations of that nature with the staff or the Head coach.” Id. at ¶ 29. Another area concerning management of sports and interpersonal relationships with coaches was cited in Plaintiff's review-specifically, Mr. Massey indicates: “[T]here was an exchange via email with our former girls' tennis coach Ms. Martin in which [Plaintiff] referred to our coach as the disgruntled wife of a head football coach. This further speaks to the creation of a hostile climate for coaches and must change.” Id. ECF No. 29-3 at 284.

The undersigned does not find Plaintiff could have legitimately been held to meeting Defendant's expectations in all categories of the performance evaluation in July of 2019. However, management of sports programs and effective working relationships with coaching staff who were under Plaintiff's supervision were certainly under the umbrella of an AD's role. In other words, effective management of sports programs and effective supervision of coaching staff were legitimate expectations of Defendant. To this end, it is the perception of Mr. Massey, Plaintiff's direct supervisor at the time of her termination, that ultimately determines whether Plaintiff was meeting legitimate expectations in those areas. The Fourth Circuit has explained that whether an employee met his employer's legitimate expectations at the time of termination depends on the “perception of the decision maker . . ., not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000); see Donaldson v. Clover Sch. Dist., No. CV 0:15-1768-MBS-KDW, 2017 WL 8897151, at *10 (D.S.C. July 24, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 0:15-1768-MBS, 2017 WL 4173596 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2017) (granting summary judgment as to ADA discrimination claim, noting employee's unprofessional conduct, which included complaints from parents of students, showed employee was not meeting legitimate expectations at time of adverse action). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that she was meeting Mr. Massey's legitimate expectations at the time of termination. She has not met this burden.

c) Replacement Hire

Throughout her brief, Plaintiff argues that Defendant used her 2018-2019 performance review as a tool to act on its discriminatory intent to fire her. Pl. Br. at 26-28. Plaintiff argues that her supervisor began looking for a replacement for her as early as October of 2018. Id. at 26 (citing ECF No. 35-1). Indeed, the affidavit of Bobby Page indicates that Mr. Massey sought out whether Page would be interested in serving in the AD role well before Plaintiff's July performance review. See id.

“In order to show pretext, a plaintiff may show that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination are inconsistent over time, false, or based on mistakes of fact. Once the plaintiff offers such circumstantial evidence, the case must be decided by a trier of fact and cannot be resolved on summary judgment.” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2001)). Evidence that Plaintiff's supervisor was putting out feelers for Plaintiff's replacement in the fall of 2018 is particularly troubling to the undersigned. Though discussions about another's interest in Plaintiff's position does not necessarily demonstrate independent evidence of discrimination, the court is mindful that there is nothing in the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that says ‘a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.'” Guessous, 828 F.3d at 220 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149). Nonetheless, the court notes that “a prima facie case of discrimination combined with evidence of pretext might fail to sustain a jury's finding of liability, in unique situations where ‘the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.'” Burgess v. Bowen, 466 Fed.Appx. 272, 277-78 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148).⁵ However, for reasons laid out below, the undersigned finds the evidence that Mr. Massey was looking for a replacement of Plaintiff well before her July 2019 review is not enough to demonstrate pretext.

5 Prior to Reeves, some circuits-including some Fourth Circuit decisions-required what was known as the “pretext-plus” standard, requiring not only that an employee-plaintiff show pretext by undercutting his or her employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, but also requiring the employee to introduce evidence that showed a “specific and discriminatory motive.” The Fourth Circuit recently reiterated that the so-called “pretext-plus” standard employed before the Reeves decision had been abrogated. An employee may show pretext by undercutting his employer's justification for termination or other adverse action. The employee is not also required to introduce evidence that shows a “specific and discriminatory motive.” Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 727 (4th Cir. 2019).

Though Plaintiff has presented evidence of Mr. Massey's early interest in finding her replacement, it does not appear that Mr. Massey was the decisionmaker in this instance. Through deposition testimony, Dr. Campbell explained that Superintendent Cook is the ultimate decision maker concerning terminations. Campbell Dep. 95-98, ECF No. 29-4 at 96-101. She testified that in termination decisions she, along with Dr. Kokolis, will make a recommendation to Dr. Cook, and specific reasons concerning why a recommendation is being made are not shared with Dr. Cook initially. Id. Rather, she testified that more information is shared regrading recommendations when and if the employee requests a pre-termination meeting. Id.

Dr. Campbell testified that after the audit results came to her attention, she decided to meet with Plaintiff and give her an opportunity to provide feedback. Id. at 103-04. Dr. Campbell testified that after receiving feedback from Plaintiff, she then decided to place Plaintiff on administrative leave and recommend her termination to Dr. Cook. Id. The July 31, 2019 letter from Dr. Campbell, indicating the District's decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave, informed Plaintiff that the action was taken because of “concerns related to violation of policies GBEA and DM.” ECF No. 29-3 at 297, Leave Letter. The August 5, 2019 letter from Dr. Campbell confirming that Plaintiff would be terminated indicates that Plaintiff's actions were particularly concerning “given the significant efforts the District administration made to ensure that [Plaintiff] conducted [herself] at all time consistent with State law and Board Policy GBEA (Staff Code of Ethics).” Id. at 299.

Mr. Massey testified that he never provided any District administrators with a recommendation regarding whether Plaintiff should go on administrative leave or be terminated. Massey Dep. at 115, ECF No. 29-13 at 116. Rather, he testified he was “informed that she would be placed on admin [sic] leave.” Id. Nothing in the evidence before the court ties Mr. Massey to the decision to terminate Plaintiff. Thus, to the extent he was seeking to replace Plaintiff as AD, this evidence alone is not enough to establish pretext. Moreover, the undersigned notes that Dr. Campbell, the District administrator who recommended Plaintiff be terminated, is also a member of Plaintiff's protected class. Though this fact is not outcome determinative, as Defendant points out, it “substantially weakens any inference that Dr. Campbell made decisions regarding Plaintiff based on her sex.” ECF No. 29-1 at 18; see e.g., Stewart v. Gestamp S.C. LLC, No. 7:17-CV-1023-TMC, 2018 WL 3454786, at *3 (D.S.C. July 18, 2018), aff'd, 754 Fed.Appx. 202 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[A]ny possible inference of race-based discrimination is weakened by the fact that the decision-maker as to Plaintiff's discipline and termination is the same race as Plaintiff.”).

At this stage, Plaintiff's burden is “to produce sufficient evidence upon which one could find that the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer's decision.” Guessous, 828 F.3d at 221 (internal citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff need only ‘show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer's motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer's decision.” Id. at 216-17 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 2523 (2013)). In sum, considering all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to present a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for terminating her when it did was pretextual. Rather, the District presented sufficient evidence indicating it had at least two legitimate/non-discriminatory reasons (the results of the internal audit and Plaintiff's failure to meet certain legitimate expectations as discussed above) for terminating Plaintiff that were not tied to any input or recommendation of Mr. Massey, Plaintiff's supervisor. It is not the court's job to comment on whether these reasons were fair. Rather, the court must determine whether a protected trait motivated an employer's decision to take adverse action against a plaintiff. Here, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the legitimate reasons Defendant offered in support of terminating Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's failure to rebut same. Therefore, Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim fails, and the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim for discrimination.

B. Mixed-Motive Framework

Plaintiff also argues that a mixed-motive analysis is appropriate here, arguing that taken together the pieces of evidence she presents suggest that she was the target of sex discrimination. Pl. Br. at 26.⁶Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the following pieces of evidence indicate a genuine issue of material fact that gender discrimination motivated Defendant's actions: (1) evidence that reveals a pattern of her supervisor, Mr. Massey, treating males in the athletic department more favorably than females; (2) Plaintiff was singled out for disparate treatment by Mr. Massey for reasons unrelated to her job performance; (3) Mr. Massey issued Plaintiff a grossly inaccurate performance evaluation after she complained about disparate treatment; and (4) Mr. Page testified that Mr. Massey repeatedly sought to replace Plaintiff even before there was any purported legitimate basis to do so, as early as October of 2018. Id.

6 Notably, Defendant does not address Plaintiff's mixed-motive framework argument in its brief arguing for summary judgment. Defendant briefly references the argument in its Reply. There, Defendant argues: Plaintiff's Response states that a community member at a church basketball game told her Massey said, ‘What does a female know about football?'” Reply at 6. Defendant argues this statement is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be asserted to defeat summary judgment. Id. The court notes that Plaintiff does not reference this purported statement in the mixed-motive analysis section of her brief. Therefore, the undersigned has not considered the statement in its analysis.

Under the “mixed motive” framework, a plaintiff can establish a claim of sex discrimination by showing that her gender was a motivating factor in her employer's decision to fire her, “even though it was not the sole motivating factor.” Warch, 435 F.3d at 520 (citation omitted); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) (requiring a plaintiff to offer sufficient evidence so that a reasonable jury could conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action). To avoid summary judgment under this framework, the plaintiff “must produce direct evidence of a stated purpose to discriminate and/or [indirect] evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact.” Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003). The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that “[r]egardless of the type of evidence offered by a plaintiff as support for her discrimination claim (direct, circumstantial, or evidence of pretext), or whether she proceeds under a mixed-motive or single-motive theory, ‘[t]he ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.'” Hill, 354 F.3d at 286 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000)). The Hill court further stated,

To demonstrate such an intent to discriminate on the part of the employer, an individual alleging disparate treatment based upon a protected trait must produce sufficient evidence upon which one could find that “the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer's decision.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). The protected trait “must have actually played a role in the employer's decisionmaking process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins ], 490 U.S. [228, ] 277 (1989) ] (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “statements by nondecision makers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself [do not] suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's burden” of proving discrimination); Koski v. Standex Int'l Corp., 307 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the pertinent inquiry is whether the decision maker, as opposed to other managers or subordinates, evaluated the aggrieved employee based upon discriminatory criteria).

Id.

Without expounding on how she was treated differently than other males in the NWHS athletic department, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Massey treated males in the athletic department more favorably than females. Evidence indicates that at times former football Coach Martin bypassed Plaintiff in communicating with Principal Massey. However, there is no indication that the direct contact occurred because of Plaintiff's gender-rather, the undersigned finds the admitted turmoil between Plaintiff and Coach Martin warranted any bypass that occurred. Further, outside of some direct communications between Mr. Massey and Coach Martin, there is no indication that Plaintiff was ever omitted from communications between Mr. Massey and other coaches. Plaintiff also takes issue with her performance evaluation which has been discussed already in this Report, as well as Mr. Massey's “disparate” treatment of her.

Finally, regarding Mr. Massey's communications with Mr. Page about his interest in becoming an AD, the undersigned already addressed the effect of this evidence in the pretext analysis above. Further, the undersigned does not find this is “evidence” of gender discrimination. Based on the evidence before the court, it appears that Plaintiff, coaches, and Mr. Massey sought Mr. Page's counsel during times of conflict, including after the Clover game. See ECF No. 35-1. Further, it appears, Mr. Page was a tenured teacher, coach, and guidance counselor. See Id. There is no indication that Mr. Massey ever referred to Plaintiff's gender or commented on it. See Id. In support of her argument, Plaintiff relies on the case of Strothers v. City of Laurel, Maryland, 895 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2018), a race discrimination case. The Strothers case mainly concerned a hostile work environment case, and there was evidence of a disclosure that a supervisor “wanted to hire someone of a different race.” Id. at 329. Here, there has never been any mention of Plaintiff's gender by Mr. Massey or a District administrator, and the undersigned finds Strothers distinguishable from the case at hand.

The only pieces of evidence Plaintiff has that at all indicate any possible discrimination occurred include her replacement by a male and discussions with a tenured coach and guidance counselor about his possible interest in becoming an AD. Plaintiff has already been given the benefit of the presumption of discrimination in the McDonnell Douglas analysis above. In response, Defendant has put forth legitimate reasons, as indicated above, to rebut any presumption of discrimination on this point. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to offer the court any evidence indicating that her gender played a role in her termination that was ultimately decided by District administrators. Therefore, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was the victim of intentional discrimination.

Moreover, even if the undersigned were to presume gender animus on the part of Mr. Massey, Plaintiff cannot prevail under her mixed-motive theory because she has failed to present sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that he was the actual decisionmaker or the one principally responsible for the District's decision to terminate her. It is undisputed that Dr. Campbell and Dr. Kokolis made the recommendation to the District superintendent that Plaintiff be terminated. It is further undisputed that Dr. Cook made the final decision to terminate Plaintiff only after an in-person meeting with Plaintiff, Mr. Massey, and other District administrators.

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Massey or the District were motivated to remove Plaintiff based on gender. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff's mixed-motive framework theory of gender discrimination.

C. Title VII retaliation claims

Next, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claims. Title VII proscribes discrimination against an employee because, in relevant part, she “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Employees engage in protected oppositional activity when, inter alia, they “complain to their superiors about suspected violations of Title VII.” Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2003). When, as here, direct evidence is lacking, a plaintiff may produce circumstantial evidence and proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (confirming the McDonnell Douglas framework remains appropriate when Title VII retaliation plaintiff is not proceeding under direct-evidence theory). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in contravention of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that she engaged in a protected activity,' as well as ‘(2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her,' and ‘(3) that there was a causal link between the two events.'” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting EEOC v. Navy Fed., 424 F.3d 397, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2005)). In determining whether something is a protected activity, “an employee is protected when she opposes ‘not only . . . employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions [she] reasonably believes to be unlawful.'” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282 (quoting Navy Fed., 424 F.3d at 406). Further, the purported Title VII violation “may be complete, or it may be in progress.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282. An employee seeking protection from retaliation must have an “objectively reasonable belief in light of all the circumstances that a Title VII violation has happened or is in progress.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to establish a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer sets forth a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action, the plaintiff then bears the burden of showing the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual or her claim will fail. See Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). In the Title VII retaliation context, the successful plaintiff must prove that “but-for” the retaliatory motive the adverse employment action would not have taken place. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr., v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346-52 (2013). In Foster, the Fourth Circuit clarified that the but-for causation standard is not applied at the prima facie stage; rather, the but-for causation requirement is part of plaintiff's proof at the pretext stage. 787 F.3d at 252. As the Guessous court noted, too, the “Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a cause need not work in isolation to be a but-for cause. Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881, 888, (2014) (‘Thus, if poison is administered to a man debilitated by multiple diseases, it is a but-for cause of his death even if those diseases played a part in his demise, so long as, without the incremental effect of the poison, he would have lived.')).” Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217.

Plaintiff seeks to prove her case using the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Pl. Mem. 15-35. To show her prima facie case, Plaintiff must establish she participated in protected activity, Defendant took an adverse employment action against her, and there was a causal link between the two. Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 281. Plaintiff argues that she engaged in protected activity on July 30, 2019, when she filed a written memorandum, asserting she was being subjected to gender discrimination. Pl. Mem. 15-16. Plaintiff argues her lawyer, on her behalf, informed Defendant that such actions were in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 16. Further, Plaintiff argues that her “first protected activity to Mr. Massey” was when she opposed a male football coach referring to her as a “bitch.” Id. (citing Massey Dep. at 23-25). Finally, Plaintiff claims that she engaged in protected activity in a communication with the District's HR Director, Dr. Campbell. Id. (citing ECF No. 29-3 at 77). Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish she participated in a protected activity or, even if she could, she cannot show the complained-of actions were adverse or that they were causally related to such participation. Def. Mem. 18-22; Reply 7-9. The undersigned will address each of Plaintiff's allegedly protected activities in turn.

a) Protected activity

In considering whether Plaintiff has satisfied the protected-activity prong of her prima facie case, the undersigned notes the Fourth Circuit's recent expansion of the scope of what may be considered a protected activity in the Title VII retaliation context. In Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282, the court “made clear that [courts] should [] interpret ‘unlawful employment practice' [in the protected-activity realm] broadly.” DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416-21 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282). As explained in Boyer-Liberto, decisions from the United States Supreme Court require that “Title VII [] be read ‘to provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for [even] victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-based, or gender-based discrimination,' because ‘effective enforcement could . . . only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances.'” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 283 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66-67 (2006)).

Defendant argues Plaintiff's March 26, 2019 email to Dr. Campbell is not protected activity because she did not complain that she was being treated differently based on her protected status as a female. Def. Mem. 20-21; Reply 7. In her email to Dr. Campbell, Plaintiff represents that she had been “completely eliminated from the chain of command with regards to the NHS football program since October 8th (2018) by Mr. Massey.” ECF No. 29-3 at 256, Email. The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the email and agrees with Defendant-that Plaintiff does not indicate or imply that she is being treated differently because of her gender. See Id. Rather, she is providing Dr. Campbell with information about the weight-lifting incident, meetings, and Mr. Massey's management style. Id. Accordingly, the undersigned does not find that Plaintiff has satisfied the protected-activity prong of her prima facie case. See e.g., Landino v. Sapp, 520 Fed.Appx. 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2013); Albero v. City of Salisbury, 422 F.Supp.2d 549, 560 n. 43 (D. Md. 2006) (“Making general workplace complaints is not protected activity.”); Sung Kun Kim v. Panetta, 2012 WL 3600288, at * 17 (E.D. Va. Aug. 21, 2012) (“Protected activity does not include generalized employment-related complaints unrelated to Title VII prohibited discrimination.”).

Next, Plaintiff argues that she engaged in protected activity by telling her direct supervisor, Mr. Massey, that a coach called her a “bitch.” Pl. Mem. at 16. In his deposition testimony, Mr. Massey testified that a coach referring to Plaintiff as a “bitch” was brought to his attention during basketball season. See Massey Dep. at 23-24, ECF No. 29-13 at 24-25. Mr. Massey testified that in response to learning that the assistant coach used this term, he required that the coach provide him with a written account of what transpired, and Mr. Massey then had a meeting with the coach. Id. at 24-25. Mr. Massey represented that the coach using the term was “verbally reprimanded during our meeting and told, of course, that was inappropriate ..... ” Id. at 25.

Plaintiff has not presented evidence that she complained of Mr. Surratt's derogatory comment to a supervisor, or specifically to Mr. Massey. Rather, the evidence presented to the court, including Plaintiff's deposition testimony, indicates that Mr. Massey learned of the comment after an investigation revealed it to him. See Pl. Dep. at 80-82, ECF No. 29-3 at 80 (where Plaintiff indicates that written statements were gathered indicating the term was used); Massey Dep. at 23-24, ECF No. 29-13 at 24-25 (where Mr. Massey testifies that he learned of Surratt's use of the derogatory comment during basketball season after he received documents during an investigation). Further, Defendant argues Mr. Massey and Plaintiff discussed the derogatory comment in her July 2019 performance review. See Reply at 7-8, ECF No. 39. Defendant confirms that Plaintiff did not report the name calling to Mr. Massey in meetings, interactions, or written correspondences with him. See ECF No. 35-8 at 35-37, Transcript of performance review. Accordingly, the evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff complained to her supervisor about the derogatory name calling, or otherwise engaged in protected activity. Moreover, as Defendant argues, there is no evidence the record that Plaintiff's purported complaint to a superior regarding the name calling caused Defendant to act adversely against her. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352 (2013); see also Foster v. Univ. of Maryland Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that “Nassar . . . held that a successful retaliation plaintiff must prove that retaliatory animus was a but-for cause of the challenged adverse employment action.”). Accordingly, considering all evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff the undersigned finds Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient evidence to establish the first prong of her prima facie retaliation case.

b) Causal Link and Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason

Finally, the undersigned turns to the most recent and final alleged protected activity-her July 30, 2019 email. As Plaintiff represents, Defendant does not contest that this communication is protected under Title VII. See Def. Mem. at 21. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a causal connection between this communication and her termination. Id. In other words, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the email was a motivating factor in her termination, much less the “but-for” cause for it. Id. Defendant indicates that the July 23, 2019 meeting, when Plaintiff was asked to respond to the results of the internal audit, led to the decision to put Plaintiff on administrative leave. Id. at 22. In contrast, Plaintiff argues: “Defendant's placement of Plaintiff on administrative leave and thereafter her termination establishes a close temporal proximity and thereby causal connection between Plaintiff engaging in her protected activity and the adverse employment actions suffered by Plaintiff.” Pl. Br. at 17.

Accordingly, the court now considers whether Plaintiff has established a causal connection between her protected activity (the July 30, 2019 email) and the decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave on July 31, 2019. While Defendant urges the court to apply a “but-for causation” standard at the prima facie stage, the burden for establishing causation at the prima facie stage is actually “less onerous” than the but-for burden for establishing causation at the pretext stage. Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015). Although the Supreme Court held in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar that “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, ” 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013), the Fourth Circuit has since held that an employee need not show “that [her] protected activities were but-for causes of the adverse action” at the prima facie stage. Strothers, 895 F.3d at 335 (citing Foster, 787 F.3d at 251) (holding that, even after Nassar, but-for causation in a Title VII retaliation case must be shown only at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework)).

Under this less-onerous standard, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie causal link when the alleged adverse action takes place soon after the employer becomes aware of the protected activity. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting that “temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action” must be “very close” to raise an inference of causation); see Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding causation where employee's demotion occurred fewer than six months after he filed complaint of racial discrimination). Conversely, a “lengthy time lapse . . . negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two.” Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that three years is too long to show causation). Here, in considering Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, prima-facie causation has been shown based on the timing of when Plaintiff sent the email and when the adverse action to place her on administrative leave occurred. This does not end the analysis, however. The court must consider the pretext portion of the analysis.

c) Pretext analysis

Because Defendant has articulated lawful, non-retaliatory reasons for firing her, Plaintiff must establish that the District's proffered explanation is pretext. A “plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the [defendant's] explanation is unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of retaliation.” Price, 380 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff is entitled to a trial on the merits only if “she establishes a factual record permitting a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that it is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was the product of . . . retaliation.” Darvishian v. Geren, 404 Fed.Appx. 822, 828 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not carried this burden. She has “not demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, or inconsistencies in [the District's] proffered reasons for [her] removal that a reasonable fact-finder could find those reasons unworthy of credence.” Nor has she offered “other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of retaliation.” Price, 380 F.3d at 212. Based on the testimony regarding the meetings and recommendations (as more fully described below) of District administrators, it appears to the undersigned that Plaintiff's email, alleging she was the target of gender discrimination, did not cause her termination.

Because the analysis for determining whether an employee reasonably believes a practice is unlawful is an objective one, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law. See Clark C'nty Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (per curiam) (resolving the objective reasonableness of Title VII plaintiff's beliefs through the summary judgment procedure). To establish its legitimate cause for Plaintiff's termination, or rather the timing of it, Defendant points to the deposition testimony of Dr. Campbell. Dr. Campbell testified that Plaintiff never discussed being treated differently because of her gender with Dr. Campbell. Campbell Dep. at 95, ECF No. 29-4 at 96, 101. Dr. Campbell explained that Superintendent Cook is the ultimate decision maker concerning terminations. Id. at 98. She testified that she, along with Dr. Kokolis, will make a recommendation to Dr. Cook, and specific reasons concerning why a recommendation is being made are not shared with Dr. Cook initially. Id. Rather, she testified that more information is shared regarding recommendations when and if the employee requests a pre-termination meeting. Id.

Dr. Campbell testified that after the audit results came to her attention, she decided to meet with Plaintiff and give her an opportunity to provide feedback. Id. at 103-04. Dr. Campbell testified that after receiving feedback from Plaintiff, she then decided to place Plaintiff on administrative leave and recommend her termination to Dr. Cook. Id. Furthermore, Dr. Campbell testified that at the time she and Dr. Kokolis decided to place Plaintiff on administrative leave, she had no knowledge of Plaintiff complaining that Mr. Massey was discriminating against her based on her gender. Id. at 119-20. When specifically asked when she first decided to recommend that Plaintiff be terminated, Dr. Campbell testified it was “the day of the recording [of Plaintiff's performance review]” after she presented Plaintiff with the audit summary and allowed her to respond to it. Id. at 84. As indicated, July 23, 2019, was the date Plaintiff met with Mr. Massey, Dr. Campbell, and Dr. Kokolis to discuss her review and the audit results.

The July 31, 2019 letter from Dr. Campbell, indicating the District's decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave, informed Plaintiff that the action was taken because of “concerns related to violation of policies GBEA and DM.” ECF No. 29-3 at 297, Leave Letter. The August 5, 2019 letter from Dr. Campbell confirming that Plaintiff would be terminated indicates that Plaintiff's actions were particularly concerning “given the significant efforts the District administration made to ensure that [Plaintiff] conducted [herself] at all time consistent with State law and Board Policy GBEA (Staff Code of Ethics).” Id. at 299.

There is no evidence before the court indicating that Dr. Campbell had knowledge that Plaintiff lodged a complaint about disparate treatment because of her gender prior to July 23, 2019, or any time leading up to her recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated. Rather, all evidence demonstrates that Dr. Campbell and Dr. Kokolis decided to recommend terminating Plaintiff prior to her July 30, 2019 email, and this decision was upheld by Dr. Cook. It appears that the District administrators did not look lightly on the audit results given their history of documenting Plaintiffs awareness of the nepotism policy. Because the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that her termination was the product of an email she sent, or, stated differently, that a reasonable jury could not find that Plaintiff probably was fired for retaliatory purposes, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiffs cause of action for retaliation. IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 29, be granted as to Title VII discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims and this case be dismissed.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”