Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-02-010
Date Submitted: June 10, 2002
Date Received: November 14, 2002
Joanne West
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire
Dear Ms. West and Mr. Nolte:
Pending before the Court is an appeal from an Industrial Accident Board ("Board") decision denying Jo Ann West's ("Claimant") Petition to Determine Additional Compensation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the Board's decision.
Some of the facts recited herein were obtained from the prior Superior Court decision on this matter. See West v. Ponderosa Steak House, Del. Super., C.A. No. 97A-02-005, Graves, J. (May 13, 1998).
On October 14, 1992, Claimant, while working for Employer, lost her footing as she was leaving Employer's kitchen and landed on her tailbone. Claimant attempted to grab onto a counter leg to hoist herself up, but her hand slipped and she injured her elbow and left hand. Claimant suffered various injuries as a result of the fall. After consulting with her attorney, Claimant signed agreements as to compensation and their accompanying receipts with Employer.
In late 1995, Claimant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due with the Board. In this petition, Claimant alleged first, that she had suffered a change in circumstances which warranted total disability payments and second, that Claimant was entitled to reimbursement by Employer for several medical bills which Employer had declined to pay. The Board heard testimony on this petition on November 4, 1996, and issued an opinion which denied Claimant's requests. Claimant appealed that decision to Superior Court and I affirmed the Board's decision as to both counts on May 13, 1998.
The basis of the present appeal before the Court is a second Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due that Claimant filed with the Board on November 5, 2001. Employer raised two defenses to the petition. As its first defense, Employer relied on 19 Del. C. § 2361(b) which reads:
Where payments of compensation have been made in any case under an agreement approved by the Board or by an award of the Board, no statute of limitation shall take effect until the expiration of 5 years from the time of the making of the last payment for which a proper receipt has been filed with the Department [of Labor].
In the alternative, Employer argued that any amount due to Claimant must be reduced in light of the previous litigation. The hearing officer ordered the case dismissed in light of Claimant's failure to file her petition within five years of Employer's last payment of benefits. Claimant appeals from this order.
A hearing officer presided over the case pursuant to the parties' consent. Her decision has the same authority and is subject to judicial review on the same basis as a decision rendered by the Board.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Essentially, Claimant challenges whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. Specifically, Claimant argues that the Board improperly rejected her petition because it issued its opinion prior to her submission of relevant evidence. Employer has filed a Motion to Affirm the decision below.
See Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 85A-NO-9, Bifferato, J. (Sept. 24, 1986) at 3 (Superior Court may characterize claimant's arguments to comport with the law to exhibit leniency toward a pro se litigant so that her case may be fully and fairly heard).
Claimant also argues that the Board erroneously denied Claimant's claim of permanent disability in its previous order. Claimant had an opportunity to challenge the Board's findings in her first appeal to this Court; the Court will not revisit those findings.
Superior Court Civil Rule 72.1, which permitted expedited procedures for appeals on the record and authorized the filing of motions to affirm, was deleted in 2001. Under the facts presented, Employer's Motion to Affirm will be treated as its Answering Brief. Claimant filed a Reply Brief and was otherwise provided a full and fair opportunity to present her case to the Court.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of ReviewThe Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 312 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960), and to review questions of law de novo, In re Beattie, 180 A.2d 741, 744 (Del.Super. 1962). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battisa v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.), app. dism., 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 29 Del. C. § 10142(d).
B. Statute of Limitation
The hearing officer dismissed Claimant's petition because she determined that Claimant was unable to prove Employer made any payments after October of 1993. Claimant testified at the hearing that she remembered Employer making payments in 1994 and perhaps 1995. She conceded that no bills were paid after 1995. The hearing officer thus concluded that, at the latest, the statute of limitation would have run in the year 2000.
The hearing officer issued her opinion two days after the January 16, 2002, hearing. Claimant argues the hearing officer thus prevented her from submitting relevant evidence to the Board within fourteen days. The argument is without merit. First, absent an express reservation to the contrary, the termination of the Board hearing operates as the close of evidence. The hearing officer did not indicate that she was providing Claimant with additional time to submit evidence. Second, Claimant has failed to demonstrate she possessed evidence that would have altered the facts as they were presented to the Board. Claimant filed with the Court numerous medical bills which presumably constitute the evidence she desired to present to the Board. The Court does not doubt that Claimant has incurred medical expenses after 1995. However, the relevant question is whether Employer has paid any bills for which a receipt has been filed with the Department of Labor within the last five years. The hearing officer found the final receipt of payment was filed with the Board in late 1993. Claimant presented no evidence below to challenge this finding nor has she submitted such evidence to the Court. As such, the statute of limitation began to run in late 1993.
At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer indicated that she would issue an opinion within fourteen days.
In 1993 when this payment was made, 19 Del. C. § 2361(b) required the filing of the receipt with the Board. A subsequent amendment to the statute now requires that the receipt be filed with the Department of Labor.
I find it interesting that this last receipt was not provided to the Court. However, Claimant does not dispute the receipt's filing nor the time at which it was filed.
19 Del. C. § 2361(b) places the burden on claimants to pursue the payment of their medical bills within five years from any order or Board-approved agreement directing the employer to pay such expenses. The running of the statute of limitations prevents the Board and this Court from hearing her claims regarding Employer's failure to pay the medical bills from her neck injury.
CONCLUSION
After a review of the record, the Court is satisfied that the hearing officer's findings and conclusion are supported by substantial evidence and are free from legal error. For the foregoing reasons, the Board's decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.