A party moving to compel production carries the initial burden of establishing that the requested documents are relevant. West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1993)). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to show the impropriety of the request. Id. at *7.
A party moving to compel production carries the initial burden of establishing that the requested documents are relevant. West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1993)). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to show the impropriety of the request.
In any event, this argument goes to the weight of the evidence in establishing bias and is an insufficient basis to bar discovery of the evidence. Plaintiffs' reliance on West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (Doc. 418, at 16), in making this argument, is misplaced. West concerned how the passage of time could affect market value, not bias.
Eternity Mart, Inc. v. Nature's Sources, LLC, 2019 WL 6052366, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Washtenaw Cty. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Walgreen Co., 2017 WL 1545764, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Omnireps, LLC v. Add-On Computer Peripherals, LLC, 2017 WL 11569214, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2017); West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2006). As can be seen from the foregoing chart, in every instance, plaintiff went about doing this by explaining that its request was relevant to its copyright claim.
Despite the liberal breadth of discovery allowed under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden to prove that the information sought is relevant. See e.g. West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006); see alsoUnited States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir.1993) (“Since the documents at issue are not relevant to the controversy before us, Farley cannot, as a matter of law, make a showing of need.”) District courts enjoy broad discretion when considering motions to compel.
In re Sulfuric Acid, 231 F.R.D. 331, 333 (N.D. Ill. 2005). "On assessing delay of a moving party, 'courts usually focus on three questions: (i) how long was the delay; (ii) was there an explanation for it; and (iii) what happened during the delay.'" West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). An untimely motion to compel may still be granted "if the party demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice resulting from the denial of discovery."
A party moving to compel production carries the initial burden of establishing, with specificity, that the requested documents are relevant. West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (citing United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1993)). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to show the impropriety of the request.
"On assessing delay of a moving party, courts usually focus on three questions: (i) how long was the delay; (ii) was there an explanation for it; and (iii) what happened during the delay." West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 11, 2006). Here, Defendants learned of the records in question on July 25, 2017, and put Plaintiff’s on notice the same day that they would be requesting the records.
en heard 30 days before [the discovery] cutoff in order for discovery to be completed by the cutoff."); Lacy v. American Biltrite, Inc., 2012 WL 909309 at *8 (S.D. Cal., March 16, 2012) ("the discovery cutoff includes hearings on motions to compel and discovery ordered as a result of a motion to compel"); Everett v. Aldi, Inc., 2009 WL 940379 (N.D. Ind., Apr. 6, 2009) (Noting that "several district courts have articulated that '[w]here a party has waited to bring a motion to compel until the eve of a discovery deadline, the court is justified in denying the motion'") (internal citations omitted); Ridge Chrysler Jeep L.L.C. v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. N. Am., L.L.C., 2004 WL 3021842, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec.30, 2004) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff filed it four days before the close of discovery and failed to file a Local Rule 37.1 statement); In re Sulfuric Acid, 231 F.R.D. at 332-42 (denying motion to compel in part where it was filed on the last day of the discovery period); West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug.11, 2006) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff filed it eleven days before the discovery deadline and other factors, such as months of discovery inaction, indicated undue delay); Grey v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 265 Fed.Appx. 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (In this unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to compel discovery when "it was filed on the day of the discovery deadline after an extensive discovery period.") Each of the Parties' Motions is noticed for hearing on the last day of discovery.
See, e.g., Ridge Chrysler Jeep LLC v. Daimler Chrysler Services North America, LLC, 2004 WL 3021842 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2004) ("The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Compel [four days] in advance of the discovery deadline. However, they filed it so late as to make it impossible to conduct the requested discovery within the discovery period."); West v. Miller, 2006 WL 2349988 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006) (finding undue delay that constituted a waiver when a motion to compel was filed eleven days before the discovery deadline but the movant knew of the discovery issue two months prior). Additionally, other courts have found lengthy delays before moving to compel to be dilatory.