Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 17-0087 No. 1 CA-JV 17-0350 (Consolidated)
10-12-2017
CHRISTOPHER W., Appellant, v. MALLORY M., G.W., Appellees.
COUNSEL Christopher W., Littleton, Colorado Appellant Pro Per The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale By Christopher Stavris Advisory Counsel for Appellant Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Phoenix By Keith Berkshire, Maxwell Mahoney Counsel for Appellee Mallory M.
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS517296
The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Christopher W., Littleton, Colorado
Appellant Pro Per The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Christopher Stavris
Advisory Counsel for Appellant Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Phoenix
By Keith Berkshire, Maxwell Mahoney
Counsel for Appellee Mallory M.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge John C. Gemmill joined. JONES, Judge:
The Honorable John C. Gemmill, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 6, Sections 3 and 20, of the Arizona Constitution.
¶1 Christopher W. (Father) appeals the juvenile court's orders terminating his parental rights to G.W. (Child) and denying his motion for new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citing Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008)).
¶2 Child was born in Nebraska in January 2015. At the time, Father had just begun serving a 5.83-year term in a Colorado federal prison for charges related to the distribution of methamphetamine. Child's mother (Mother) was also incarcerated and granted Child's maternal aunt, Mallory M. (Aunt), permission to care for Child. Aunt and Child visited family in Montana for a few weeks and then returned to Aunt's home in Arizona, where the two have since resided.
¶3 Father initiated the Arizona litigation regarding this matter when he filed a petition to establish paternity in an Arizona family court in February 2015. Two months later, Aunt filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate Father's parental rights to Child on the grounds of abandonment, substance abuse, and length of incarceration. Within the petition, Aunt indicated she had Mother's consent to adopt Child and intended to do so upon termination of Father's parental rights. At a contested severance hearing in February 2017, Aunt presented evidence that Father had been incarcerated for the entirety of Child's life, had never met Child, and would not be released for another two and a half years.
¶4 After taking the matter under advisement, the juvenile court entered an order finding Aunt proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father had been convicted of a felony and would be incarcerated for a length of time that would deprive Child of a normal home for a period of years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(4). The court also found severance was in Child's best interests and entered an order terminating Father's parental rights. After Father timely appealed the termination order, Father filed a motion for new trial. The juvenile court denied the motion after concluding it did not have jurisdiction to take further action while the matter was on appeal. Father then appealed the order disposing of his motion for new trial. This Court previously consolidated Father's appeals, and we have jurisdiction to consider them pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), (5)(a), -2102(B), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A).
Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version.
DISCUSSION
I. Due Process
¶5 Father argues his due process rights were violated because his counsel was ineffective. Father argues his attorneys were ineffective because they disregarded his direction to collect and present evidence indicating: (1) he and Mother intended for Child to be raised by paternal family members, not Aunt, while they both were incarcerated, and (2) Mother unilaterally released Child to Aunt without his knowledge or consent. These materials, totaling more than six hundred pages, were not presented to the juvenile court but are included in an appendix to Father's opening brief, and he now moves to add them to the record on appeal.
¶6 Reversal of an order terminating parental rights may be justified "by inadequacy of counsel" if the parent can show "both incompetence and prejudice." John M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 320, 325, ¶¶ 17-18 (App. 2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), and Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 578 (App. 1989)). Father has shown neither.
¶7 Father erroneously believes Aunt's assumption of Child's care without his permission nullifies the petition for termination of his paternal rights. But, as detailed below, those circumstances are irrelevant to Aunt's standing to file the petition, the juvenile court's jurisdiction to consider it, and whether Father's incarceration deprives Child of a normal home for a period of years. See infra Parts II through IV.
¶8 The facts Father seeks to prove through introduction of the materials contained in his appendix have no bearing on our analysis of the issues presented on appeal. Therefore, we can say neither that counsels' conduct fell below the standard of care, nor that Father has been prejudiced by the omission of these materials. For these reasons, we deny Father's motion to supplement the record and find no due process violation or reversible error.
II. Standing
¶9 Father challenges Aunt's standing to petition for termination of his parental rights. A party's standing to initiate an action presents a question of law we review de novo. State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 242 Ariz. 325, 329, ¶ 7 (App. 2017) (citing Pawn 1st, L.L.C. v. City of Phx., 231 Ariz. 309, 311, ¶ 11 (App. 2013)). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain language "unless such an application will lead to absurd or impossible results." Tanya K. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 154, 156, ¶ 5 (App. 2016) (quoting Grubaugh v. Blomo ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 238 Ariz. 264, 266, ¶ 6 (App. 2015)).
¶10 Father contends Aunt does not have standing to petition for termination of his parental rights because she did not have "lawful possession" of Child. But custody is not a prerequisite to filing such a petition; pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(A), "[a]ny person or agency that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child, including, but not limited to, a relative, [or] a foster parent . . . may file a petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship." Aunt is both a relative and foster parent of Child, has cared for Child since birth, and has a legitimate interest in Child's welfare by virtue of those roles as well as her desire to adopt Child. Moreover, Aunt's filing is consistent with the statute's purpose: "to provide for both voluntary and involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship and for substitution of parental care and supervision" compatible with the parent's rights and the child's welfare. Hernandez v. State ex rel. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 23 Ariz. App. 32, 36 (1975) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude Aunt was authorized to file the petition.
Father also argues the juvenile court erred, or "exhibited bias and prejudice against [him]," by failing to hold a hearing to determine Aunt's standing. However, Father does not dispute that Aunt is Child's relative and foster parent and desires to adopt Child. Furthermore, given the broad language of the statute authorizing "any person . . . that has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child" to file a petition, no hearing was necessary to evaluate Aunt's standing, and we find no abuse of discretion. See State v. Tuggle, 101 Ariz. 216, 219 (1966) (finding no abuse of discretion in the failure to hold a hearing where the record revealed no circumstances requiring the taking of evidence) (citing State v. Thomas, 81 Ariz. 124, 126 (1956)).
III. Jurisdiction
¶11 Father argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights. "Whether the superior court had jurisdiction to sever Father's parental rights is a question of law this court reviews de novo." Angel B. v. Vanessa J., 234 Ariz. 69, 71, ¶ 6 (App. 2014) (citing Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 36 (App. 2001), and David S. v. Audilio S., 201 Ariz. 134, 136, ¶ 4 (App. 2001)).
¶12 This Court has previously held that Arizona's "exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions to terminate the parent-child relationship when the child involved is present in the state," A.R.S. § 8-532, must yield to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), A.R.S. §§ 25-1001 to -1067, if applicable. Angel B., 234 Ariz. at 73, ¶ 14. Under the UCCJEA, the child's home state has original jurisdiction over the first proceeding initiated to determine the custody of a child. A.R.S. §§ 25-1002(A), -1031(A)(1). A child's "home state" is:
(a) The state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding, including any period during which that person is temporarily absent from that state[; or]A.R.S. § 25-1002(7).
(b) If a child is less than six months of age, the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent, including any period during which that person is temporarily absent from that state.
¶13 At the time the petition for termination was filed, Child was only three months old. She had lived in Arizona with Aunt, acting as her parent, for the entirety of her short life, with the exception of the short period of transition between Nebraska and Aunt's home in Arizona. Arizona is Child's home state as defined within A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(b), and jurisdiction in the juvenile court was proper under both A.R.S. §§ 8-532 and 25-1031(A)(1). Father himself asserted Arizona was "[t]he only appropriate [forum]" to adjudicate his paternity because Arizona "has been the only home state of the child since her birth."
¶14 Father nonetheless argues jurisdiction is proper in Wyoming, where he and Mother resided prior to his arrest, incarceration, and conviction, because Aunt "essentially kidnapp[ed]" Child and therefore Child "was not in Arizona lawfully." But Wyoming is not Child's home state because Child never lived in that state. See supra ¶ 12. Additionally, the Wyoming court had the opportunity to make the initial custody determination in a separate custody proceeding initiated by Father, in Wyoming, after the severance petition was filed. However, after consultation with the Arizona court, the Wyoming court declined to do so, instead indicating Arizona was the more convenient and appropriate forum to resolve disputes regarding Child's care and custody. See A.R.S. § 25-1036 (directing the courts in states where proceedings concerning the custody of a single child commence simultaneously to communicate with each other to determine which is the more appropriate forum). Thus, the Arizona juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
Father also argues Aunt should have been precluded from filing a termination petition because she "came to the Juvenile Court with unclean hands" after assuming responsibility for Child without his consent. This assertion is not supported by the record, which reflects Aunt assumed custody of Child at birth, with Mother's permission, at a time when Mother and the alleged father — whose paternity had not been acknowledged or established, see infra ¶ 16 — were serving lengthy terms of incarceration in federal prison for drug trafficking offenses; and Aunt has since provided a safe, loving, and appropriate home for Child.
Father argues the Wyoming court's decision to disclaim jurisdiction is unsupported by the evidence. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the basis for another state court's decisions. See generally A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A) (defining the Arizona appellate court's jurisdiction).
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Factual Findings
¶15 Father argues certain findings within the juvenile court's under advisement ruling are not supported by the evidence, including that (1) paternity was not established at Child's birth; (2) Mother gave Aunt permission to care for Child; and (3) Child is lawfully within the State of Arizona. On review, we accept the court's findings of fact so long as they are supported by reasonable evidence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002) (citing Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 20 (2000), and Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997)).
¶16 The record reflects the parents were not married when Child was born. and Mother did not place Father's name on Child's birth certificate, necessitating his later filing, within this state, of a petition for paternity. Aunt testified Mother gave her permission to care for Child, knowing Aunt would be returning to Arizona, and continues to support Child's placement with, and eventual adoption by, Aunt. Although Father testified otherwise, "[t]he resolution of such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact; we do not re-weigh the evidence on review." Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 12 (citations omitted); see also Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985) (noting that, where certain facts are "sharply disputed," the appellate court "defer[s] to the judgment of the trial court which had the opportunity to assess the credibility, attitude and condition of the parties at trial"); Aranda v. Cardenas, 215 Ariz. 210, 219, ¶ 34 (App. 2007) (noting self-serving testimony is not conclusive, but rather, becomes "a matter of credibility for the fact-finder to determine") (citation omitted). Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, and we find no error.
Father argues his paternity was "a presumption conceded as Fact by [Aunt] and [Mother] by their own admissions," but Arizona law creates a presumption of paternity only if: the parents were married "at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth" of the child, "[g]enetic testing affirms at least a ninety-five per cent probability of paternity," or both parents sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or the birth certificate. See A.R.S. §§ 25-807(A), -812(A), -814(A). The record does not contain any evidence indicating paternity had been established under Arizona law.
B. Statutory Grounds
¶17 Father suggests the juvenile court erred in concluding Aunt presented clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for severance. "We will not reverse the juvenile court's order unless it is clearly erroneous." Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 555 (citing S-2397, 161 Ariz. at 577).
¶18 A parent's rights may be terminated if that "parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony if . . . the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). There is "no 'bright line' definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years." Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29. Rather, the inquiry is individualized and fact-specific and requires the court to consider "all relevant factors," which include, but are not limited to:
(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child's age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.Id. at 251-52, ¶ 29.
¶19 The juvenile court here found several factors weighed in favor of severing Father's parental rights: Child had no relationship with Father as she was in utero when his incarceration began, and there is no relationship to continue and nurture; Father had been incarcerated for the entirety of Child's life and, at the time of trial, would not be released for another two-and-a-half years; and Mother had consented to Child's adoption by Aunt and was not available to provide a normal home life. Father does not contest these findings, arguing only: (1) the court should not have considered his absence from Child's life because it was involuntary — caused by Aunt's reluctance to foster a relationship between them, and (2) severance was unnecessary because Father's parents and sister were willing to care for Child until his release.
Father also argues the court erred by failing "to see Termination of [Father]'s rights as a last resort." While it is true Arizona courts have emphasized "severance of the parent-child relationship should be resorted to 'only when concerted effort to preserve the relationship fails,'" Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 189 (App. 1984) (quoting Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. S-111, 25 Ariz. App. 380, 387 (1975), and citing Ariz. State Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Mahoney, 24 Ariz. App. 534, 537 (1975)), where severance is justified upon the grounds of a lengthy incarceration, there is no statutory or constitutional obligation to promote reunification; "[t]he damage to the parent-child relationship that justifies severance stems from the enforced physical separation of the parent from the child," and no efforts on the part of the parent "can affect that reality." James H. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 1, 2-3, ¶¶ 6-9 (App. 2005)).
¶20 Father presented evidence and argument to this effect at the severance trial. However, a "normal home" is one in which the parent has a presence — not one where extended family members care for a child pending the natural parent's release from imprisonment. See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5609, 149 Ariz. 573, 575 (App. 1986). And, we are not persuaded that Father's lack of relationship with Child falls entirely on Aunt, rather than Father's participation in illegal drug trafficking activities, or is otherwise involuntary. Cf. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Ayala, 185 Ariz. 314, 317-18 (App. 1996) (rejecting the argument that incarceration following a criminal conviction is akin to an involuntary lack of employment). Regardless, Father's argument amounts to a request that this Court reweigh the Michael J. factors — a task in which we will not engage. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 12 (citations omitted); see also Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (holding "there is no threshold level under each individual factor in Michael J. that either compels, or forbids, severance" and emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the juvenile court's inquiry into whether severance is appropriate under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4)).
¶21 The juvenile court properly considered the factors identified in Michael J. and ultimately determined Father's incarceration would deprive Child of a normal home for a period of years. Father has presented no basis upon which to disturb the court's conclusion.
C. Best Interests
¶22 Father argues the juvenile court erred: (1) in concluding Child's sense of stability will be disrupted if she is placed with Father after his release; and (2) in failing to hold a hearing to determine "whether there was a need for [Child] to be protected from her father." We interpret these arguments as a challenge to the court's determination that severance was in Child's best interests, and specifically, to any finding that Child would be harmed if the parental relationship continued. We review the propriety of a best interests finding for an abuse of discretion, see Orezza v. Ramirez, 19 Ariz. App. 405, 409 (1973) (citation omitted), and will affirm the finding so long as it is supported by reasonable evidence, see Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (citations omitted).
¶23 Termination is in a child's best interests if the child "would derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (citing Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557, and then Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990)). The determination is not made in a vacuum, but rather, after "evaluat[ing] the totality of [the] circumstances." Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98-99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (citing Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 30 (App. 2013)). "When a current placement meets the child's needs and the child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child's best interests." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016) (citing Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50-51, ¶¶ 19-21 (App. 2004), and Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 6). If a benefit from termination is established, the juvenile court need not consider whether a detriment would exist by continuation of the relationship. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334, ¶ 6.
¶24 Here, the juvenile court found Child was "happy, secure, and progressing as a normal young girl" in Aunt's care and that freeing Child for adoption by Aunt would allow Child to "achieve permanency with the only parent figure she has ever had." Father does not challenge these findings, they are supported by the record, and they provide a sufficient benefit to Child to conclude termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Demetrius L., 239 ARiz. at 4, ¶ 12. Thus, we need not and do not address Father's argument that Aunt failed to prove Child would be harmed by a continuation of the relationship. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
D. Placement
¶25 Father also argues the juvenile court erred in failing to consider whether Father's family members would serve as a more appropriate placement for Child. However, the court is required to consider the appropriateness of a child's placement only after finding the petitioner proved the statutory grounds for severance and that termination is in the child's best interests. Antonio M., 222 Ariz. at 370, ¶ 2 (citing A.R.S. § 8-538(B)-(C)). Therefore, "the court does not 'weigh alternative placement possibilities to determine' if severance is in the child's best interests." Id. at 371, ¶ 2 (quoting Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377). We find no abuse of discretion on this ground.
To the extent Father also argues the juvenile court's placement of Child with Aunt was in error, we note he lacks standing to contest that decision. See Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 370, ¶ 2 (App. 2009) ("Once [a parent]'s parental rights were terminated, he no longer had standing to challenge [the child]'s placement and anticipated adoption.") (citing Sands v. Sands, 157 Ariz. 322, 324 (App. 1988)).
E. Typographical Errors
¶26 Father argues the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights is generally unreliable because it contains typographical errors. Specifically, the order erroneously: (1) refers to Father by his middle name, rather than his first name, on one occasion; (2) refers to Mother by Aunt's name on one occasion; (3) misidentifies the petitioner in one location as the Department of Child Safety; (4) states Child was born in a prison hospital when, he contends, Mother was transported from the prison to a local hospital for the birth; and (5) miscalculates Child's age at the time of Father's release. Father does not cite any authority suggesting the existence of typographical errors warrants relief from an order terminating parental rights, and, on this record, we find no basis for reversal.
¶27 The errors in the juvenile court's order are not of a nature or magnitude to alter the court's ultimate conclusions or warrant reversal. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 ("No cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done."). As the appellate court, we are able to understand and meaningfully review the findings, conclusions, and termination order. Although the court confused the names of the parties, it correctly identified each participant by his or her birthdate and relationship to Child, and it is apparent to whom the court is referring within its order. The court miscalculated Child's age when Father is scheduled to be release as "approximately seven years old," but it twice correctly identified Child's birthdate as January 2015 and understood Father's release date to be September 2019. Whether Child is four years and eight months, or approximately seven, on his release, Father's incarceration will have deprived her of a normal home for "a period of years" sufficient to satisfy A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 8 (directing the juvenile court to consider "the total length of time the parent is absent from the family, not the more random time that may elapse between the conclusion of legal proceedings for severance and the parent's release from prison"). This is particularly evident here, whereby the court found Father had never met Child and had no relationship with her and it was not in Child's best interests to initiate contact. Finally, the specific location of Child's birthplace is immaterial to Father's ability to provide her with a normal home.
¶28 None of the errors identified by Father affect the interpretation and application of the juvenile court's order. As such, Father has failed to establish reversible error on this basis.
V. Motion for New Trial
¶29 Finally, Father argues the juvenile court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the request after Father appealed the termination order. The extent of the court's jurisdiction to address Father's request presents a question of law subject to de novo review. See Coombs v. Maricopa Cty. Special Health Care Dist., 241 Ariz. 320, 321, ¶ 5 (App. 2016) (citing Ariz. Physicians IPA, Inc. v. W. Ariz. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 228 Ariz. 112, 114, ¶ 9 (App. 2011)).
Aunt also moves this Court for dismissal of Father's appeal of the denial of his new trial motion for want of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the lack of authority to file the motion for new trial that was ultimately fatal to its success, see infra ¶ 30, an order "[g]ranting or refusing a new trial" is specifically appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(a); see generally Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77 (App. 2005) (considering the merits of a parent's appeal from a motion for new trial). Aunt's motion is denied.
¶30 The Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court do not authorize the filing of a motion for new trial in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Don, 16 Ariz. 407, 409 (App. 1990); Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. J-9365, 157 Ariz. 497, 501-02 (App. 1988); Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-1109, 26 Ariz. App. 518, 518 (1976)). Rather, a parent's opportunity to attack the juvenile court's orders lies in his presentation to this Court on appeal. J-9365, 157 Ariz. at 502. Because Father was not authorized to file a motion for new trial, the court was without jurisdiction to consider it. See Don, 165 Ariz. at 409 (concluding the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting relief not authorized by statute). Accordingly, we find no error in the disposition of Father's motion for new trial.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, we note the issues raised in Father's motion for new trial are identical to those raised on appeal and have been substantively addressed in this decision. --------
CONCLUSION
¶31 The juvenile court's orders terminating Father's parental rights to Child are affirmed.