Opinion
Case No. 20030009-CA.
Filed May 30, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Sandy Department, The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg.
George M. McCune, West Jordan City, Appellant Pro Se.
Kevin R. Watkins and Ryan Carter, West Jordan City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Following conviction of a speeding infraction in justice court, McCune appealed the conviction to the district court. Following a trial de novo, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002), McCune was again convicted. McCune now appeals the conviction to this court. This case is before this court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.
This court's jurisdiction to review McCune's appeal is limited. "The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7) (emphasis added). This court's review "is limited to only those issues attacking the . . . constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct.App. 1998); see Monticello City v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 517 (Utah 1990).
McCune claims, inter alia, the district court erred in interpreting and applying the statutes and ordinances underlying the conviction. However, the district court did not rule on the constitutionality of the statutes or ordinances underlying the conviction. Therefore, section 78-5-120(7) does not permit this court to review these claims.
McCune further claims the district court erred by ruling that rule 4-508 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration is constitutional. However, section 78-5-120(7) does not permit this court to review the district court's ruling upon the constitutionality of a court rule. See, e.g., Murray City v. Serre, 2002 UT App 264 (per curiam).
McCune also claims the district court erred by ruling that section 78-5-120(7) is constitutional. However, the district court declined to consider McCune's claims that section 78-5-120(7) violates article I, sections 7, 25, and 27 of the Utah Constitution because McCune raised the claims in "most conclusory terms" and "failed [to] sufficiently . . . analyze [the] claims under the law." In addition, McCune has not provided this court with a transcript, see State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah Ct.App. 1998), and there is no evidence that the district court considered the constitutionality of section 78-5-120(7) under article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. To preserve an issue for review under section 78-5-120(7) "[a]t least as much, if not more, specificity and precision is required . . . as would be required to preserve . . . [an] objection to the admissibility of evidence. . . . Such a challenge should be supported by precise averments and legal argument, and not just conclusory allegations." Monticello City v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (per curiam); see also State v. Lancaster, 665 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1983). Because the district court did not rule on McCune's claims that section 78-5-120(7) violates these constitutional provisions, section 78-5-120(7) does not permit this court to review these claims.
The district court ruled that section 78-5-120(7) does not violate article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the open courts provision. However, McCune's claim that section 78-5-120(7) violates the open courts provision presents an insubstantial question. See Christensen, 788 P.2d at 516 (holding that "right to an `appeal' from a court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in a court of record").
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the district court's ruling that section 78-5-120(7) does not violate the open courts provision. We dismiss the remainder of McCune's claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, and Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, concur.