The term "public * * * convenience", as found in Section 3, supra, of the ordinance, is not used in a colloquial manner as being synonymous with "handy." The word "convenience" as there employed refers to what is fitting or suited to the public need. West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 268, 121 A.2d 640 (1956). The term "public welfare" baffles attempt to give it precise definition because of its constantly expanding concepts.

The question before us is whether the reasons assigned by the memorandum of decision of the board in November are reasonable and pertinent in light of the board's decision in May, which has now become the law of the case, as well as the record produced before the board. It is not relevant that under different zoning regulations Beit Havurah might not have been a permitted use; West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 268, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); and it is no longer relevant whether the board might earlier have determined Beit Havurah to be a religious institution, eligible only for consideration as a special use, rather than a house of worship, a permitted use. The practical effect of the board's decision is either to persuade Beit Havurah to curtail its late-night use of its premises entirely, a purpose disclaimed by the defendant's brief, or to require Beit Havurah members to seek overnight lodging at one of the local motels.

Under similar legislation, the same conclusion has been reached. West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Fox, 402 Ill. 617, 85 N.E.2d 43; Long v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Ind. App. 97, 182 N.E.2d 790; Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5. The Center Realty view, on the other hand, treats the words "convenience" and "welfare" as though they are synonymous, and reading them as if the legislative intention had been to use them in a strict police power sense, in effect, considers them as if they were a substitute for the phrase "* * * the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."

[37] Do all of the foregoing principles fall into the discard when a religious organization asserts a right to a variance? This question has been answered in the negative in West Hartford Meth. Ch. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263 [ 121 A.2d 640, 643]; Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13 [ 57 S.E.2d 834, 836]; Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach (Fla.), 82 So.2d 880. In the last cited case it is said, at page 882: "It seems that the appellant bought the property with knowledge of the zoning restrictions when, as we understand the record, sites for churches were available in other parts of the city.

See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 62 Haw. 556, 617 P.2d 816 (1980); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 172 N.E.2d 39 (1961); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956); Congregation Committee v. City Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Civ.App. 1956); O'Brien v. Chicago, 347 Ill.App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952). Although some jurisdictions have so held, not all states espouse this ruling, see, e.g., Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1955); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), nor does the Congregation cite a federal case explicitly upholding this extremely broad principle. Most importantly, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken directly on this subject, lower court decisions demonstrate that it is not good law in Pennsylvania.

146 Colo. at 380, 362 P.2d at 175-76 (emphasis added) (McWilliams, J. concurring). Here, as in City of Englewood, the zoning ordinance at issue is the "permissive" type. A majority of jurisdictions have held these types of ordinances to be constitutional. See, e.g., Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Rogers v. Mayor Aldermen, 137 S.E.2d 668 (Ga.App. 1964); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956); State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115 N.E.2d 65 (1953); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958); State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wn.2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957); Annotation, Zoning Regulations as Affecting Churches, 74 A.L.R.2d 377 (1960); 2 A. D. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 20-9 to -10 (1987). We join the majority of jurisdictions that are consistent with the special concurrence in City of Englewood.

The fact that the defendants have raised state constitutional issues does not give them the right to bypass the zoning procedures of the city of Shelton. See Beit Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 446, 418 A.2d 82 (1979); West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 268, 121 A.2d 640 (1956). Until the defendants have exhausted these procedures, they cannot claim that the city has denied their right of free speech under the state constitution.

" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 8, 94 S.Ct. at 1540, 39 L.Ed.2d at 803-04 (footnote omitted). See e.g., West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Caboni v. City of New Orleans, 321 So.2d 800 (La.App. 1975); Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 Minn. 79, 226 N.W.2d 306 (1975); Lumpkin v. Township Committee, 134 N.J.L. 428, 48 A.2d 798 (1946); Congregation Committee v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Civ.App. 1956); State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876 (1930). Seward Chapel points out that its school, which at the time of trial had about a dozen students, does not create any significant impact on the neighborhood, and that the city should have imposed reasonable restrictions on parking and similar land uses rather than wholly excluding the school.

We think the time has come and that this is an appropriate case in which to breathe vitality into the so far lifeless words of Judge FROESSEL that, notwithstanding that churches, with schools, enjoy a favored status in the law of zoning, nonetheless, they can be held subject to "appropriate restrictions" (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526). In our view New York should approach the position taken by the growing number of States holding what has been termed the "minority view" (1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning [3d ed], pp 19-4-19-5; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-Day Saints v City of Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, app dsmd 338 U.S. 805, rehearing den 338 U.S. 939; Minney v City of Azusa, 164 Cal.App. 12; West Hartford Methodist Church v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263; Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnessesv Mullen, 214 Or. 281; St. James Temple of A.O.H. Church of God v Board of Appeals, 100 Ill. App.2d 302, cert den 395 U.S. 946; Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v City of Miami Beach, 82 So 2d 880 [Fla]). The issue here is not the validity of a zoning ordinance which totally excludes churches and synagogues from a residential district, or even the validity of the present regulatory ordinance in all circumstances. Rather the question is the validity of the 100-foot sideline setback restriction of this ordinance as applied specifically to respondent synagogue.

See Roman catholic Welfare Corporation v. Piedmont, 45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438; Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583; State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370; State ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43; Miami Beach v. State, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537; Phillips v. Homewood, 255 Ala. 180, 50 So.2d 267; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 522, 136 N.E.2d 827. Rather, this is a case where they are permitted, the only proviso being that they meet certain requirements for obtaining a special permit. See West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 269, 121 A.2d 640: Milwaukie Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, supra. The question is whether, under the agreed state of facts before us, it is a legitimate exercise of the police power to require the plaintiff to meet such requirements in order to locate a school in the most highly restricted residence zone.