Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV150719
Duffy, J.
West Cliff Lynch Associates, LLC (West Cliff) is the owner of the Clearview Court Mobilehome Park (Park) located in the City of Santa Cruz (City). Arturo Guerrero (Arturo) and Maria Guerrero (Maria) (collectively the Guerreros) are two of the Park’s tenants and owners of a mobilehome unit located there. In late 2003, a dispute arose out of the Guerreros’ attempt to avail themselves of the benefits of a City ordinance providing for rent control to mobilehome tenants. They did not make a timely election to enroll in the rent control program. The Guerreros, however, sought relief under an “escape clause” in the Ordinance that permits a mobilehome owner to submit an application for rent control eligibility to the City’s planning director within 45 days of the mobilehome owner’s gaining actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance. Their application was rejected by the City, but the Guerreros prevailed in an administrative appeal. West Cliff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging that decision was denied by the court below.
The rent control ordinance is discussed in greater detail, post. We will refer to it generally at times simply as the Ordinance.
The parties who filed the petition for writ of mandamus consisted of the owner of the Park, West Cliff, and Green Valley Corp., dba Barry Swenson Builder (Green Valley), which was alleged to have been the property manager for the Park. It is apparent that Green Valley is also an appellant herein. For the sake of convenience, however, we will refer to the procedural steps taken, and the contentions made by appellants (petitioners below) as having been those of West Cliff.
On appeal, West Cliff argues that there was no substantial evidence supporting the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that the Guerreros did not have actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance until on or about December 8, 2003, which was a date within 45 days of the filing of their application with the City. Additionally, West Cliff challenges the hearing officer’s jurisdiction over the matter. We reject that jurisdictional challenge and conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not err; we will affirm the denial of West Cliff’s petition for writ of mandamus.
We present an abbreviated recitation of facts here. The facts relevant to the disposition of the Guerreros’ application for rent control eligibility are discussed in part IV.A. of the Discussion, post.
The Guerreros are husband and wife. They first moved to the Park in 1998. In approximately November 1999, they purchased a mobilehome situated in space 26 in the Park and signed a lease with the former Park owner at or about the same time.
In January 2004, the Guerreros made their first effort to obtain the benefits of rent control under the Ordinance when they submitted an application to the City. That application was apparently prompted by their receipt in December 2003 of a notice increasing their monthly rent from approximately $500.00 to $1,600.00.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2005, West Cliff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus with the superior court, naming the City and Dave Linn (the City’s hearing officer) as respondents and the Guerreros as real parties in interest. In the petition, West Cliff alleged that the City, acting through Hearing Officer Linn, abused its discretion by granting the Guerreros’ application for relief. The Guerreros filed an answer to the petition. After a hearing, the court entered its order on October 5, 2006, denying the petition. West Cliff filed a timely notice of appeal. The matter is appealable. (Wong v. Ohlone College (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382, fn. 3 [order denying writ of mandate, despite absence of entry of separate formal judgment thereon, is final judgment for purposes of an appeal].)
DISCUSSION
I. Issues On Appeal
The main issue presented in this appeal is whether the City’s hearing officer erred in granting the Guerreros’ application for relief to avail themselves of the benefits of mobilehome rent control under the Ordinance. As a procedural matter, however, West Cliff first argues that the administrative decision is void because Hearing Officer Linn had no jurisdiction to hear the case. It argues that Linn failed to schedule a hearing within 60 days of the appeal as required by the rules and that he therefore was without power to thereafter hear and decide the matter.
West Cliff next argues that there was no substantial evidence—or, indeed, any evidence—from which Hearing Officer Linn could have concluded that the Guerreros became aware of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance within 45 days of presenting their application to the City. In making this argument, West Cliff essentially focuses on two claimed flaws: (1) the application itself failed to comply with the Ordinance because it did not specify the date on which the Guerreros became aware of rent control and did not state the circumstances under which they acquired this knowledge; and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the conclusion that the Guerreros were unaware of the availability of rent control until on or after December 8, 2003, as found by Hearing Officer Linn.
II. Standard of Review
As we recently explained, “a superior court’s review of an agency’s adjudicatory administrative decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is subject to two possible standards depending on the nature of the rights involved. [Citation.] If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a ‘fundamental vested right,’ the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.] . . . [¶] [But w]here no fundamental vested right is involved, the superior court’s review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1056-1057, fns. omitted.)
Review by the appellate court of such matters is governed by the same substantial evidence standard, irrespective of whether the controversy involves a fundamental vested right. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 218.) “Thus, even in those cases where ‘the trial court is required to review an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, the standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s determination is the substantial evidence test. [Citations.]’ (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) But the reviewing court’s focus changes, depending on which standard of review governed at trial. ‘If the independent judgment test . . . applied at the trial, . . . on appeal, the trial court’s factual bases for its decision, not the findings of the agency, are reviewed.’ [Citation.] ‘If the substantial evidence test governed at the trial level, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the appellate court focuses on the findings made by the agency rather than on findings made by the superior court.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 1989) Appeal from Superior Court Judgment, §§ 14.25, 14.27, pp. 461-464.)
Here, there is no contention that a fundamental vested right was involved, and thus our role is clear: We must determine from a review of the record presented before the City whether there was substantial evidence supporting Hearing Officer Linn’s findings. In our application of this deferential substantial evidence standard, we “begin with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain the [administrative agency hearing officer’s] findings of fact.” (Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 287.)
Principles that apply to the substantial evidence standard of review are familiar. Nonetheless, given the importance of the standard to the disposition of this appeal, we will summarize some of the key features here. (See People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018: “However convoluted the facts, or complex the issues, the standard of review is the compass that guides the appellate court to its decision.”)
As aptly summarized by the Third District Court of Appeal: “ ‘[I]f the word “substantial” [is to mean] anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous with “any” evidence. It must be reasonable . . ., credible, and of solid value . . . .’ [Citation.] The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole record. [Citation.] While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation.]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) If the reviewing court determines that substantial evidence existed to support the trial court’s (or, in this instance, the administrative body’s) findings, it is inconsequential that there may have been substantial evidence from which a contrary conclusion could have been reached. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.) And “the focus is on the quality, not the quantity of the evidence. Very little solid evidence may be ‘substantial,’ while a lot of extremely weak evidence might be ‘insubstantial.’ [Citation.]” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871-872.)
We apply the above principles in our review of the record below to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support Hearing Officer Linn’s findings.
III. The Mobilehome Rent Control Ordinance
The Ordinance, found at Chapter 22.01 et seq. of the Santa Cruz Municipal Code, includes an introductory statement as follows: “The city council finds that both the allowance of unregulated rent increases upon the sale of a mobilehome, or the sale of mobilehomes for prices inflated as a result of the mobilehome owners’ ability to transfer the benefit of their rent control to mobilehome purchasers, would frustrate its goal of preserving affordable housing stock within the city of Santa Cruz. This goal is advanced only if rents remain affordable and resale prices are not inflated. The council is therefore willing to regulate mobilehome rents only where there is a commitment from mobilehome owners to sell their mobilehomes for affordable prices.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.010, subd. (c).) Therefore, under the Ordinance, only mobilehome owners who make a specific irrevocable election by signing an “irrevocable participation agreement” (IPA), under which they agree to limit the resale price of their units, are eligible for rent control. (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (a).)
All section references are to the Santa Cruz Municipal Code unless otherwise stated.
The Ordinance provides that “[m]obilehome owners who take possession of mobilehomes eligible for rent control under this chapter after the effective date of this chapter shall have one hundred twenty days from the date of possession to execute [an IPA]. Mobilehome owners who take possession of rent-controlled mobilehomes by virtue of the fact that they have purchased their mobilehomes from persons who have [executed an IPA] shall have one hundred twenty days from the date upon which they take possession to apply in writing for [an IPA] in order to retain the rights and protections afforded by this chapter.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (d).)
At the time that the Guerreros acquired their mobilehome and became tenants in space 26 of the Park in or about November 1999, subdivision (d) of section 22.01.040 contained a uniform 180-day limitation for a mobilehome owner’s making of an application for an IPA. The Ordinance was amended by the city council on September 23, 2003, to reduce the time as quoted above.
But the next subdivision provides relief for owners who fail to timely execute an IPA. “Notwithstanding the one-hundred-eighty-day limitation period for execution of [IPAs] set forth in [subdivision] (d), mobilehome owners who take possession of mobilehomes eligible for rent control, whether or not the mobilehome was subject to the rent control provisions of this chapter prior to their possession, may be allowed to [execute an IPA] beyond the one-hundred-twenty day limitation period and to receive [an IPA] beyond the one hundred eighty day period upon demonstrating to the planning director that they had no actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter at the time they took possession of their mobilehome and thereafter failed to obtain actual knowledge during the one hundred twenty day period following their possession. Relief from the limitation periods provided for in this [subdivision] shall only be available to those mobilehome owners who submit a written letter of application for relief to the planning director within forty five days of . . . actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter. . . . The letter application for relief under this [subdivision] shall include an explanation of the circumstances giving rise to the applicant’s actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter, setting forth the date the applicant first obtained actual knowledge . . . . The application shall contain a proof of personal service of a copy of the application upon the mobilehome park owner or the mobilehome park property manager.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (e), italics added.) Section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) requires that the planning director provide a written decision disposing of the application between 15 and 28 days after the application’s filing, which decision may be appealed within 30 days thereafter. (Ibid.)
At the time that the Guerreros acquired their mobilehome and became tenants in space 26 of the Park in or about November 1999, subdivision (e) of section 22.01.040 required that such an application for relief be filed with the planning director within 30 days of gaining actual knowledge of the availability of rent control. The Ordinance was amended by the city council on September 23, 2003, to increase the time period to 45 days as quoted above. There is no dispute that the 45-day limitation period applied in this instance.
IV. Review of Hearing Officer’s Decision
As we have discussed, our task is to review the decision of the administrative hearing officer to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence. We will therefore first review in some detail the evidence adduced at the administrative hearing before discussing West Cliff’s jurisdictional and substantive challenges to the hearing officer’s decision.
A. Evidence Presented at Administrative Hearing
Arturo and Maria are married. They are both from Mexico; as of the time of the hearing, Maria had lived in this country for approximately 23 years. Maria and Arturo went to school for two years in Mexico. Maria neither reads nor writes English. Arturo does not speak, read, or write English. Maria works as a housekeeper, and Arturo is a dishwasher. Maria is the one in the family who makes the rent payments and takes care of any papers they receive.
The Guerreros first moved to the Park with their two children in 1998, when they purchased their first mobilehome located at space 11. There were papers in English involved in that transaction. In or about November 1999, they purchased another mobilehome and signed a lease to occupy space 26 at the Park. The Guerreros received some assistance from a woman named Myra with respect to the purchase and lease transactions. The lease and purchase papers were in English. The lease called for monthly rent of $450—this was explained by Myra. No one explained the lease to Maria; Myra simply showed her where to sign it. Maria does not understand what the lease says. The Guerreros and Manuel Vierra, the former Park owner, signed the lease together. The Guerreros did not receive any other papers from Vierra. Vierra never mentioned anything to the Guerreros about rent control.
West Cliff acquired the Park in June 2002. In or about July 2002, West Cliff held a barbecue for the residents to introduce itself; the barbecue was heavily attended. Rent control was specifically discussed during the barbecue, according to the testimony of Corbett Wright, a principal of West Cliff. The discussions were in English. Wright recalled that he spoke with Maria and that he gave her some chicken to take home to Arturo. Maria denied that she attended the barbecue; she testified that she had heard about it, but did not attend because she was working.
In approximately October 2002, Wright gave the Park’s new on-site manager, Arden Wiedenmeyer, materials to distribute to Park residents. (Wiedenmeyer does not speak Spanish.) These materials included copies of the Ordinance; Wiedenmeyer delivered them to each of the Park residents, including the residents of space 26. Maria testified that she did not recall receiving a delivery of documents in the fall of 2002.
Danielle Uhariett, a City employee who was the contact person for implementation of the Ordinance, prepared a package at the City Council’s request in May 2002 concerning the Ordinance; it was to be sent to all Park residents. The package consisted of a cover letter, a copy of the Ordinance, and a list of frequently asked questions. (All materials were in English.) This package was sent to the residents of the Park on or about June 20, 2002; each package was addressed to “Resident” and to a specific space number. The package sent to the residents of space 26 of the Park was not returned by the post office to Uhariett. Maria testified that she did not recall receiving a copy of the Ordinance in 2002.
Uhariett sent out a similar information package (all in English)—that also included a copy of the Ordinance and frequently asked questions—to residents of the Park on or about August 4, 2003. Each package was addressed to “Resident” and to a specific space number. Again, the package sent to the residents of space 26 of the Park was not returned by the post office to Uhariett. Maria testified that she did not recall being contacted by the City about rent control in August 2003.
The City sponsored a meeting held at the Coast Hotel on September 11, 2003, to discuss changes to the Ordinance. A notice for the meeting written in English was sent to the Park residents. The Ordinance was discussed at the meeting and informational materials (including the revised Ordinance) were made available. Approximately 20 to 30 Park residents attended the meeting. There was a Spanish-speaking interpreter present. Wright testified that he could not recall whether or not the Guerreros attended this meeting.
Another meeting, this time sponsored by West Cliff, was held at the Coast Hotel in November 2003. The owners invited the Park’s residents, specifically the residents who had not elected rent control, to the meeting. There was a written notice of the meeting. Wright discussed the subject of rent control. He told the group that did not have rent control that “their [rent] rates would possibly increase.” Copies of the Ordinance were made available. There was a Spanish-speaking interpreter, Denise Choate, present. Wiedenmeyer testified that the Spanish-speaking residents were in a group with the interpreter who spoke with them during the meeting.
Wiedenmeyer prepared a list of the residents who were not rent control participants who attended the November 2004 meeting at the Coast Hotel; both Arturo and Maria were included on the list. He indicated on the list that the meeting had taken place on a Monday evening, November 10, 2003; however, the header on the list noted that the meeting was on November 11, 2003. Wiedenmeyer listed the attendees by consulting the signatures found on a sign-up sheet that was circulated during the meeting. (The sign-up sheet was not produced at the hearing.) He testified that he could not recall whether he actually saw the Guerreros at the meeting.
Wiedenmeyer initially testified that the Guerreros attended the November 2003 meeting and that they were included in the group of Spanish-speaking residents and the interpreter. On cross-examination, he stated that he “[could] not say yes” to whether he physically saw the Guerreros at that meeting.
Maria testified that she had become aware of the November 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel from other Park residents, but that she did not attend. Arturo similarly denied attending any meetings involving West Cliff that concerned rent control, and Maria denied that Arturo attended the November 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel.
The hearing officer in his decision concluded that there was “no credible evidence of a November 11, 2003 meeting that included an interpreter.” There was some confusion at the administrative hearing as to whether the September 11, 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel sponsored by the City and the November 10, 2003 meeting at the same hotel described in the testimony of Wiedenmeyer and Wright were one and the same meeting. But Wright testified that there were multiple meetings in 2003 concerning rent control, that there were several meetings in which an interpreter was available, and that at least two such meetings took place at the Coast Hotel. From our review of the record, the evidence supports the conclusion that there was both a September 11, 2003 meeting and a November 10, 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel. In fact, the Guerreros concede this point in their appellate brief, although they deny that they attended either meeting. While West Cliff makes much of the point that the hearing officer was seemingly incorrect in his conclusion that there was no November 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel, this error does not affect our conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support Linn’s decision, as we discuss, post.
The Guerreros received in the mail on December 8, 2003, a letter dated December 5, 2003, notifying them that their monthly rent was going to be increased to $1,600.00. They had apparently received one prior rent increase effective in or about June 2003. Maria recalled having received a “very small” rent increase. Wright believed that the rent increase was approximately $50.00. Maria did not understand what the letter said, and she took it to a neighbor, Alguien, to translate it for her. He explained that the document concerned an increase in rent.
Arturo testified that he first learned about rent control when he and his wife received notice that their rent was raised “really high.” Based upon his testimony, his understanding of rent control was, at best, very limited: “I virtually understand that rent control is when you don’t have to pay more money for rent.” When asked if she knew what rent control was, Maria testified: “I do not know. I want to know.” None of the Guerreros’ neighbors mentioned anything about rent control to them before December 2003.
Maria later testified on cross-examination, in response to the same question about her understanding of rent control: “I don’t understand much of it. I want to.”
On or about January 21, 2004, Maria sent a letter to the City requesting relief in order to obtain the benefits of rent control. She had prepared a letter in Spanish, and it was translated into English by someone in an organization (Western Service Workers) she had consulted. Arturo testified that his wife had sent a letter to the City on behalf of both of them.
B. Proceedings Below
On February 12, 2004, the City notified the Guerreros in writing that it was denying their application for relief. The City wrote that the Guerreros had “failed to prove that [they] did not have knowledge of the [rent control p]rogram before the expiration of the 180 days nor did [they] provide evidence of when [they] first obtained knowledge of the [p]rogram.” The Guerreros, through their counsel, timely filed an appeal of that decision on March 14, 2004. The administrative hearing before Hearing Officer Linn transpired on July 6, 2004, and October 1, 2004. The Guerreros appeared, testified, and were represented by counsel at the first session. Neither they nor their counsel attended the October 1, 2004 hearing.
Counsel for the Guerreros made a request for a continuance of the hearing on September 30, 2004, asserting that a medical condition and a medical appointment precluded her appearance on October 1, 2004. Hearing Officer Linn denied that application for continuance and issued a formal order thereon.
On or about October 17, 2004, Linn issued his decision (erroneously captioned “Award of Arbitrator”), reversing the City’s denial of the Guerreros’ petition. West Cliff submitted a written request for reconsideration on October 29, 2004, arguing, inter alia, that the hearing officer’s decision was based upon erroneous findings of fact and law and evidenced bias against West Cliff. Hearing Officer Linn denied that request for reconsideration by letter dated November 20, 2004. West Cliff submitted a second request for reconsideration on December 22, 2004. Included in this submission was a declaration of an employee of West Cliff’s off-site property manager and a declaration of a Spanish-speaking interpreter who stated that she provided interpretive services at a meeting involving Park owners and residents at the Coast Hotel on November 10, 2003. At Hearing Officer’s Linn’s solicitation, counsel for the City sent a letter to Linn dated December 30, 2004, in which he conceded that the rules governing the proceedings contained no provision for reconsideration of a hearing officer’s decision and concluding: “There is no procedure for reconsideration and, therefore, no procedural basis for you to reconsider your decision.” Linn denied the second request for reconsideration on January 4, 2005. West Cliff’s mandamus petition followed.
C. Jurisdiction of Hearing Officer
West Cliff contends that Hearing Officer Linn had no jurisdiction to consider and decide the matter. It cites to Rule 6 of the City’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure (rule 6), which provides: “City Staff shall file stamp the petition and shall transmit the [petition] to the Hearing Officer, who shall schedule a hearing no sooner than 30 days and no later than 60 days after the filing of the petition.” Because the Guerreros’ appeal to the City was filed March 14, 2004, and Hearing Officer Linn did not send a letter to the parties scheduling the hearing until May 24, 2004, Linn (West Cliff argues) had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Both Linn and the court below rejected this argument. We similarly reject it.
Our acceptance of West Cliff’s position would require us to ignore the events that led up to Linn’s May 24, 2004 letter scheduling the hearing. The record reflects the chronology after the Guerreros filed their appeal that follows.
First, the matter was originally assigned to another hearing officer, who apparently recused himself or herself. It was assigned to Linn on April 14, 2004, one month after the appeal was filed.
Second, on April 20, 2004, Linn wrote to the City, the Park’s off-site property manager, and Sharon Kinsey—who was counsel both for the Guerreros and for Gloria Echeverria, another Park tenant who had filed an appeal in which Linn was also the hearing officer. In that letter, Linn made reference to a prior letter of April 6, 2004, in which he had proposed seven possible dates for the scheduling of a hearing in the Echeverria appeal. In his April 20, 2004 letter, Linn proposed that the parties agree that the hearing on the Guerrero appeal take place on one of the seven dates he had mentioned in his previous letter.
Third, on May 4, 2004, West Cliff’s counsel sent a letter to Linn and Kinsey, “request[ing] a stay of the above-referenced appeals. . . .” (The reference line of the letter only noted the Echeverria appeal.) The asserted grounds for the stay included the fact that the City adopted an emergency ordinance in April 2004 that placed a temporary moratorium on new IPAs, and that a stay was therefore appropriate “in order to conserve the parties[‘] resources and promote administrative economy . . . .”
We also note that after the hearing was scheduled to commence on July 6, 2004, West Cliff, by letter dated July 1, 2004, made a request to continue the hearing for two weeks to provide additional time to attempt to resolve the case informally. Guerreros’ counsel opposed the request, and Hearing Officer Linn denied it on the day of the hearing.
Fourth, on May 7, 2004, Linn responded to the May 4, 2004 letter of West Cliff’s counsel; Linn’s letter referred to both the Echeverria and Guerrero appeals. In that letter, Linn noted that he could not stay the matters unless he received a stipulation signed by counsel agreeing to such a stay.
Fifth, on May 12, 2004, counsel for the City wrote to the attorneys for West Cliff and Kinsey (as counsel for Echeverria, the Guerreros, and other West Cliff residents who had filed appeals). In that letter, the City took the position that the temporary moratorium on new IPAs in the emergency ordinance did not apply to the matters on appeal, and that therefore continuances of the hearings on the appeals or dismissals of the appeals were inappropriate.
Sixth, on May 14, 2004, Linn sent a letter to Kinsey, with copies to the City and West Cliff’s counsel, concerning both the Guerrero and Echeverria appeals. The letter concerned preliminary procedural issues such as time estimates and scheduling. Linn also proposed five potential dates for hearing both appeals. And he expressed some concern over the identity of the hearing officer in the Guerrero appeal, based upon some information that another person and Linn had both been listed as the hearing officer.
The record reflects that Hearing Officer Linn acted with diligence in the scheduling of the hearing. Indeed, less than one week after being assigned the case, he contacted the parties in an effort to schedule a hearing. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that the City, West Cliff, or the Guerreros responded in a timely fashion to Linn’s April 21, 2004 request to firm up a hearing date for the Guerreros’ appeal. After sending the initial scheduling letter on April 21, 2004, Linn followed up with two letters to the parties concerning scheduling and about West Cliff’s request to stay the proceedings. And Linn—apparently receiving no reply to his April 21, 2004 request to the parties to select a hearing date from one of seven dates proposed—was thus required to send a second letter on May 14, 2004; in that letter, he sought the parties’ cooperation in the scheduling of a hearing by proposing five new potential hearing dates.
Since the apparent purpose of rule 6 is to require that the hearing officer act promptly to schedule the hearing in an administrative appeal, nothing would be served by an overly strict interpretation of the rule. Moreover, a finding that the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction under the circumstances presented here would be antithetical to the goal of section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) of providing the nonprevailing party an administrative appeal from an adverse decision of the planning director. Furthermore, we conclude that, in light of West Cliff’s apparent failure to respond to Linn’s scheduling efforts with a proposed hearing date—coupled with its efforts to stay the proceedings entirely—it is estopped from complaining about Hearing Officer Linn’s lack of strict compliance with rule 6. We therefore find that Hearing Officer Linn had jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter.
D. Discussion of Hearing Officer’s Decision
We have reviewed the entire record of the administrative agency. Bearing in mind the deferential standard that governs our review as discussed, ante, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support Hearing Officer Linn’s finding that the Guerreros filed their application for relief within 45 days of the date they acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance.
The evidence supporting that finding of the administrative hearing officer includes, without limitation: (1) Arturo and Maria are both Spanish-speaking, they have had limited education, and they have had no education in the English language; (2) neither Arturo nor Maria reads or writes English; (3) according to the Guerreros’ testimony, the subject of rent control under the Ordinance was not discussed at the time they entered into the lease for space 26 with the former Park owner, Vierra, or at the time they entered into the purchase agreement; (4) there was no evidence that Vierra informed the Guerreros about the availability of rent control at any time that he owned the Park; (5) there was no evidence that the package delivered by Wiedenmeyer in October 2002 to Park residents contained any materials in Spanish; (6) none of the notices sent by the City was in Spanish; (7) the Guerreros did not recall receiving any materials about the Ordinance; (8) after the Guerreros received a letter (in English) on December 8, 2003, advising them that their rent was to be increased by a factor of more than three times the then-existing rate, Maria testified that she spoke with her neighbor, Alguien, who translated the notice and told her that it involved a rent increase; (9) none of the Guerreros’ neighbors ever mentioned anything to them about rent control before December 2003; (10) the Guerreros submitted an application to the City for eligibility for rent control after obtaining a notice on December 8, 2003, more than tripling their rent; and (11) both Arturo and Maria, even as late as the July 2004 hearing, expressed that they had very little understanding about rent control. There was substantial evidence therefore that the Guerreros did not have actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance until on or after December 8, 2003, which is a date within 45 days of the filing of their application.
The record does not reveal the precise date that Maria spoke with Alguien after receiving the rent increase notice on December 8, 2003.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that there was significant evidence from which the administrative hearing officer could have concluded that the Guerreros knew about the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003. Indeed, Hearing Officer Linn expressed the view that “the question [of when the Guerreros acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control was] not cut-and-dried.” The evidence that would have supported a contrary finding by the hearing officer included, inter alia, the following: (1) there was a barbecue in July 2002 sponsored by West Cliff in which the subject of rent control was raised, an event that Maria (at least according to Wright) attended; (2) Wiedenmeyer’s hand delivery of materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) in October 2002 to all Park residents, including the occupants of space 26; (3) Uhariett’s mailing in June 2002 of various rent control materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) to all Park residents, coupled with the fact that the mailing for space 26 was not returned by the post office; (4) Uhariett’s subsequent mailing in August 2003 of rent control materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) to all Park residents, coupled with the fact that the mailing for space 26 was not returned by the post office; (5) evidence—although disputed by the Guerreros and disbelieved by Hearing Officer Linn—that the Guerreros attended a November 2003 meeting sponsored by West Cliff in which the issue of rent control was specifically discussed, rent control materials were made available, and an interpreter was present to translate from English to Spanish; (6) the fact that the Guerreros did not deny having received materials written in English from the City and others that were hand-delivered; and (7) the language in the Guerreros’ application stating that “the lease that I signed, and every rent increase I have received since I lived here until 2003, contained ‘rent control formula’ language, further leading me to believe that I did have protection against rent increases . . . .”
We exclude from consideration on this point the evidence of the September 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel sponsored by the City. There was no evidence that the Guerreros attended that meeting (as opposed to the November 2003 meeting, where Wiedenmeyer’s notes reflected the Guerreros’ attendance).
As noted in the recitation of the hearing evidence, Maria testified that she had not attended the barbecue. But the hearing officer, notwithstanding this evidentiary conflict, credited West Cliff with having established that Maria attended this event, but nonetheless found the evidence of little significance in proving her prior knowledge of the availability of rent control. Linn wrote: “[West Cliff] claims to have informed the tenants about rent control at a barbecue on July 4, 2002. However, [Maria] arrived late, possibly after rent control discussions were over and done with, and [Arturo] probably was not there at all.”
West Cliff emphasizes the importance of the last item of evidence cited in the preceding paragraph as showing that the Guerreros had knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance before December 8, 2003. The application to the City was prepared on the Guerreros’ behalf by a workers’ organization. While Maria did testify that she prepared a letter in Spanish and gave it to the organization, the evidence is unclear—as observed by the hearing officer—whether the application ultimately submitted was merely a translation of Maria’s Spanish letter. Further, we note that the above-quoted language that West Cliff argues is a conclusive admission that the Guerreros had prior knowledge of the availability of rent control is identical to the language contained in the applications of six other Park tenants with Hispanic surnames who likewise sought relief under the Ordinance. Moreover, contrary to the statement in the Guerreros’ application, there was no “ ‘rent control formula’ language” in their lease. We thus disagree that the language in the application itself refuted the Guerreros’ contention (found to be true by the hearing officer) that they had no knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance prior to December 8, 2003.
To be certain, the seven items of evidence cited above constituted substantial evidence that would have supported a finding that the Guerreros did have knowledge of the availability of rent control more than 45 days prior to submission of their application. But it does not negate the existence of substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s finding to the contrary. (See Bowers v. Bernards, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874 [if substantial evidence supported finding, it is of no consequence that reviewing court determines there was significant evidence to support contrary conclusion].)
We must emphasize that section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) only requires that the applicant (1) demonstrate that he or she had no actual knowledge of the availability of mobilehome rent control under the Ordinance within the 180-day period specified in subdivision (d) of that section, and (2) file the application not less than 45 days of acquiring such actual knowledge. Although the Ordinance does not define this italicized term, we may draw on case law to supply such meaning.
In I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 281, the Supreme Court addressed the nature and extent of the duties of a trustee in attempting to provide notification to a trustor/debtor of the existence of a default in connection with nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In emphasizing that the trustee’s statutory duty is to provide notification to the trustor’s last known address if that address differs from the address contained in the trust deed, the court explained: “[The trustor] contends that there is a triable issue as to whether [the trustee] actually knew [the trustor’s] last known address. . . . [¶] The problem with this argument is that [the trustee] did not have actual knowledge of the address of any of the [trustor’s] partners. All [the trustee] had was the names of the partners from their signatures on the note and deed of trust. Actual knowledge is that ‘which consists in express information of fact.’ [Citations.] Although the circumstances might have put [the trustee] on inquiry as to the partners’ addresses, that is by definition constructive, not actual, knowledge. [Citations.] The statute specifically requires actual knowledge. The notice given complied with [Civil Code] section 2924b.” (Id. at pp. 284-285.)
Similarly, in the context of determining whether the purchase of a motor vehicle is made free and clear of an unperfected security interest in the vehicle, this court held that “a buyer who has no actual knowledge of a defect in title is entitled to rely upon the information reflected on the registration and ownership certificates, without further inquiry. [Citation.]” (Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1574, 1587 (Louis & Diederich).) In reaching this conclusion, we cited California Uniform Commercial Code former section 1201, subdivision (25)(a) (now Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1202, subds. (a)-(c)), stating that “[u]nder the Commercial Code, a person has ‘knowledge’ of a fact when ‘he has actual knowledge of it.’ [Citation.] This definition is embodied in the concept of ‘good faith.’ Good faith is ‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’ [Citation.] The good faith of a buyer is therefore to be determined by what he actually knew, rather than what a reasonable man should have known from all the circumstances.” (Louis & Diederich, supra, at p. 1587; see also TME Enterprises, Inc. v. Norwest Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1031 [holding that Cal. U. Com. Code., § 4A-207, subd. (b) provides “immunity from responsibility . . . for a beneficiary’s bank that relies on the account number specified in a wire transfer order to identify the beneficiary of the order” as long as bank has no actual knowledge that beneficiary’s name and account number refer to different people].)
The evidence cited by West Cliff constituted substantial—if not compelling—evidence of the Guerreros’ constructive knowledge of the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003. That fact, however, does not undermine our conclusion here that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the Guerreros acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance within 45 days of the filing of their application.
And much of that same evidence was circumstantial proof of the Guerreros’ actual knowledge of rent control availability prior to December 8, 2003. (See Gantner & Mattern Co. v. Hawkins (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 783, 786 [actual knowledge may be established through circumstantial evidence].) But as we have concluded, the existence of substantial evidence of a finding that West Cliff urges here cannot be used to support reversal where, as here, there was sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding.
In support of its position, West Cliff cites Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225. There, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that required a convicted felon residing in the City of Los Angeles for more than five days to register with the chief of police. The court framed the issue as “whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.” (Id. at p. 227.) It held that “[w]here a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.” (Id. at pp. 229-230.) Although the Lambert court did not define what it meant by “probability of such knowledge,” West Cliff cites the case presumably for its position that the Guerreros knew about the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003, and that that prior knowledge could be inferred from the evidence presented. To the extent that West Cliff contends that prior knowledge of the availability of rent control on the part of the Guerreros was constructive, that argument fails as stated above. To the extent that West Cliff argues that there was substantial evidence from which to infer that the Guerreros had actual knowledge of the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003, we cannot reverse the hearing officer’s decision on this basis; as noted, we have concluded that there was substantial evidence to support his findings, notwithstanding the existence of evidence supporting contrary findings.
In addition, West Cliff contends that the hearing officer applied an incorrect standard, namely, that he based his decision on the fact that the Guerreros’ obligation to apply for relief under the Ordinance was “not triggered until [they] received a large rent increase [notice] from [West Cliff] . . . .” But this was not a finding of the hearing officer; it was merely a recital of what the Guerreros asserted that appeared in the first paragraph of Linn’s eight-page decision. In his conclusion, Linn held that the Guerreros “did not receive adequate notice prior to December 5, 1993 [sic], . . . regarding the existence of the subject [Ordinance], which substantially affected [their] contractual rights, and that [they] should, therefore, be accorded the right to participate as a mobile home tenant under the terms of the subject [Ordinance].” This finding—together with the hearing officer’s entire narrative of the evidence—may reasonably be construed as a conclusion by Linn that the Guerreros met the requirements of section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) of filing an application for relief within 45 days of the date of their acquiring actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance. (See Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 954: “Administrative agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.”)
While the date referenced by the hearing officer here was to “December 5, 1993,” it is clear that this date refers to December 8, 2003, the date that the December 5, 2003 letter increasing the rent by more than threefold was received in the mail by the Guerreros.
West Cliff argues further that Hearing Officer Linn based his decision on irrelevant material, gave undue credence to the Guerreros’ “self-serving testimony and demonstrated “bias that arose from . . . sympathy” toward the Guerreros. Much of this argument concerns Linn’s rejection of evidence that a November 10, 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel transpired, as testified to by Wiedenmeyer and Wright. While we believe the evidence supported that such a meeting, in addition to the September 11, 2003 meeting sponsored by the City, did in fact occur (see fn.8, ante), this does not impact our conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the Guerreros had no knowledge of the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003. And while the decision quite arguably includes a discussion of various matters not essential to the hearing officer’s ultimate conclusion—such as opinions that the Park owner and/or the City should have provided to hispanic Park residents some information in Spanish explaining the substance of the rent control program—this flaw, if it is one, is not fatal.
Finally, West Cliff argues that Hearing Officer Linn’s decision cannot be upheld because the Guerreros’ application failed to meet the requirements of section 22.01.040, subdivision (e), in that it failed to specify the date they gained actual knowledge of the availability of rent control and did not set forth the factual circumstances under which they acquired that knowledge. While the application does not present a clear statement of the date and circumstances under which the Guerreros first acquired knowledge of the availability of rent control, it does include the date, December 8, 2003, on which the Guerreros learned that their rent would be increased more than threefold, indicating that until that time, they “had no reason to believe that [they] would ever be faced with an exorbitant rent increase . . . .” The application went on to state that the Guerreros had never received a copy of the Ordinance from the Park owner. In our view, while the matters that the Ordinance requires to be included in the application should not be ignored, ambiguous or incomplete statements in an unverified application—particularly in the circumstances presented here (i.e., the limited education of the applicants and their inability to read English)—should not be allowed to trump sworn testimony by the applicants or other witnesses that supports a finding that a timely application was submitted within 45 days of the applicants’ acquiring knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance.
West Cliff also challenges the application on the ground that it did not include an attached proof of service showing personal service upon the Park owner as required under section 22.01.040, subdivision (e). As pointed out by Guerreros in their appellate brief, West Cliff did not raise this issue at the administrative hearing. We conclude that this challenge was forfeited and we therefore decline to address it.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandamus is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., McAdams, J.