Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super.Ct.No. CV150914
OPINION
Duffy, J.
West Cliff Lynch Associates, LLC (West Cliff) is the owner of the Clear view Court Mobilehome Park (Park) located in the City of Santa Cruz (City). Ramon Orozco (Orozco) and Maxima Sanchez (Sanchez) (collectively Orozco/Sanchez) are two of the Park’s tenants and owners of a mobilehome unit located there. In late 2003, a dispute arose out of Orozco/Sanchez’s attempt to avail themselves of the benefits of a City ordinance providing for rent control to mobilehome tenants. They did not make a timely election to enroll in the rent control program. Orozco/Sanchez, however, sought relief under an “escape clause” in the Ordinance that permits a mobilehome owner to submit an application for rent control eligibility to the City’s planning director within 45 days of the tenant’s gaining actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance. Their application was rejected by the City, but Orozco/Sanchez prevailed in an administrative appeal. West Cliff’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging that decision was denied by the court below.
The rent control ordinance is discussed in greater detail, post. We will refer to it generally at times simply as the Ordinance.
The parties who filed the petition for writ of mandamus consisted of the owner of the Park, West Cliff, and Green Valley Corp., dba Barry Swenson Builder (Green Valley), which was alleged to have been the property manager for the Park. It is apparent that Green Valley is also an appellant herein. For the sake of convenience, however, we will refer to the procedural steps taken, and the contentions made by appellants (petitioners below) as having been those of West Cliff.
On appeal, West Cliff argues that there was no substantial evidence supporting the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that Orozco/Sanchez did not have actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance until on or about December 8, 2003, which was a date within 45 days of the filing of their application with the City. We conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not err; we will affirm the denial of West Cliff’s petition for writ of mandamus.
We present an abbreviated recitation of facts here. The facts relevant to the disposition of Orozco/Sanchez’s application for rent control eligibility are discussed in part IV.A. of the Discussion, post.
Orozco and Sanchez are husband and wife. They purchased a mobilehome situated in the Park in April 2002 and signed a lease with the former Park owner at or about the same time. Orozco/Sanchez have lived in the Park since in or about May 2002.
Their first attempt to avail themselves of the benefits of rent control under the Ordinance occurred more than one and one-half years later, in January 2004, when they submitted an application to the City. That application was apparently prompted by Orozco/Sanchez’s receipt in December 2003 of a notice increasing their monthly rent from $467.50 to $1,250.00.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2005, West Cliff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus with the superior court, naming the City and Dennis B. Kavanagh (the City’s hearing officer) as respondents and Orozco/Sanchez as real parties in interest. In the petition, West Cliff alleged that the City, acting through Hearing Officer Kavanagh, abused its discretion by granting Orozco/Sanchez’s application for relief. Orozco/Sanchez filed an answer to the petition. After a hearing, the court entered its order on October 10, 2006, denying the petition. West Cliff filed a timely notice of appeal. The matter is appealable. (Wong v. Ohlone College (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382, fn. 3 [order denying writ of mandate, despite absence of entry of separate formal judgment thereon, is final judgment for purposes of an appeal].)
DISCUSSION
I. Issue On Appeal
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the City’s hearing officer erred in granting Orozco/Sanchez’s application for relief to avail themselves of the benefits of mobilehome rent control under the Ordinance. West Cliff argues that there was no substantial evidence—or, indeed, any evidence—from which Hearing Officer Kavanagh could have concluded that Orozco/Sanchez became aware of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance within 45 days of presenting their application to the City. In making this argument, West Cliff essentially focuses on two claimed flaws: (1) the application itself failed to comply with the Ordinance because it did not specify the date on which Orozco/Sanchez became aware of rent control and did not state the circumstances under which they acquired this knowledge; and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the conclusion that Orozco/Sanchez were unaware of the availability of rent control until December 8, 2003, as found by Hearing Officer Kavanagh.
II. Standard of Review
As we recently explained, “a superior court’s review of an agency’s adjudicatory administrative decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is subject to two possible standards depending on the nature of the rights involved. [Citation.] If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a ‘fundamental vested right,’ the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.] . . . [¶] [But w]here no fundamental vested right is involved, the superior court’s review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1056-1057, fns. omitted.)
Review by the appellate court of such matters is governed by the same substantial evidence standard, irrespective of whether the controversy involves a fundamental vested right. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 218.) “Thus, even in those cases where ‘the trial court is required to review an administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, the standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s determination is the substantial evidence test. [Citations.]’ (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) But the reviewing court’s focus changes, depending on which standard of review governed at trial. ‘If the independent judgment test . . . applied at the trial, . . . on appeal, the trial court’s factual bases for its decision, not the findings of the agency, are reviewed.’ [Citation.] ‘If the substantial evidence test governed at the trial level, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the appellate court focuses on the findings made by the agency rather than on findings made by the superior court.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 1989) Appeal from Superior Court Judgment, §§ 14.25, 14.27, pp. 461-464.)
Here, there is no contention that a fundamental vested right was involved, and thus our role is clear: We must determine from a review of the record presented before the City whether there was substantial evidence supporting Hearing Officer Kavanagh’s findings. In our application of this deferential substantial evidence standard, we “begin with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain the [administrative agency hearing officer’s] findings of fact.” (Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 281, 287.)
Principles that apply to the substantial evidence standard of review are familiar. Nonetheless, given the importance of the standard to the disposition of this appeal, we will summarize some of the key features here. (See People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018: “However convoluted the facts, or complex the issues, the standard of review is the compass that guides the appellate court to its decision.”)
As aptly summarized by the Third District Court of Appeal: “ ‘[I]f the word “substantial” [is to mean] anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous with “any” evidence. It must be reasonable . . ., credible, and of solid value . . . .’ [Citation.] The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole record. [Citation.] While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation.]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) If the reviewing court determines that substantial evidence existed to support the trial court’s (or, in this instance, the administrative body’s) findings, it is inconsequential that there may have been substantial evidence from which a contrary conclusion could have been reached. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874.) And “the focus is on the quality, not the quantity of the evidence. Very little solid evidence may be ‘substantial,’ while a lot of extremely weak evidence might be ‘insubstantial.’ [Citation.]” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871-872.)
We apply the above principles in our review of the record below to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support Hearing Officer Kavanagh’s findings.
III. The Mobilehome Rent Control Ordinance
The Ordinance, found at Chapter 22.01 et seq. of the Santa Cruz Municipal Code, includes an introductory statement as follows: “The city council finds that both the allowance of unregulated rent increases upon the sale of a mobilehome, or the sale of mobilehomes for prices inflated as a result of the mobilehome owners’ ability to transfer the benefit of their rent control to mobilehome purchasers, would frustrate its goal of preserving affordable housing stock within the city of Santa Cruz. This goal is advanced only if rents remain affordable and resale prices are not inflated. The council is therefore willing to regulate mobilehome rents only where there is a commitment from mobilehome owners to sell their mobilehomes for affordable prices.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.010, subd. (c).) Therefore, under the Ordinance, only mobilehome owners who make a specific irrevocable election by signing an “irrevocable participation agreement” (IPA), under which they agree to limit the resale price of their units, are eligible for rent control. (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (a).)
All section references are to the Santa Cruz Municipal Code unless otherwise stated.
The Ordinance provides that “[m]obilehome owners who take possession of mobilehomes eligible for rent control under this chapter after the effective date of this chapter shall have one hundred twenty days from the date of possession to execute [an IPA]. Mobilehome owners who take possession of rent-controlled mobilehomes by virtue of the fact that they have purchased their mobilehomes from persons who have executed [an IPA] shall have one hundred twenty days from the date upon which they take possession to apply in writing for [an IPA] in order to retain the rights and protections afforded by this chapter.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (d).)
At the time that Orozco/Sanchez acquired their mobilehome and became tenants of the Park in or about May 2002, subdivision (d) of section 22.01.040 contained a uniform 180-day limitation for a mobilehome owner’s making of an application for an IPA. The Ordinance was amended by the city council on September 23, 2003, to reduce the time as quoted above.
But the next subdivision provides relief for owners who fail to timely execute an IPA. “Notwithstanding the one-hundred-eighty-day limitation period for execution of [IPAs] set forth in [subdivision] (d), mobilehome owners who take possession of mobilehomes eligible for rent control, whether or not the mobilehome was subject to the rent control provisions of this chapter prior to their possession, may be allowed to [execute an IPA] beyond the one-hundred-twenty day limitation period and to receive [an IPA] beyond the one hundred eighty day period upon demonstrating to the planning director that they had no actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter at the time they took possession of their mobilehome and thereafter failed to obtain actual knowledge during the one hundred twenty day period following their possession. Relief from the limitation periods provided for in this [subdivision] shall only be available to those mobilehome owners who submit a written letter of application for relief to the planning director within forty five days of . . . actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter. . . . The letter application for relief under this [subdivision] shall include an explanation of the circumstances giving rise to the applicant’s actual knowledge of the mobilehome rent control available under this chapter, setting forth the date the applicant first obtained actual knowledge . . . . The application shall contain a proof of personal service of a copy of the application upon the mobilehome park owner or the mobilehome park property manager.” (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 22.01.040, subd. (e), italics added.) Section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) requires that the planning director provide a written decision disposing of the application between 15 and 28 days after the application’s filing, which decision may be appealed within 30 days thereafter. (Ibid.)
At the time that Orozco/Sanchez acquired their mobilehome and became tenants of the Park in or about May 2002, subdivision (e) of section 22.01.040 required that such an application for relief be filed with the planning director within 30 days of gaining actual knowledge of the availability of rent control. The Ordinance was amended by the city council on September 23, 2003, to increase the time period to 45 days as quoted above. There is no dispute that the 45-day limitation period applied in this instance.
IV. Review of Hearing Officer’s Decision
As we have discussed, our task is to review the decision of the administrative hearing officer to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence. We will therefore first review in some detail the evidence adduced at the administrative hearing before discussing West Cliff’s challenge to the hearing officer’s decision.
A. Evidence Presented at Administrative Hearing
Orozco and Sanchez are married and live together with their two children. Both Orozco and Sanchez work as laborers for a mushroom farm. They are both from Mexico; Orozco and Sanchez have lived in this country for approximately 16 and 13 years, respectively. Orozco has a second-grade education; Sanchez has an eighth-grade education. Sanchez never studied English in school. Neither Orozco nor Sanchez reads English. Orozco testified that his wife takes care of all of the family’s papers that they receive and that she pays all of the bills.
Orozco/Sanchez purchased a mobilehome from the former occupant of space 31 of the Park and signed a lease for space 31 in April 2002. They have lived in their mobilehome at space 31 of the Park since in or about May 2002. The purchase agreement was in English. Their dealings in the transaction were with a real estate agent, Mayra Perez, who Sanchez understood was representing her. They had no direct dealings with the former owner of the unit, who was apparently Penny Oliver. Perez did not say anything to Orozco/Sanchez about rent control at the time they purchased the mobilehome.
Oliver executed an agreement to participate in the rent control program under the Ordinance in or about December 1999. There was no evidence that Orozco/Sanchez were aware of this fact or that they received a copy of the participation agreement at any time before they filed their application with the City in January 2004.
The lease that Orozco/Sanchez signed was in English. It called for monthly rent of $425 and contained a provision that the landlord could raise the rent upon 90 days’ written notice. Orozco/Sanchez had a discussion in Spanish with Mr. Vierra, former Park owner, at the time they entered into the lease. Vierra did not explain the terms of the lease to them and did not mention anything about rent control. He only explained that the rent might be increased about $8.00 per year. Orozco testified that he had no idea what he signed when he bought the mobilehome because all of the documents were in English.
Corbett Wright, through the entity West Cliff, has a beneficial interest in the Park. West Cliff acquired the Park in June 2002. Shortly before that acquisition, Wright was an observer to a transaction involving a new resident and the former Park owner, Vierra. During the transaction, Vierra reviewed with the prospective residents—who were not Spanish speakers—matters concerning mobilehome ownership, including the availability of rent control. Vierra distributed materials to the prospective residents, including a copy of the Ordinance.
Shortly after West Cliff acquired the Park, it held a barbecue for the residents to introduce the new ownership. Copies of the Ordinance were available at the barbecue, which was heavily attended. Sanchez did not attend the barbecue.
In the fall of 2002, West Cliff had the Park’s new on-site manager, Arden Wiedenmeyer, hand-deliver a package of materials to Park residents. Included in these materials was a copy of the Ordinance.
Danielle Uhariett, a City employee who was the contact person for implementation of the Ordinance, prepared a package at the City Council’s request in May 2002 concerning the Ordinance; it was to be sent to all Park residents and to residents of De Anza Mobile Home Park (the one other mobilehome park in the City that was not resident-owned; De Anza). The package consisted of a cover letter, a copy of the Ordinance, and a list of frequently asked questions. After sending this package to the residents of the Park and De Anza on or about June 20, 2002, the package sent to the residents of space 31 of the Park was not returned by the post office to Uhariett.
Uhariett sent out a similar information package—that also included a copy of the Ordinance and frequently asked questions—to residents of the Park and De Anza on or about August 4, 2003. Again, the package sent to the residents of space 31 of the Park was not returned by the post office to Uhariett.
The City sponsored a meeting held at the Coast Hotel on September 11, 2003, to discuss changes to the Ordinance. The Ordinance was discussed at the meeting and informational materials (including the revised Ordinance) were made available. Wright spoke at the meeting. The meeting was heavily attended, and the vast majority of people there were Park residents. There was a Spanish-speaking interpreter present. Wright did not recall if Orozco or Sanchez attended the meeting.
Another meeting, this time sponsored by West Cliff, was held at the Coast Hotel in November 2003. The owners invited the Park’s residents, specifically the residents who had not elected rent control, to the meeting to discuss the Ordinance changes and how they impacted those residents. There were approximately 35 to 40 people in attendance, and written materials, including copies of the amended Ordinance, were made available. There was a Spanish-speaking interpreter present.
Sanchez and Orozco both testified that they attended the November 2003 meeting. Orozco testified that he did not understand what was said and that the interpreter spoke too quickly. Sanchez testified that she arrived while the meeting was in progress and that there were some men in the front of the room “talking about the rent” and about rent increases. There was an interpreter present, but it was really difficult for Sanchez to understand because there were multiple people talking at once and the interpreter could not translate everything. She left immediately after the meeting and did not stay to speak with the interpreter. She did not take any written materials with her.
Sanchez was uncertain of the date of the one meeting at a hotel that she and her husband attended; she recalled that it was probably in October or November of 2003. It may be reasonably inferred from the record that Orozco/Sanchez did not attend the September 2003 meeting sponsored by the City, but that they did attend the November meeting that West Cliff sponsored.
On or about December 8, 2003, Orozco/Sanchez received a letter dated December 5, 2003, notifying them that their rent was going to be increased to $1,250.00. (They had received one prior rent increase notice in December 2002 in which their rent had been raised from $425.00 to $467.50 per month.) Sanchez took the letter to a neighbor, Antonio, to translate it for her. She asked him if he had received a similar letter, and Antonio responded that he had not. Sanchez asked him why she was the only one having her rent increased. Antonio responded by “ask[ing] if she had her rent control. She said she didn’t know nothing [sic] about the rent control.”
Sometime after talking to Antonio about the rent increase notice, Sanchez met with Uhariett and an interpreter. (Sanchez had gotten Uhariett’s name from Antonio.) She asked Uhariett what she needed to do and what she needed to file. Uhariett responded that it was too late to file anything.
After speaking with Uhariett, Sanchez contacted a workers’ organization, Western Service Worker Association (Western). Western helped to write a letter to the City in English. Sanchez took a letter written in Spanish to Western and they translated it into a letter in English. In that letter, dated January 21, 2004, Orozco/Sanchez applied to the City “for [r]elief from the 180-day limitation period to execute a Participation Agreement under the [Ordinance].”
B. Proceedings Below
On February 12, 2004, the City notified Orozco/Sanchez in writing that it was denying their application for relief. The City wrote that Orozco/Sanchez had “failed to prove that [they] did not have knowledge of the [rent control p]rogram before the expiration of the 180 days nor did [they] provide evidence of when [they] first obtained knowledge of the [p]rogram.” Orozco/Sanchez, through their counsel, timely filed an appeal of that decision on March 14, 2004. The administrative hearing before Hearing Officer Kavanagh transpired on October 6, 2004. On or about November 22, 2004, Kavanagh issued his decision reversing the decision of the City that had denied Orozco/Sanchez’s petition. West Cliff’s mandamus petition followed.
C. Discussion of Hearing Officer’s Decision
We have reviewed the entire record of the administrative agency. Bearing in mind the deferential standard that governs our review as discussed, ante, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support Hearing Officer Kavanagh’s finding that Orozco/Sanchez filed their application for relief within 45 days of the date they acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance.
The evidence supporting that finding of the administrative hearing officer includes, without limitation: (1) Orozco and Sanchez are both Spanish-speaking, they have had limited education, and they have had no education in the English language; (2) neither Orozco nor Sanchez reads English; (3) according to the testimony of Orozco and Sanchez, the subject of rent control under the Ordinance was not discussed at the time they entered into the lease with the former Park owner, Vierra, or at the time they entered into the purchase agreement; (4) none of the notices sent by the City or by the Park owner was in Spanish; (5) after Orozco/Sanchez received a letter (in English) on December 8, 2003, advising them that their rent was to be increased by a factor of more than two and one-half times the then-existing rate, Sanchez testified that she spoke with her neighbor, Antonio, who translated the notice, told her that he had not received a similar rent increase notice, and asked her “if she had her rent control”; (6) Sanchez testified that she responded to Antonio by telling him that she knew nothing about rent control; (7) Sanchez testified that Antonio then referred her to Uhariett; and (8) Orozco/Sanchez submitted an application to the City for eligibility for rent control after Uhariett (according to Sanchez’s testimony) advised them that they were too late to request rent control. There was substantial evidence therefore that Orozco/Sanchez did not have actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance until on or after December 8, 2003, which is a date within 45 days of the filing of their application.
In repeatedly making the argument that there was no evidence in the record that supported a finding that Orozco/Sanchez were unaware of the availability of rent control until December 8, 2003, West Cliff makes no mention of Sanchez’s testimony that she was asked by Antonio about rent control when she took the rent increase notice to him for translation on or about December 8, 2003, and that she replied to him that she knew nothing about rent control.
The record does not reveal the precise date that Sanchez spoke with Antonio after receiving the rent increase notice on December 8, 2003.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that there was significant evidence from which the administrative hearing officer could have concluded that Orozco/Sanchez knew about the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003. Indeed, Hearing Officer Kavanagh expressed the view that it was “a very close case.” The evidence that would have supported a contrary finding by the hearing officer included, inter alia, the following: (1) the prior Park owner, Vierra, at least on one occasion near in time to the commencement of Orozco/Sanchez’s occupancy, reviewed the availability of rent control with prospective tenants; (2) Wiedenmeyer’s hand delivery of materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) in the fall of 2002 to all Park residents; (3) Uhariett’s mailing in June 2002 of various rent control materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) to all Park residents, coupled with the fact that the mailing for space 31 was not returned by the post office; (4) Uhariett’s subsequent mailing in August 2003 of rent control materials (including a copy of the Ordinance) to all Park residents, coupled with the fact that the mailing for space 31 was not returned by the post office; (5) Orozco/ Sanchez’s attendance at the November 2003 meeting sponsored by West Cliff in which the issue of rent control was specifically discussed, rent control materials were made available, and an interpreter was present to translate from English to Spanish; (6) the fact that Orozco/Sanchez did not deny having received materials written in English from the City and others that were hand-delivered; and (7) the language in Orozco/Sanchez’s application stating that “the lease that I signed, and every rent increase I have received since I lived here until 2003, contained ‘rent control formula’ language, further leading me to believe that I did have protection against rent increases . . . .”
We exclude from consideration on this point the evidence of the barbecue hosted by West Cliff in the summer of 2002, or the September 2003 meeting at the Coast Hotel sponsored by the City. There was no evidence that Orozco/Sanchez attended either the barbecue or the September 2003 meeting.
The letter was prepared on behalf of Orozco/Sanchez by a workers’ organization, Western. Moreover, we note that contrary to the statement in Orozco/Sanchez’s application, there was no “ ‘rent control formula’ language” in their lease. We thus disagree with West Cliff that the language in the application itself refuted the Orozco/Sanchez’s contention (found to be true by the hearing officer) that they had no knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance prior to December 8, 2003.
To be certain, the above-cited evidence constituted substantial evidence that would have supported a finding that Orozco/Sanchez did have knowledge of the availability of rent control more than 45 days prior to submission of their application. But it does not negate the existence of substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s finding to the contrary. (See Bowers v. Bernards, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874 [if substantial evidence supported finding, it is of no consequence that reviewing court determines there was significant evidence to support contrary conclusion].)
We must emphasize that section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) only requires that the applicant (1) demonstrate that he or she had no actual knowledge of the availability of mobilehome rent control under the Ordinance within the 180-day period specified in subdivision (d) of that section, and (2) file the application not less than 45 days of acquiring such actual knowledge. Although the Ordinance does not define this italicized term, we may draw on case law to supply such meaning.
In I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 281, the Supreme Court addressed the nature and extent of the duties of a trustee in attempting to provide notification to a trustor/debtor of the existence of a default in connection with nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In emphasizing that the trustee’s statutory duty is to provide notification to the trustor’s last known address if that address differs from the address contained in the trust deed, the court explained: “[The trustor] contends that there is a triable issue as to whether [the trustee] actually knew [the trustor’s] last known address . . . . [¶] The problem with this argument is that [the trustee] did not have actual knowledge of the address of any of the [trustor’s] partners. All [the trustee] had was the names of the partners from their signatures on the note and deed of trust. Actual knowledge is that ‘which consists in express information of fact.’ [Citations.] Although the circumstances might have put [the trustee] on inquiry as to the partners’ addresses, that is by definition constructive, not actual, knowledge. [Citations.] The statute specifically requires actual knowledge. The notice given complied with [Civil Code] section 2924b.” (Id. at pp. 284-285.)
Similarly, in the context of determining whether the purchase of a motor vehicle is made free and clear of an unperfected security interest in the vehicle, this court held that “a buyer who has no actual knowledge of a defect in title is entitled to rely upon the information reflected on the registration and ownership certificates, without further inquiry. [Citation.]” (Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1574, 1587 (Louis & Diederich).) In reaching this conclusion, we cited California Uniform Commercial Code former section 1201, subdivision (25)(a) (now Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1202, subds. (a)-(c)), stating that “[u]nder the Commercial Code, a person has ‘knowledge’ of a fact when ‘he has actual knowledge of it.’ [Citation.] This definition is embodied in the concept of ‘good faith.’ Good faith is ‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’ [Citation.] The good faith of a buyer is therefore to be determined by what he actually knew, rather than what a reasonable man should have known from all the circumstances.” (Louis & Diederich, supra, at p. 1587; see also TME Enterprises, Inc. v. Norwest Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1031 [holding that Cal. U. Com. Code, § 4A-207, subd. (b) provides “immunity from responsibility . . . for a beneficiary’s bank that relies on the account number specified in a wire transfer order to identify the beneficiary of the order” as long as bank has no actual knowledge that beneficiary’s name and account number refer to different people].)
The evidence cited by West Cliff constituted substantial—if not compelling—evidence of Orozco/Sanchez’s constructive knowledge of the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003. That fact, however, does not undermine our conclusion here that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that Orozco/Sanchez acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance within 45 days of the filing of their application.
And much of that same evidence was circumstantial proof of Orozco/Sanchez’s actual knowledge of rent control availability prior to December 8, 2003. (See Gantner & Mattern Co. v. Hawkins (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 783, 786 [actual knowledge may be established through circumstantial evidence].) But as we have concluded, the existence of substantial evidence of a finding that West Cliff urges here cannot be used to support reversal where, as here, there was sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding.
In support of its position, West Cliff cites Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225. There, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that required a convicted felon residing in the City of Los Angeles for more than five days to register with the Chief of Police. The court framed the issue as “whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.” (Id. at p. 227.) It held that “[w]here a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.” (Id. at pp. 229-230.) Although the Lambert court did not define what it meant by “probability of such knowledge,” West Cliff cites the case presumably for its position that Orozco/Sanchez knew about the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003, and that that prior knowledge could be inferred from the evidence presented. To the extent that West Cliff contends that prior knowledge of the availability of rent control on the part of Orozco/Sanchez was constructive, that argument fails as stated above. To the extent that West Cliff argues that there was substantial evidence from which to infer that Orozco/ Sanchez had actual knowledge of the availability of rent control prior to December 8, 2003, we cannot reverse the hearing officer’s decision on this basis; as noted, we have concluded that there was substantial evidence to support his findings, notwithstanding the existence of evidence supporting contrary findings.
West Cliff argues further that the hearing officer did not in fact make a finding that Orozco/Sanchez acquired actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance within 45 days of the filing of the application. It contends that Kavanagh’s “[d]ecision is an exercise in ambiguity” and contains various irrelevant findings and conclusions. While the decision quite arguably includes a discussion of various matters not essential to the hearing officer’s ultimate conclusion—such as opinions that the former Park owner should have provided a lease in Spanish, and it would have been reasonable for the Park owner to have provided a short explanation in Spanish of the Ordinance—this flaw, if it is one, is not fatal. The hearing officer determined that “December 8, 2003, is the date in the petition that apparently triggered [Orozco/Sanchez’s] ‘knowledge’ of the rent control Ordinance.” This finding—together with the hearing officer’s entire narrative of the evidence, his statement that “[i]f ‘knowledge’ of the substance of the rent control Ordinance was obtained by [Orozco/Sanchez] on December 8, 2003, then the petition met the 45 day deadline by one day,” and his finding that Orozco/Sanchez “finally at the last minute sought help from the worker’s association”—may reasonably be construed as a conclusion by Kavanagh that Orozco/Sanchez met the requirements of section 22.01.040, subdivision (e) of filing an application for relief within 45 days of their receipt of actual knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance. (See Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 954: “Administrative agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.”)
Finally, West Cliff argues that Hearing Officer Kavanagh’s decision cannot be upheld because Orozco/Sanchez’s application failed to meet the requirements of section 22.01.040, subdivision (e), in that it failed to specify the date they gained actual knowledge of the availability of rent control and did not set forth the factual circumstances under which they acquired that knowledge. We agree with the hearing officer’s assessment that “[t]he petition is poorly and unartfully drafted and is somewhat vague and ambiguous.” The hearing officer’s decision stated further that “it could be implied that” what Orozco/Sanchez were “trying to get at” in their petition was that December 8, 2003, was “the date . . . that apparently triggered [their] ‘knowledge’ of the rent control Ordinance.” It is apparent that the hearing officer concluded that the application, supplemented with the testimony that he heard, was sufficient to grant relief. In our view, while the matters that the Ordinance requires to be included in the application should not be ignored, ambiguous or incomplete statements in an unverified application—particularly in the circumstances presented here (i.e., the limited education of the applicants and their inability to read English)—should not be allowed to trump sworn testimony by the applicants or other witnesses that supports a finding that a timely application was submitted within 45 days of the applicants’ acquiring knowledge of the availability of rent control under the Ordinance.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandamus is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., McAdams, J.