Opinion
No. 4864.
Argued November 2, 1960.
Decided November 30, 1960.
1. Where a by-law of the Nashua Police Relief Association provided that members who have retired under the provisions of the "Police Pension Act" shall continue members of the association and there was in effect on the date of adoption of such by-law two systems providing retirement benefits for policemen (Laws 1923, c. 226, as amended, and RSA ch. 103) the words "Police Pension Act" were construed as words of general application and intended to apply to retired policemen who were members of either system.
BILL IN EQUITY, brought by Ray E. Wesson to require the defendant to reinstate his name as a retired member of the association with all incidental rights, including life insurance coverage.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts. The Court (Griffith, J.) granted the relief prayed for. The plaintiff, on December 23, 1958, resigned as a member of the Nashua police department after twenty consecutive years of service, and on February 24, 1959, the board of aldermen voted to grant him a pension under the provisions of Laws 1923, c. 226, as amended by Laws 1925, c. 307, entitled "An Act Relating To Pensions For Employees of The City of Nashua." The provisions of said chapter are incorporated into the city charter, the pertinent portion of which provides, "Any employee in any department of said city, existing by virtue of law, may be eligible for pension if he or she has been in such employment for twenty consecutive years." At the time of his retirement the plaintiff was a member of the Nashua police relief association.
In existence is another retirement system, RSA ch. 103, entitled "Policemen's Retirement System" which applies to the permanent policemen of the state and provides under s. 12 that such a policeman may retire from active service upon reaching the age of sixty-five years provided he has served as a permanent policeman for thirty continuous years. This act became effective June 11, 1941. A policeman who retires under this act receives a supplemental pension under the pension provisions of the city charter which were established in 1923.
A policeman is eligible for membership in the Nashua police relief association without being a member of the "Policemen's Retirement System" under ch. 103, and some members of the department are presently members of the association and not members of the "Policemen's Retirement System."
At a special meeting of the board of directors of the defendant association held March 10, 1959, it was voted to cancel the plaintiff's life insurance under a group policy.
All questions of law raised by the agreed statement of facts were reserved and transferred. Other pertinent facts appear in the opinion.
Guertin Widener and Normand R. Pelletier (Mr. Pelletier orally), for the plaintiff.
Louis M. Janelle and Sheehan, Phinney, Bass, Green Bergevin and Richard A. Morse (Mr. Morse orally), for the defendant.
The sole issue presented is the interpretation of Art. X, s. 1 of the by-laws of the Nashua Police Relief Association, Inc., which provides, "Retired members who shall be retired from active duty under the provisions of the Police Pension Act shall continue to be members of this Association, entitled to all benefits thereunder. Whenever a member, however, ceases to be a member of the Police Department or of this Association, except by retirement, he shall forfeit all claims to the funds and property of this Association." The by-laws of the association were adopted September 5, 1941.
It is the contention of the defendant that the benefits incident to membership in the association continue to extend only to those retired members who have retired under the provisions of the "Policemen's Retirement. System." RSA ch. 103.
The plaintiff contends that the provisions of Art. X which continue the benefits of the association to retired members of the police department ". . . who shall be retired from active duty under the provisions of the Police Pension Act . . ." also include those who have retired under the provision of Laws 1923, c. 226, as amended.
The declared purposes of the association as set forth in the by-laws are "(a.) To afford aid and relief to the sick members of the corporation and to help defray expenses caused by the decease of a member or of his wife" and "(b.) To establish peaceful and harmonious relations between its members and their employers, to improve their wages and hours of work, to increase their job security and to better their other working conditions." A member is also entitled to life insurance coverage of five thousand dollars under a group life insurance plan under Art. IX, s. 2.
We think the words of Art. X s. 1 "Retired members who shall be retired from active duty under the . . . Police Pension Act shall continue to be members of this Association . . . ." failed to identify any specific legislative act. (Emphasis supplied). A police officer is entitled to be a member of the association without being a member of the retirement system established by RSA ch. 103. All members pay the same dues. At the time the by-laws were adopted on September 5, 1941, the incorporators presumably were aware of the existence of both Laws 1923, c. 226 and RSA ch. 103, yet no attempt was made beyond the use of the words "Police Pension Act" to further define eligibility for continuing membership in the association after retirement. The words "Police Pension Act" as used in Art. X of the by-laws of the association are construed as words of general application, intended to apply to policemen who are members of either pension plan. The agreed statement of facts indicates that all retired policemen benefit under the provisions of the 1923 act. If members of the association who retired under this act were intended to be excluded from continued membership in the association more distinct identification of the act could readily have been provided. By-laws must be construed reasonably and to limit the application of the act as contended by the defendant would result in discrimination between members of the association. We do not think such a result was intended by the incorporators.
Since the ruling and decree of the Trial Court were consistent with these views the order is
Judgment for the plaintiff.
All concurred.