Opinion
CV-21-00623-PHX-MTL (ESW)
09-23-2021
Arlandis Wesley, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Eileen S. Willett United States Magistrate Judge
TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is Arlandis Wesley's (“Petitioner”) “Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).
I. BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2017, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County found Petitioner guilty on the following counts: (i) Conspiracy to Commit Burglary in the First Degree; (ii) Burglary in the First Degree; (iii) four counts of Kidnapping; (iv) two counts of Armed Robbery; (v) Attempted Armed Robbery; and (vi) Unlawful Flight from Law Enforcement Vehicle. (Doc. 9-1 at 49-51). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of 32.75 years in prison. (Id. at 62-63).
Petitioner filed a direct appeal. On January 31, 2019, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (Id. at 84-88). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 201).
On February 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Id. at 212-214). The trial court appointed counsel, who could not find a colorable PCR claim to raise. (Id. at 216-23). Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Id. at 235-310). On June 18, 2020, the trial court denied relief. (Doc. 9-2 at 36-38). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 4093). On February 11, 2021, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Id. at 121). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme Court.
On April 12, 2021, Petitioner timely filed the Petition (Doc. 1) seeking federal habeas relief. The Petition contains one ground for relief that alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court screened the Petition and ordered Respondents to file an Answer. (Doc. 4). Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 9) on June 21, 2021. Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10) on July 12, 2021. As discussed below, the Court finds that Respondents correctly assert that Petitioner's habeas claim is without merit.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Deference to Last Reasoned State Court Decision
In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner's claims, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's adjudication of his or her claims either:
A. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
B. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).
As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).
As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Clearly Established Federal Law Regarding Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a habeas petitioner arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must establish that his or her counsel's performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard, such that the state court's rejection of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 825 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In assessing the performance factor of Strickland's two-part test, judicial review “must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel's representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers “whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012).
To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland's two-part test, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner's convictions arise from a home invasion occurring in May 2014. As recounted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the facts underlying Petitioner's convictions are as follows:
A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not rebutted this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
¶2 .... In May 2014, D.D. and his friend, J.S., rented a home in Glendale, Arizona. D.D.'s girlfriend L.S. and their one-year-old son A.D. lived there also. J.S. moved his large gun safe into the home's garage. D.D. heard from a neighbor about a theft in the area and installed an alarm system and surveillance cameras.
¶3 On the night of May 6, L.S. went out to dinner and a movie with her sister, C.S., and C.S.'s daughter, M.S. D.D. went to sleep with A.D. in J.S.'s bedroom so that L.S., C.S., and M.S. could sleep in the master bedroom when they arrived home. L.S., C.S., and M.S. arrived home around 1:00 a.m. on May 7, and L.S. activated the alarm system before they went to sleep in the master bedroom.
¶4 Around 6:30 a.m., a red Toyota Camry parked in front of D.D.'s house, and [Petitioner], Arthur Meeds, and Antonio Yanez exited the car and walked toward the house. The three men met up with a fourth man armed with a gun, Eric Boozer, and they entered the home through an Arcadia door.
¶5 D.D. was awakened by a “burning” and “stinging” sensation to his head. He saw a person wearing “pantyhose” over his face and felt Meeds putting pressure on his back. In a “deep, raspy voice, ” Meeds told D.D., “Get up . . . I'm going to kill you. I want the money. I want the power. I got three of my partners in here with me. We're going to get it.” At that point, D.D. “felt a gun put to the back of [his] head, ” and A.D. woke up crying. Knowing that the door to the garage was alarmed, D.D. told Meeds that he had money in the garage and to follow him, intending to set off the alarm and alert the police.
¶6 As Meeds and Boozer walked D.D. down the hall, D.D. “saw a couple more people” in the master bedroom. He also noticed that the hallway closet had been “torn apart, ” items had been scattered “all over the place, ” and the entertainment system and television had been taken off the wall. Further, he noticed “a little hole” near the lock on a window. Around 6:40 a.m., D.D. opened the door to the garage and entered with Meeds pointing a gun at him. As soon as they entered the garage, the alarm activated and initially made a beeping sound. D.D. knew that if he did not deactivate the alarm within ten seconds that it would create a “crazy, ridiculous noise” and also contact the police. After the ten seconds passed, a “siren noise” came on. Meeds made D.D. turn the alarm off and then told D.D. to open the safe in the garage.
¶7 Although the safe belonged to J.S., D.D. had previously seen J.S. open it. He thought he knew the combination but was not able to open it. After D.D. failed to open the safe, Boozer said, “Maybe his son will help him open it. If not,
we'll cut his fingers off.” Meeds told Boozer to get A.D. and pointed the gun at D.D.'s head and said, “This is your last chance . . . If you don't open this [ ] safe, I'm going to blow your head off.” Boozer then returned to the garage with A.D., and the men laid D.D. on the floor while Boozer tried to open the safe. [Petitioner] entered the garage and informed Meeds that D.D. had a safe in his bedroom. As Meeds started to take D.D. to the bedroom, [Petitioner] attempted to open the safe in the garage.
¶8 During this time, Yanez woke up L.S. and C.S. by stating, “Wake up. Wake up. We are the police.” L.S. attempted to get up to retrieve A.D., but Yanez slammed her down on the bed and said, “If you get up, we will shoot you.” L.S. and C.S.'s hands were zip-tied behind their backs and then laid face down on the bed. M.S. remained asleep during these acts.
¶9 After reaching the bedroom, Meeds told D.D. to open the safe in the closet. At this point, L.S. and C.S. saw that D.D. had “blood gushing on the side of his face.” D.D. noticed that a wire was sticking out of the safe, and his attempts to open it were unsuccessful. Meeds then told D.D., “You better stop [mess]ing around and hurry up.” During this exchange, Meeds had lifted his mask above his face, and D.D. saw his face. After further unsuccessful attempts to open the safe, Meeds took D.D. back to J.S.'s bedroom, laid him down on the bed, zip-tied his hands and feet, placed a mirror on top of D.D., and zip-tied D.D. to the mirror. Meeds told D.D., “You know if we don't find nothing in here . . . I'm going to kill you. I'm going to kill you.” Meeds also stated, “If we don't find nothing, we are going to take their I.D.'s and we are going to find and look for them and come back.” Then one of the men took L.S.'s passport out of her purse. D.D. overheard the men talking about using his Cadillac Escalade in the driveway to take one of the safes.
¶10 Officer Joseph Pinda responded to the alarm call, and he arrived at the home around 7:00 a.m. He noticed D.D.'s Escalade parked in front of the house with the engine running, and he pulled up next to the driver-side window. The driverside window lowered, and Officer Pinda saw a black male who appeared nervous. Officer Pinda asked the man what was going on, and the man replied, “I live here.” Then Officer Pinda asked for the house's address, and the man replied,
“[C]'mon man . . . I only lived here for a month.” The man got out of the Escalade, left the car running, and returned to the house through the front door. At that point, Officer Pinda called for backup and waited.
¶11 D.D. heard Boozer inform his accomplices that the police were outside. D.D. then asked Meeds to let him go so that he could tell the police that everything was fine in the house. Meeds removed D.D.'s zip ties and attempted to clean the blood from D.D.'s head. Meeds placed a robe over D.D. and told him to tell the police that everything was fine in the house. Before D.D. went outside, the men noticed that D.D.'s feet were covered in blood. After cleaning D.D.'s feet, Meeds said, “If you don't want nothing to happen to your [ ] family, you better get out there, tell them everything's fine.”
¶12 Around 7:10 a.m., D.D. went out the front door and walked toward Officer Pinda, who noticed that D.D.'s head was bleeding. D.D. told Officer Pinda that four men were in his home doing an “invasion.” During this time, L.S. “heard silence, ” got out of the bed, looked down the hallway, and saw that the area was “clear.” While C.S. remained in the master bedroom with A.D. and M.S., L.S. went into the next room and exited through the room's window with her hands still zip-tied.
¶13 After exiting, L.S. saw [Petitioner] standing behind the gate on the west side of the house. [Petitioner] saw L.S., turned back, looked over the gate, and then walked toward the Camry. Officer Pinda ordered [Petitioner] to stop. [Petitioner] turned to Officer Pinda and stated, “I don't know what's going on, ” got into the Camry, and drove off. L.S. followed [Petitioner] out of the gate and told Officer Pinda to stop [Petitioner] because he was one of the home invaders. Officer Pinda informed other officers to pursue the Camry, and they did so. A SWAT team arrived and entered the house, saw no other suspects, and brought out C.S., A.D., and M.S.
¶14 Police officers pursued [Petitioner], who drove recklessly through stop signs and red lights. He also drove directly at an officer before driving on the sidewalk to get around the officer. The officers lost track of [Petitioner]. Around this time, officers had caught Meeds and Yanez who had fled on foot, but neither person was armed when arrested. Meeds had two of D.D.'s watches in his possession, and L.S.'s passport
was found near a dumpster that Meeds had passed while fleeing.
¶15 A few hours later, a homeowner along [Petitioner's] escape route found a gun in his front yard and called the police. Officers retrieved the gun, which had blood on it. The gun was loaded, had a bullet in the chamber, and the hammer was cocked. A detective learned that [Petitioner] was the registered owner of the red Toyota Camry. One of D.D.'s neighbors had previously seen that car, or a similar car, driving around the neighborhood and thought that the previous car's occupants were “casing” D.D.'s house. The police located and arrested [Petitioner] twelve days after the home invasion.(Doc. 9-1 at 85-86).
Petitioner was initially charged in Superior Court Case No. 2014-121668-003. The State filed a “Request for Rule 609 Hearing” in that case. (Doc. 10 at 12-17). The State recounted that in 1998, Petitioner was convicted of (i) Aggravated Assault-Serious Physical Injury, a class 5 felony, and (ii) Discharging a Firearm at a Structure, a class 3 felony. (Id. at 13-14). The State requested that the trial court determine whether the prior convictions would be admissible to impeach Petitioner if he testified at trial. (Id. at (Id. at 16). However, on April 17, 2017, the trial court dismissed Case No. 2014-121668003 as a new indictment was filed in Case No. CR2017-001601-002. (Attachment 1). On June 6, 2017, the State filed its Notice of Disclosure in Case No. CR2017-001601-002. (Doc. 9-1 at 90-100). In its Notice, the State declared that it intended “to use at trial any prior felony convictions of the defendant or defense witness for impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence.” (Id. at 98). The State, however, did not re-file a “Request for Rule 609 Hearing” in Case No. CR2017-001601-002.
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 609(b) provides that evidence of a felony conviction older than ten years is admissible only if: “(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.”
In his single claim for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's purported failure to “investigate, respond, or object to Rule 609(b).” (Doc. 1 at 6). In his Reply, Petitioner clarifies that he is alleging that his trial counsel failed “to investigate and respond to the State motion for a hearing regarding the use of prior convictions for impeachment purpose” and failed “to inform Petitioner that due to the age of the prior conviction, he could not be impeached if he decide to testify on his own behalf[.]” (Doc. 10 at 1). Petitioner raised the above ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his PCR proceeding. (Doc. 9-1 at 253-55; Doc. 9-2 at 48-52).
The Petition also states: “By failing to order a [Rule 609] hearing, the court failed to perform its duty as a fact-finding forum.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner disputes Respondents' treatment of this statement as a separate habeas claim in their Answer. (Doc. 9 at 20). In his Reply, Petitioner states: “The mischaracterization of a supporting fact as a ‘claim' by the Respondent and the following argument is a smoke screen deserved of none consideration.” (Doc. 10 at 5). To the extent that the Court may conclude that the statement in the Petition regarding the trial court's failure to hold a Rule 609 hearing is a separate claim for habeas relief, the undersigned finds that the claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted for the reasons explained in Respondents' Answer (Doc. 9 at 20).
The last state court decision reviewing Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the February 11, 2021 Arizona Court of Appeals ruling that affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's PCR proceeding. (Doc. 9-2 at 121). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the trial court's decision, the U.S. District Court may review the trial court's decision as part of the review of the Arizona Court of Appeals' decision. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when the last reasoned decision is a state appellate court decision which adopts or substantially incorporates lower state court decisions, the lower state court decisions may be reviewed as part of the review of the state appellate court's decision).
In denying PCR relief, the trial court stated:
Defendant alleges that he was improperly advised about testifying on his own behalf because his priors could not have been used against him pursuant to Rule 609(b), Ariz. R. Evid. However, the Court did not make a decision as to whether his priors could be used to impeach him. The Court was never
asked to make a 609 finding by weighing the probative value or prejudicial impact of the convictions. Defendant may or may not have been impeached with his priors had he testified. The issue was never resolved.(Doc. 9-2 at 37). The trial court found that Petitioner failed to meet both prongs of the Strickland test. (Id.).
“[A] defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). However, a defendant can waive his right to testify and the waiver “need not be explicit.” United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). “Although the ultimate decision whether to testify rests with the defendant, he is presumed to assent to his attorney's tactical decision not to have him testify.” United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993). A defendant who wants to reject his attorney's advice and take the stand may do so by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court, or discharging his lawyer. Id.
An attorney's error in instructing a criminal defendant regarding the defendant's right to testify is subject to the two-prong Strickland test. See, e.g., Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Strickland standard is applicable when a petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective by denying him his constitutional right to testify.”); Rossetti v. United States, 773 F.3d 322, 329 (1st Cir. 2014) (rejecting petitioner's argument that he did not need to show prejudice to obtain habeas relief where his counsel's “erroneous advice caused [petitioner] to surrender his right to testify”).
Here, Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim rests on the speculative assertion that if the trial court held a Rule 609 hearing, it would have deemed Petitioner's prior felony convictions inadmissible. Mere speculation is insufficient to grant a writ of habeas corpus, because “speculation does not give rise to a ‘grave doubt' whether the error had a substantial effect in determining the jury's verdict.” Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, Petitioner's claim that he would have testified if the trial court deemed his prior felony convictions inadmissible is conclusory and self-serving. See e.g., Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2000) (habeas petitioner's self-serving affidavit was insufficient evidence to establish a factual basis for claim); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (“selfserving statement” insufficient to raise claim for relief); Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 792 (D. Ariz. 2008) (a “self-serving, conclusory statement which lacks supporting evidence” is insufficient to establish prejudice on habeas review); Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (to show prejudice resulting from counsel's deficient advice, petitioner must offer more than self-serving statements). Petitioner's claim that his testimony would have changed the outcome of trial is speculative. See Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 640 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[The petitioner's] speculation that his testimony would have left a favorable impression with the jury does not demonstrate the required prejudice under Strickland.”); Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[The petitioner's] self-serving conclusory statement that his testimony would have resulted in an acquittal, standing alone, falls far short of satisfying Strickland's prejudice element.”).
Moreover, Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim rests on the erroneous assertion that the State moved for a Rule 609 hearing in the case in which he was convicted (Case No. CR2017-001601-002). In his Reply, Petitioner states: “Prior to trial, the State announced its intention to use Petitioner's two May 28, 1998 convictions for impeachment purposes if Petitioner decides to testify and requested for [sic] a Rule 609 hearing. Defense counsel failed to file a response to the State request. No Rule 609 hearing was held.” (Doc. 10 at 2). Attached to Petitioner's Reply is a copy of the State's “Request for Rule 609 Hearing” filed in Superior Court Case No. Case No. 2014-121668003. (Id. at 12-17). As discussed, that case was dismissed and the State did not request a Rule 609 hearing in the new case (Case No. CR2017-001601-002). (Attachment 1). Therefore, Respondents accurately state that Petitioner's trial counsel “had no motion to investigate, respond, or object to.” (Doc. 9 at 24).
Finally, the trial court informed Petitioner on the record that he had an absolute right to testify. (Doc. 9-1 at 151). Petitioner answered affirmatively when the trial court asked Petitioner whether it is his decision not to testify. (Id.). Petitioner has not shown that it is reasonably probable that there would have been a more favorable result in the absence of trial counsel's alleged failings. See Sinclair v. United States, 481 Fed.Appx. 354 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting contention that counsel was ineffective because he either failed to advise defendant or misadvised him of his right to testify, stating that the defendant had not “shown that it is reasonably probable that there would have been a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's alleged failings”). The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the state courts' rejection of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. It is recommended that the Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
ATTACHMENT 1
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA MARICOPA COUNTY
State of Arizona
v.
Superstar Arlandis Wesley (003)
CR2014-121668-003 DT
CASE DISMISSED
Courtroom 903 - CCB
State's Attorney: April Sponsel
Defendant's Attorney: Shannon Allen
Defendant: Present
A record of the proceedings is made digitally in lieu of a court reporter.
This is the time set for Final Trial Management Conference.
Court and counsel discuss Defense counsel's Motion to Substitute Counsel.
The Court is informed a new Indictment has been filed in CR2017-001601-002.
The State makes an oral Motion to Dismiss this case without Prejudice.
Counsel for Defense objects and requests the case be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS ORDERED granting the State's oral Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice.
9:56 a.m. Matter concludes.