Summary
In Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes (19 F. Supp. 425) the United States District Court, in passing upon a similar situation, said (p. 434): "These Federal rules do not become effective until July 1, 1937, and it was certainly not the intent of the Congress that motor trucks engaged in interstate commerce should be without regulation of any kind * * * until July 1, 1937."
Summary of this case from PeopleOpinion
No. 15487.
June 18, 1937.
James C. Leaton and Franklin R. Overmyer, both of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., and Jerome F. Dixon, of Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Before EVANS, Circuit Judge, and BARNES and HOLLY, District Judges.
Suit by the Werner Transportation Company and others against Edward J. Hughes, Secretary of State of Illinois, and others.
Injunction denied, and bill dismissed.
This is a suit by Werner Transportation Company and others, common carriers, engaged in the transportation by motor truck of property in interstate commerce on and over the highways of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois, against Edward J. Hughes, Secretary of State of the state of Illinois, and others, officers of the state of Illinois and of counties and municipalities in the state of Illinois charged with the enforcement of the Illinois motor vehicle laws, whereby the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of parts of those laws. A temporary restraining order was granted. The defendants answered and both sides filed affidavits and stipulated that the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction should be regarded as final. That hearing has been had and the case now stands for decision.
In 1935 the General Assembly of the state of Illinois enacted the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, section 131 of which reads as follows:
" Wheel and axle loads
"(a) The maximum gross weight to be permitted on the road surface through any axle of any vehicle shall not exceed sixteen thousand pounds nor shall it exceed eight hundred pounds, per inch of width of tire upon any one wheel. Provided, further, that the gross weight, including the weight of the vehicle and maximum load of any self-propelled four-wheel vehicle shall not exceed twenty-four thousand pounds. The gross weight including the weight of the vehicle and the maximum load of any self-propelled six or more wheel vehicle including the weight of the vehicle and the maximum load, or the gross weight of any self-propelled vehicle operated as a tractor with one semi-trailer, including the weight of said vehicle, and semi-trailer with their maximum loads, or the gross weight of any track type motor vehicle including the weight of the vehicle and its maximum load, shall not exceed forty thousand (40,000) pounds, nor shall any two axles lie in the same vertical plane, nor shall the axle spacing be less than forty inches from center to center; provided, that the axle arrangement shall be such that the proportion of the gross load carried on any axle shall remain constant; and the gross weight, including the weight of the vehicle and maximum load, of any trailer or semi-trailer vehicle pulled or towed by a motor vehicle shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pounds.
"(b) Weight limits 50 per cent. above those provided for herein may be permitted by ordinance in cities having a population of more than 20,000, but such increase shall not apply to vehicles when outside of the limits of such city, nor shall the gross weight of any vehicle operating over any street or highway of this State exceed forty thousand (40,000) pounds." Section 228, chapter 95 1/2, S.H.Rev.Stat.Ill. 1935, paragraph 406, chapter 121, Illinois Revised Statutes 1935.
The plaintiffs charge that this section violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it constitutes an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious interference with the rights of the plaintiffs to use the highway in a reasonable manner and for a lawful purpose; that such regulations have no real and substantial relation to the avowed objects and purposes of the act, that is, to achieve economy in highway costs and to protect the safety and lives of the traveling public, and have no real and substantial relation to any other objects or purposes properly within the police power of the state of Illinois; that the enforcement will not only not achieve such objects and purposes, but will tend to damage and destroy the highways and prevent the free and safe use thereof by the traveling public by increasing the number of vehicles on the highways and diverting the traffic of motor transportation to smaller, overloaded and more dangerous trucks; and that the actual result of its enforcement will be to limit arbitrarily and unreasonably the use of the public highway by motor trucks engaged in interstate commerce.
The plaintiffs further charge that the section violates section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States in that it has operated, and if enforced, will continue to operate, as a direct and substantial burden on interstate commerce; that the maximum gross weight allowed by other states through which pass the channels of interstate commerce into, from and across the state of Illinois, are in excess of the maximum weight allowed by such section, although the highways of such states are no better constructed or maintained than the highways of Illinois and in most cases are not as well constructed or maintained as such highways; that the essential services and functions of interstate commerce cannot be performed by the plaintiffs with the use of motor equipment limited to a maximum weight of 40,000 pounds; that the effect of such disparity is effectively to disturb and block the orderly and efficient flow or transportation through said channels of interstate commerce into, from and across the state of Illinois, and effectively to prevent all interstate motor carriers, of which the plaintiffs are representative, from rendering to the public that adequate, economical and efficient transportation which is essential to the communities served by them and which is required by law, and which it is their duty and desire to perform if permitted so to do.
The facts shown by the affidavits of the parties and bearing on the foregoing contentions may be summarized as follows:
The plaintiffs were required to buy licenses from the state of Illinois for 1937 at a cost in excess of $30,000 and similar amounts were payable in Wisconsin and Minnesota. In 1936 the plaintiffs paid the state of Illinois in excess of $60,000 for gasoline tax for trucks operating over the highways and over $6,000 gasoline tax for trucks operated in the city of Chicago and suburbs.
The freight being carried by plaintiffs from Chicago to Minnesota points is mostly dry, but the haul back is made up of commodities such as butter, eggs, poultry and packing house products which require refrigeration. Between 60 and 80 per cent. of plaintiffs' equipment is of the refrigerator type. For dry commodities a lighter type of uninsulated equipment could be used, but the strength of the refrigerator semitrailer and the protection it gives to all types of commodities makes it highly desirable and efficient. While a refrigerated semitrailer has 1,000 cubic feet capacity, the same as the lighter van type, it weighs 4,000 to 7,000 pounds more than the latter or the open top or stock rack type. Inability to employ this refrigerated equipment in the transportation of all types of commodities would increase the cost of transportation and likewise freight rates. For the plaintiffs to equip themselves with the van or open top type of vehicle for use exclusively in the transportation of dry commodities would be costly because the back haul to Chicago would be largely empty trailers. If the pay load on the refrigerated type of vehicle is held to the present limits, the use value of $250,000 worth of refrigerator equipment of the plaintiffs will be greatly impaired.
Illinois permits the operation of a combination truck and full trailer, the gross weight of which may reach 72,000 pounds. The straight truck deprives the operator of the use of the motive power while the vehicle is being loaded. The tractor used with a semitrailer may be employed in hauling a semitrailer making freight collections while the over-the-road semitrailer is being loaded at the terminal dock. The facilities both of the shippers and carriers are generally such that it is impracticable to back up a full trailer to a loading platform. In only few instances can trucks be fully loaded or unloaded from side doors. The combination of truck and full trailer makes access to a less than truck load shipment in the truck highly impracticable for delivery. The employment of semitrailers facilitates the interchange of equipment between connecting carriers, so that the semitrailer, into which the shipment is loaded by the initial carrier, may be used in making delivery by the connecting carrier.
Illinois law limits the over-all length of the tractor semitrailer to 35 feet. The average tractor measures 14 feet from the center of the front axle to the center of the rear axle. When coupled with a semitrailer, the rear axle of the tractor is 17 1/2 to 18 feet from the axle of the semitrailer. When the semitrailer is equipped with tandem axles, such axles are spaced from 40 to $51 inches apart, so as to allow clearance for the wheels and distribute the weight of the load on the road, and the distance from the rear axle of the tractor to the front axle of the tandem axles is 13 1/2 feet. The extra axle weighs about 4,000 pounds, including its braking equipment. The lowest weight of the tractor semitrailer of the refrigerator type, not having tandem axle, is from 14,000 to 15,000 pounds, but the average weight of those employed by the plaintiffs is 17,000 pounds without tandem axles, and some of the plaintiffs' semitrailers, equipped with tandem axles, weigh 21,000 pounds or more, including the tractor. The gross load permitted by law necessarily influences the pay load of the carrier.
Plaintiffs' tractor semitrailer combinations produce less pavement and bridge stresses than some vehicles and combinations that are permitted by the Illinois statutes.
The bridges in Illinois are not designed to bear greater gross loads than those permitted by statute. Between the years 1912 and 1936, the state constructed 2,730 bridges at a total cost of approximately $48,000,000. They have all been built of either steel or concrete, there being a total of 589 of steel and 2,141 of concrete. There are still 30 old bridges in use which are not strong enough to carry the present gross and axle limits. Many of these old bridges are located upon heavily traveled highways. There are two types of bridges. One is a type designed for H-20 loadings and the other a type designed for H-15 loadings. A bridge designed for an H-20 loading means that it is so designed as safely to bear an H-20 loading train on each lane of the bridge, consisting of one 20-ton truck preceded and followed at intervals of 30 feet by a line of 15-ton trucks. A bridge designed for an H-15 loading means that it is so designed as safely to bear an H-15 loading train on each lane of the bridge, consisting of one 15-ton truck preceded and followed at intervals of 30 feet by a line of 11 1/4-ton trucks. The H-20 bridges have been built in metropolitan areas where the traffic is dense, and the H-15 bridges are in use outside of these areas. Since 1927, the bridges have been designed and built to conform with the increase in gross loads permitted by the statute as amended that year, and, while many of the bridges constructed prior to 1927 carry traffic safely under the present legal load limits, they do so with a lesser margin of safety than is used in designs subsequent to 1927. If the present legal load limits should be increased, the members of the bridges will be stressed beyond the limits upon which the design is based, resulting in damage and destruction to the bridges.
The highways of Illinois are not designed to bear greater axle or gross loads than those permitted by statute. The first Illinois concrete pavements were constructed with a uniform thickness of 7 inches, that is, the pavement was of the same thickness from one side to another. It was then discovered that the edges of the pavements receive greater stress from vehicles passing over them than the center. For that reason, pavements designed since the discovery have been thicker at the edges than at the center. Illinois began to construct what are called nine-six-nine pavements, that is, pavements with a center thickness of 6 inches until it reaches a point 2 feet from either edge, where the thickness is increased to 9 inches. Another discovery was that the allowable stress upon a pavement slab should not exceed 50 per cent. of the ultimate strength of the concrete in order to preserve the pavement from destruction. In other words, there is a certain point at which any given pavement will break from a load imposed upon it. But a few applications of a load having 90 per cent. of the ultimate strength of the pavement will cause breakage. If 80 per cent. should be used, a failure would not appear so soon, but the life of the pavement would be relatively short. A small encroachment of 55 or 60 per cent. might not result in any visible signs of distress for some years, but the pavement's useful life would be decreased. If 50 per cent. or less than the ultimate stress, or modulus of rupture, is imposed upon a pavement slab, there will be no pavement failure. Consequently, all concrete roads recently constructed in Illinois have been designed with a safety factor of two, that is, pavements capable of bearing twice the legal load before the modulus of rupture is reached. This formula contemplates ideal subgrade conditions. It does not take into consideration conditions which provide weaker subgrade support. Among the conditions which the formula did not take into consideration were changeable climatic conditions, unsatisfactory embankment materials, inadequate embankment construction methods, effect of weather on embankments and subgrades, curling of the slab due to changes in temperature of the concrete and cracking of the slab. Changes in temperature and large amounts of precipitation cause bad conditions in the pavement slab which greatly affect the load carrying capacity of the slab. Because of the presence of varied types of soil in Illinois, there is a variance in the supporting power of the subgrade during the seasons of the year. In the case of embankment materials, it is difficult to place them in a state of compaction which is uniform in its supporting power and will prevent settlement of the pavement slab. When the frost leaves the ground, many soils have little supporting power and many change greatly in volume with the addition of a relatively small amount of precipitation. During periods of freezing weather many soils expand greatly, due to the presence of water, and lift the pavement from the subgrade, introducing roughness into the surface, resulting in impact stresses under heavy loads, producing pavement destruction. Daily changes in temperature cause the pavement slab to warp, or curl, thus leaving that particular portion of the slab without subgrade support, so that when a vehicle passes across such portion of a slab, the slab must act as a beam to carry the load back to the point where there is support. As a consequence, it is impossible to increase the load for which the pavement was designed without decreasing the safety factor. In case there is a cracking of the slab at the end of the first year or two after the pavement is constructed, the crack interval averages about 50 feet. As the pavement grows older, the number of cracks increases, so that the average distance between cracks is about 27 feet and, in case of poor subgrade, the crack interval may be as short as 15 feet. These cracks are caused largely by changes in temperature, the passage of heavy loads over the payment when it is lifted off the subgrade by curling or by frost heaves, or in cases where heavy vehicles pass over pavement the subgrade of which is weak. Not only would the life of the pavement be impaired by increasing the present axle limit of 16,000 pounds, but the same result would be produced in case the present gross load limit should be increased, either by increasing the number of axles within the over-all length or by increasing the overall length so that several shorter units might be combined, the operation of such units causing the application of several 16,000 pound loads in rapid succession. Although the great majority of concrete pavements in Illinois are of the nine-six-nine type, this type of pavement has been found to be wholly insufficient in the vicinity of populous districts due to the forces of nature acting in conjunction with the application of heavily loaded vehicles. Accordingly, in 1933 the Illinois Division of Highways changed its policy with reference to the thickness of pavement slabs near those centers and since that time has constructed pavements with a thickness of ten-eight-ten in areas adjacent to the cities of East St. Louis and Chicago. In territory adjacent to cities having populations in excess of 20,000, the thickness of the slab has been increased to nine-seven-nine, and in the case of unincorporated territory not adjacent to cities over 20,000 in population such slab has been increased to a thickness of nine-six and a half-nine.
Subgrade conditions are frequently unstable on fills back of bridge abutments and at other locations. Depressions in the subgrade are usually caused by the action of moisture upon unstable soil and a variety of other causes. Where a weakened subgrade condition exists the pavement slab performs to some extent the functions of a bridge, in which case the total or gross weight imposed upon the slab determines the stress induced upon the material constituting the slab. If the stress produced by such total weight is in excess of the ultimate strength of the material, rupture will occur and the slab will settle into the affected area. Because of the settlement of slabs, it is necessary to raise them by what is called a mud pumping outfit. Since the year 1931, there has been in Illinois a total of 12,050 depressions so raised, covering a total area of 1,082,775 square yards. However, in numerous locations where such settlements have occurred, the pavements have been so badly broken that they had to be entirely rebuilt.
Even under the present legal weight limits, it was necessary for Illinois to spend the sum of $26,715,118.87 between the years 1925 and 1936 in the maintenance, reconstruction and resurfacing of pavement slabs and shoulders upon the paved road system. During the year 1934 the total cost of pavement replacement throughout the state was approximately $191,000. During the year 1936 such replacement cost rose to $248,000. The records for 1936 have not yet been fully compiled but the cost exceeds that of the year 1935. United States route No. 66, between Joliet and Granite City, is a heavily traveled truck route between Chicago and St. Louis. By actual traffic count, the ratio of truck travel on this route, compared with the general average for the state highway system, was 4.5 to 1 during the year 1932 and 4.2 to 1 during the year 1934. The cost of maintenance of route 66 between the years 1925 and 1936, has been the sum of $1,684,363.68, or an average of $763.53 per mile as against an average maintenance cost of $293.20 for the entire highway system of the state. There are highways in Lake county, Ill., which carry heavy truck travel between Chicago and Milwaukee and those that do not. Both sets of highways are of similar thicknesses, are subject to the same climatic conditions and have the same type of subgrades and similar drainage. In the case of the pavements carrying but little truck travel, the pavements are enjoying corparatively normal lives with low maintenance cost. In the case of the pavements bearing excessive truck travel, they are rapidly disintegrating. Whenever a particular piece of pavement begins to carry heavy truck travel, immediately the life of the pavement begins to go down and the cost of maintenance begins to go up. One of the large items of cost of maintenance is in connection with the shoulders. Because of the width of the trucks, they must use the shoulders at frequent intervals when passing other vehicles. On narrow pavements, trucks often run with the outside or dual wheel entirely upon the shoulders. The consequence of this is twofold, first, to increase the cost of maintenance of the shoulders, and second, to create a hazardous condition by causing deep ruts.
There was a total of approximately 209,000 trucks licensed to operate in Illinois last year, and only 99 full trailers. The tractor full trailer combination is impractical from an operating standpoint and is rarely used. The facilities of both the shippers and carriers are such that it is impractical to back up a full trailer to a loading platform.
About 87 1/2 per cent. of the motor vehicles registered in Illinois are passenger cars and about 12 1/2 per cent. are commercial vehicles. The average commercial vehicle weight at ten stations under an exhaustive survey made by the Statewide Planning Survey covering a year's time had a maximum axle weight of 7,418 pounds. That is 46 per cent. of what might be carried under the statute. Only 3.3 per cent. of the local (Illinois) trucks had axle loads in excess of 15,800 pounds, that being 0.34 per cent. of the total traffic. 4.7 per cent. of the foreign trucks had axle loads exceeding 15,800 pounds, the same being 0.18 per cent. of the total traffic; of all trucks weighed, but 3.5 per cent. were found to have axle loads exceeding the maximum and 0.7 per cent. had gross weights approaching and over the maximum. Trucks carrying farm products, such as grain, dairy products and livestock, exceeded the maximum axle loads in 1.4 per cent. of the total. The average maximum axle load of such trucks was 6,986 pounds and the average gross weight was 11,138.
Heavily laden vehicles have the tendency to slow down traffic. This results in a hazardous condition at the crest of grades by reason of the impatience of drivers of passenger cars coming from the rear who attempt to pass the truck in the opposite lane. Illinois is subject to severe winters and it is usually contemplated that roads in the northern half of the state will be subject to ice and slippery pavements about 25 or 30 per cent. of the time. The inability of heavy vehicles to negotiate hills (the grades of many of which approach or exceed 6 per cent.) causes a blockading of the highways. Frequently trucks slide across the roads in such positions as entirely to block them, creating nuisances and endangering the lives and property of other motorists. The Highway Department has had much difficulty in removing such vehicles because of the fact that equipment for that purpose is oftentimes not available nearby. Trucks frequently become stuck in snowdrifts with a similar difficulty in removal. When heavy truck traffic interferes with the operation of snowplows, blockades are found over long stretches of the highways. Lighter trucks can be moved without much difficulty but, as has already been stated, heavy trucks can not. When overloading of trucks does occur, the ratio of the braking load is reduced in proportion to the amount of the overload, resulting in a lower deceleration rate, or an increase in the distance in which the trucks can be stopped, which has a tendency to cause collisions with other vehicles. The heavier the truck, the greater the impact in case of a collision and the more serious the accident. The total number of known vehicles (passenger cars, trucks, busses, school busses, motorcycles and taxis) involved in accidents in Illinois in 1936 was 22,391. The total number of trucks and busses involved in accidents in Illinois in 1936 was 3,295, this being 14.7 per cent. of the total number of known vehicles which is the exact figure of the proportion of commercial vehicles compared to the total of the vehicles using the highways furnished by the Statewide Planning Board. (While the registered trucks in Illinois during 1936 were 12 1/2 per cent. of the total registered vehicles, the actual traffic count taken by the Statewide Planning Board showed that the trucks constituted 14.7 per cent. of the total. This difference can be accounted for because the average truck receives more use than the average passenger car). The total number of vehicles involved in accidents in which death resulted (involving the same types of vehicles just listed) amounted to 2,506. Of this number 509 were trucks and busses which is 20.3 per cent. of the total number of known vehicles involved in fatal accidents. These figures disclose that an accident in which a truck is involved is more severe and more serious than one in which passenger cars are involved. They fail to disclose the accidents indirectly caused by trucks, occasioned by passenger cars passing trucks on hills or in long lines of traffic or overturning on deep shoulder ruts made by trucks, which are not reportable accidents as far as trucks are concerned. There are many such accidents.
In 1935, the Congress of the United States enacted the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 (section 201 et seq. [ 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.]). Section 204(a)(1) ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(a)(1) thereof is as follows: "It shall be the duty of the Commission — (1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this chapter, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment."
Section 225 of the act ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 325) provides: "The Commission is hereby authorized to investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation of the sizes and weight of motor vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles and of the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of all motor carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle; and in such investigation the Commission shall avail itself of the assistance of all departments or bureaus of the Government and of any organization of motor carriers having special knowledge of any such matter."
On December 23, 1936, the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to authority conferred by section 204(a)(1), prescribed rules relating to the "Reporting of Accidents," effective April 1, 1937, and rules relating to the "Qualifications of Drivers," "Driving of Motor Vehicles," and "Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation," all effective July 1, 1937.
The plaintiffs charge that by the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 the Congress exercised the power to regulate the size and weight of motor trucks used in interstate commerce and that, accordingly, the power of Illinois to regulate the size and weight of such trucks has ceased, and that section 131 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (section 228, chapter 95 1/2, S.H.Rev.Stats.Ill. 1935, paragraph 406, chapter 121, Illinois Revised Statutes 1935) is, and since the date of the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, has been, void and of no effect as regards such motor trucks.
The plaintiffs further charge that the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, has completely superseded sections 33, 34, 35, 221, 222, 224, 227, 229, 231 and 237 of chapter 95 1/2, Smith-Hurd's Rev.Stats.Ill. 1935, paragraphs 28 to 30, both inclusive, of chapter 95a and paragraphs 399, 400, 402, 405, 407, 409, 415, of chapter 121, Illinois Revised Statutes 1935, in so far as they may apply to motor trucks engaged in interstate commerce, and such other provisions of said acts as regulate other matters relating to the safety of operation and equipment and standards of equipment of trucks engaged in interstate commerce, and the qualifications of drivers employed by motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce; and that such provisions are, and since the date of the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.), have been, void and of no effect as to such motor trucks and carriers.
Does section 131 of the Illinois Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 95 1/2, § 228), violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution because its provisions, fixing the maximum weights of motor vehicles, constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with the rights of the plaintiffs to the use of the highways of Illinois? In exercising its authority over its highways, the state may prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. Limitations of size and weight are manifestly subjects within the broad range of legislative discretion. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 1167; Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 548, 550, 71 L.Ed. 966; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997; Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris (D.C.) 59 F.2d 437. In Morris v. Duby, supra, it was said: "The mere fact that a truck company may not make a profit unless it can use a truck with load weighing 22,000 or more pounds does not show that a regulation forbidding it is either discriminatory or unreasonable. That it prevents competition with freight traffic on parallel steam railroads may possibly be a circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of such a limitation, though that is doubtful, but it is necessarily outweighed when it appears by decision of competent authority that such weight is injurious to the highway for the use of the general public and unduly increases the cost of maintenance and repair."
The language of the court in Sproles v. Binford, supra, is particularly applicable here: "When the subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the Legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set aside because compliance is burdensome." See, also, Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 586, 49 S.Ct. 430, 73 L.Ed. 856.
The fact that, under the Illinois statute, a tractor full trailer combination weighing 72,000 pounds may be used while plaintiff's tractor semitrailer combination weighing 45,000 pounds may not be used does not invalidate the statute. The Legislature, in making its classifications, is entitled to consider frequency and character of use and to adapt its regulations to the classes of operations, which, by reason of their extensive as well as constant use of the highways, brought about the conditions making the regulations necessary. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 52 S.Ct. 595, 76 L.Ed. 1155, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Sproles v. Binford, supra. In Carley Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66, at page 72, 50 S.Ct. 204, 207, 74 L.Ed. 704, 68 A.L.R. 194, it was said: "That the Legislature may graduate the fees according to the propensities of the vehicles to injure or to destroy the public highways, and may exempt those with respect to which this tendency is slight or nonexistent, cannot be doubted."
We are of opinion that section 131 of the Illinois statute, fixing maximum weights for motor vehicles, is a reasonable exercise of police power and involves no such arbitrary or unreasonable discrimination as to justify this court in declaring it violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Does section 131 of the Illinois Act violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by imposing an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce? A state is properly interested in preventing, and should be allowed considerable latitude to enact statutes designed to prevent undue wear and destruction of roadbeds, overcrowding and congestion of highways and use of highways by vehicles dangerous to traffic because of size and weight. 31 Mich. Law Rev., p. 934. While, of course, a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce in the absence of national legislation especially covering the subject, the state may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways and the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its own citizens. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385; Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 548, 71 L.Ed. 966; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167. Plaintiffs say that the statute in question directly burdens interstate commerce because the maximum gross weights allowed by adjoining states are in excess of the maximum weight allowed by the statute in question. The real question here is not whether the weight allowed by Illinois is less than those allowed by Minnesota and Wisconsin, but is, rather, whether the regulations imposed by Illinois bear some reasonable relation to the results sought to be accomplished. Carley Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66, 71, 50 S.Ct. 204, 206, 74 L.Ed. 704, 68 A.L.R. 194; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 48 S.Ct. 502, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385. We believe that there is a reasonable relation between the limitation of weights prescribed by Illinois and the results sought to be accomplished and that, accordingly, the statute does not impose an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce.
We now come to the question as to whether section 131 of the Illinois Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 95 1/2, § 228), has been superseded by the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, and particularly by section 204(a)(1) thereof ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(a)(1), which has been quoted above. We are clear that it has not been superseded. The fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission is expressly given the power by section 225 of the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935 ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 325), to investigate and report on the need for federal regulation of the size and weight of motor vehicles negatives the idea that the power to regulate the size and weight of motor vehicles was embraced in the more general language of section 204(a)(1). Other courts, which have considered this question, have arrived at the same conclusion. L. L. Freight Lines v. Railroad Comm. of Florida (D.C.) 17 F. Supp. 13; Barnwell Bros. v. South Carolina State Highway Dept. (D.C.) 17 F. Supp. 803; Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines (Tex.Civ.App.) 92 S.W.2d 296.
Sections 41, 42, 43 and 44 of an act of the General Assembly of the state of Illinois, entitled "an Act in relation to the regulation of traffic," approved July 9, 1935 (sections 138 to 141, both inclusive, chapter 95 1/2, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Revised Stats. 1935) relate to the reporting of accidents to the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the state of Illinois. As has been indicated above, the rules relating to "Reporting of Accidents," prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to the authority conferred by section 204(a)(1) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, became effective April 1, 1937, and the question arises, Have those rules superseded the Illinois statutes in question? The rule applicable has been well stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, at page 533, 32 S.Ct. 715, 726, 56 L.Ed. 1182, as follows:
Is, then, a denial to the state of the exercise of its power for the purposes in question necessarily implied in the Federal Statute? For when the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished — if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect — the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power. Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, 9 Ann.Cas. 1075; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 378, 32 S.Ct. 160, 56 L.Ed. 237; So. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 436, 32 S.Ct. 140, 56 L.Ed. 257.
"But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state."
See, also, Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 147, 148, 23 S.Ct. 92, 47 L.Ed. 108; Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 256, 51 S.Ct. 458, 462, 75 L.Ed. 1010; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 209, 71 L.Ed. 432; Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143, 47 S.Ct. 548, 549, 71 L.Ed. 966. The making of a report, whether it be to the Interstate Commerce Commission or to the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the state of Illinois, cannot be said to be an end in itself. Presumably the reports are required in order that the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the one hand, and the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the state of Illinois, on the other, may determine whether the laws and rules in force are operating in accordance with the legislative intent. One purpose of the reports to the Highway Commission is doubtless the gathering of statistics upon the operation of the laws relating to sizes and weights of trucks and, as we have seen, that is one field of regulation which the federal government has not entered. Accordingly, so far as the reporting of accidents is concerned, the federal law and the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribed in pursuance thereof may be given their full force and effect and yet there is ample room for the operation of the state laws relating to the reporting of accidents. It results that sections 41, 42, 43 and 44 (sections 138 to 141 of chapter 95 1/2, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Revised Stats. 1935) have not been superseded by the federal law or by the rules prescribed in pursuance thereof.
As we have seen, the other rules prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to section 204(a)(1) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, that is, rules relating to "Qualification of Drivers," "Driving of Motor Vehicles," and "Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation," do not become effective until July 1, 1937. No doubt some of these rules relate to some of the same subjects covered by various of the provisions of the Illinois Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways and sections 33-35, chapter 95 1/2, Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats., paragraphs 28-30, chapter 95a, Ill.Rev.Stats. (Illinois Motor Vehicle Act), but we think the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Railway Comm., 297 U.S. 471, 480, 56 S.Ct. 536, 539, 80 L.Ed. 810, is applicable: "In any event, we think that section 20(5) cannot be read as authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to supplant state power to regulate depreciation rates of telephone companies except by prescribing a rate administratively determined by the commission itself. A direction that the commission, as soon as practicable, prescribe depreciation rates, is hardly to be read as authority to permit the telephone companies to fix the rates for themselves in defiance of state power."
See, also, Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 29 S.Ct. 214, 53 L.Ed. 352; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 39 S.Ct. 403, 63 L.Ed. 886; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 159, 51 S.Ct. 65, 72, 75 L.Ed. 255. These federal rules do not become effective until July 1, 1937, and it was certainly not the intent of the Congress that motor trucks engaged in interstate commerce should be without regulation of any kind in the respects provided by these rules until July 1, 1937. If on or after July 1, 1937, the state attempts to enforce laws which are inconsistent with and superseded by the federal statute and rules, it will then be early enough for the plaintiffs to apply for relief.
It results that plaintiffs' application for an injunction should be denied and their bill dismissed for want of equity.