Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering

13 Citing cases

  1. Drake Ins. Co. v. King

    606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980)   Cited 55 times
    Noting where seller's attempted transfer of motor vehicle to purchaser was void, purchaser had no title to transfer to subsequent purchaser

    The law will not permit one to take advantage of his own wrong. Werner Stove Co. v. Pickering, 119 S.W. 333, 334 (Tex.Civ.App. 1909, no writ). See also 43 A.L.R.2d 814, 826 (1955).

  2. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Maddox

    155 Tex. 284 (Tex. 1956)   Cited 18 times

    It is true in that case that the parties were cotenants, but we think what the court has said applies with equal force here though the petitioner is denominated an innocent 'trespasser' instead of a 'cotenant'. Judge Critz cites with approval Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333, quoting at length from the opinion by Judge Pleasants. In that case, as in this, the cutting of the trees resulted from an innocent and unintentional trespass.

  3. Kirby Lbr. Co. v. Temple Lbr. Co.

    125 Tex. 284 (Tex. 1935)   Cited 29 times
    In Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 125 Tex. 284, 83 S.W.2d 638, 642, Justice Critz expresses the opinion which we feel governs the evidence in this case, to wit: "It is impossible for us to announce any hard and fast standard by which it can always be absolutely determined when a fact is conclusively established so as to present a pure question of law.

    Under such a rule it is held that the owner of timber may reclaim it when manufactured into lumber, cross-ties, shingles, etc. The E. Bolles Woodenware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 433, 1 Sup. Ct., 398, 27 L.Ed., 230; Young v. Pine Ridge Lumber Co. (Civ. App.), 100 S.W. 784; Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering (Civ. App.), 119 S.W. 333; Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Jones' Ex'rs. (Civ. App.), 77 S.W. 955; Baker v. Wheeler Martin, supra; DeWitz v. Saner-Whiteman Lumber Co., supra. Notwithstanding the above rule manufactured value will not be applied in regard to timber cut and appropriated where the trespass is the result of inadvertence or mistake, or where the person committing the wrong acted in good faith, and without any intention of committing a wrongful act. Of course the act must not be in reckless disregard of the rights of the owner, but the act must be wilful and the wrong intentional, or committed under such circumstances that the law will impute malice.

  4. Withers v. Tyler County Lumber

    326 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 7 times

    But where a person acting in bad faith cuts another's timber, and increases its value by labor and money spent on it, there is a continuing act of conversion, or different stages thereof, and the owner may elect at what point he will hold the wrongdoer and in such case there is no offset for such labor or increase in value. Brown v. Pope, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 65 S.W. 42; Ripy v. Less, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 492, 118 S.W. 1084; Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333. However, the wrongdoer may be held for the highest value only while the article is still in his possession or control, and not for a still higher value that an innocent third person who purchases from the wrongdoer may bring about.

  5. Stevenson v. Record Pub. Co.

    107 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)   Cited 4 times

    There is evidence in the record in substance that the present publication and mailing list is new and complete, and entirely distinct from the list upon which a lien was given, save and except that as the result of an advertising campaign possibly some old subscribers to the paper published by the former corporation are now included in the list of subscribers to the paper of the same name now published by Fisk. We recognize the rule with reference to accession laid down in the authorities cited by appellant, to wit: First Nat. Bank v. Western Mort. Inv. Co., Ltd., 86 Tex. 636, 26 S.W. 488; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 125 Tex. 284, 83 S.W.2d 638; American Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 519, 114 S.W. 176, 180; Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333; 1 C.J. 382; 11 C.J. 501; 1 Tex.Jur. 240. But we are of the opinion that it is not shown that they are necessarily applicable to the facts of the instant case.

  6. Bozeman Mortuary Association v. Fairchild

    253 Ky. 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934)   Cited 20 times
    In Bozeman Mortuary Asso. v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74 68 S.W.2d 756, it was held that one in possession of stolen property could have no rights superior to those of the thief, and in a situation somewhat similar to the one before us that, as a thief could not claim title to parts added by him to the automobile he had stolen as against its owner, neither could one who had acquired it innocently and in good faith.

    " See, also, 1 R. C. L. 124; Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333. We are now led to the inquiry whether the defendant Fairchild is to be regarded as a willful or unintentional trespasser.

  7. Ochoa v. Rogers

    234 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)   Cited 10 times

    "It is therefore the general rule that, where it can be shown that the labor and materials of an innocent trespasser contributed more to the value of the present chattel than those materials which he took without intending a wrong, he is entitled to keep the chattel as his own, making, however, due compensation to the owner of the materials for what he took." In this state the rule is even more liberally applied, according to the opinion of Chief Justice Pleasants in Werner v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333: "It is a well-settled rule of decision in other jurisdictions that, when the appropriation of property is made in good faith under a mistake of facts, and the taker has by labor expended upon said property converted it into a thing entirely different from the original and of greatly increased value, the title to the property will pass to the person by whose labor the change has been wrought, and the original owner can only recover the value of the article at the time it was taken.

  8. North Texas Lumber Co. v. First Nat. Bank

    186 S.W. 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)   Cited 7 times

    The rule so far adopted by the courts in this state seems to be that where the trespass was not willful, but the result of an honest mistake, the trespasser is liable only for the value of the property converted while in its natural state. Railway Co. v. Jones, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77 S.W. 955; Young v. Pine Ridge Lumber Co., 100 S.W. 784; Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333. The evidence offered and rejected, when considered in connection with that which was admitted, was sufficient at least to present an issue for the jury as to whether the appellant acted in good faith and under an honest belief that it had a legal right to appropriate the timber.

  9. Grayson v. Boyd

    185 S.W. 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)   Cited 3 times

    He invokes the rule applied in a number of cases in this state that, where the conversion of property is the result of a mistake made in good faith, and not intentional, the value of the property when first taken must govern, and not the value of the finished product. Pettit et al. v. Frothingham et al., 48 Tex. Civ. App. 105, 106 S.W. 907; Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77 S.W. 955; Bayle et al. v. Norris et al., 134 S.W. 767; Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering et al., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333; Callen v. Collins et al., 56 Tex. Civ. App. 620, 120 S.W. 546. Upon the authority of this principle it is asserted the correct measure of damage was the value of the ungathered crop, as it stood in the field, rather than the measure applied in the third issue.

  10. De Witz v. Saner-Whiteman Lumber Co.

    155 S.W. 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)   Cited 6 times

    In other words, the act of taking or trespass must have been willful and without the belief in good faith that he had the right to make appropriation thereof. This rule has been substantially adopted and followed in this state in the following cases: Railway v. Jones, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77 S.W. 955; Young v. Lumber Co., 100 S.W. 784; Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S.W. 333. But has the rule any application to a case where one person cuts and sells the trees, knowing at the time that he is not the sole owner of the land, but that he is only a tenant in common with others?