The plaintiffs in error present their case under two general propositions: (1) That this is an action against the state of Oklahoma and cannot be maintained without the consent of the state granted by direct legislative enactment; and (2) that there is no law which enjoins upon the state of Oklahoma, or the state highway commission as the agents thereof, the return of the check involved in this action. The rule defining the distinction between an action against the state and an action against state officers was laid down and applied by this court in the following cases: Wentz v. Ingenthron, 146 Okla. 165,294 P. 154, 155; Wentz v. Board of Com'rs, 147 Okla. 173, 295 P. 599; Wentz v. Dawson, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493, and Hawks v. Seay, 150 Okla. 160, 1 P.2d 148; and it was stated as follows: "When officers of the state act under invalid authority, or exceed or abuse their lawful authority, and thereby invade private rights that are secured by the Constitution, an action to redress injuries caused by the unauthorized act is not a suit against the state, since the acts of officials that are not legally authorized, or that exceed or abuse authority of discretion conferred upon them, are not acts of the state."

"The State Highway Commission is created and vested with powers and duties necessary to fully and effectively carry out all of the objects of the act creating it, and, when acting consistently with said act, it cannot be enjoined from using the funds in its possession and under its control in constructing and improving highways which it is authorized to construct and maintain, except such funds as are raised by the issuing of bonds or taxation for a designated purpose; such funds must be used for the purpose raised and designated." The judgment appealed from prevents the expenditure of the money raised by the road bonds issued by Pottawatomie county for any purpose other than for the purpose raised, and does not attempt to interfere with the lawful functions of the State Highway Commission. Wentz et al. v. Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County, Okla., 147 Okla. 173, 295 P. 599; Wentz et al. v. Ingenthron et al., 146 Okla. 165, 294 P. 154; Wentz et al. v. Dawson, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493. Upon the authority of the cases cited herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

ssary or proper parties. Chancery Rule 18; Walls v. Skelton, 215 Ala. 357, 110 So. 813; Travis v. First Nat. Bank, supra; 21 C. J. 303; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 23 S.Ct. 115, 47 L.Ed. 183; Modoc County v. Spencer, 103 Cal. 498, 37 P. 483; Hughson v. Crane, 115 Cal. 404, 47 P. 120; Carruthers v. Astoria, 72 Or. 505, 143 P. 899, 1106; Dixon Township v. Board, 25 Kan. 519; Hoffman v. Board, 18 Mont. 224, 44 P. 973; Leitch v. Wentworth, 71 Ill. 146. Moneys collected for educational purposes in Alabama are trust funds, and cannot be lawfully used for purposes other than educational purposes. Const. 1901, §§ 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 269; Gen. Acts 1927, p. 148, § 2-K; Mobile School Com'rs v. Putnam, 44 Ala. 506; Francis v. Peevey, 132 Ala. 58, 31 So. 372; McKinnon v. State, 70 Fla. 561, 70 So. 557, L.R.A. 1916D, 90; State v. Springfield, 6 Ind. 83; New Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U.S. 185, 21 S.Ct. 347, 45 L.Ed. 485; Chadron v. Daws County, 82 Neb. 614, 118 N.W. 469; Wentz v. Dawson, 149 Okl. 94, 299 P. 493. Advances to the state on warrants issued prior to the current fiscal year cannot be lawfully paid from current educational revenue. Const. 1901, § 213; People v. Board, 52 N.Y. 556; Billeter v. State H. Com., 203 Ky. 15, 261 S.W. 855.

To hold otherwise would be an unwarranted interference with the discretion of the State Highway Commission as to the location and improvement of the highways of the state. Wentz v. Ingenthron, 146 Okla. 165, 294 P. 154; Wentz v. Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County, 147 Okla. 173, 295 P. 599; Wentz v. Dawson, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493; Hawks v. Seay, 150 Okla. 160, 1 P.2d 148. The fact that a contract existed in this case between plaintiff and the State Highway Commission calling for the construction of the "south road," can form no basis for a right in plaintiff to enjoin the building of the "north road." We next consider plaintiff's right to require construction of the "south road," or to the return of the money.

Applicable here are some decisions with reference to the highway, one being the application of control of the department by this court in the routing of highways, and the expenditure of public moneys, and the other the decision of the court upon the constitutionality of the legislative act on the subject of the removal of a highway commissioner. See Wentz v. Dawson, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493, concurred in by all the members of the court except one who was absent and not participating. See the recent case of Thomas v. Wentz, decided Sept. 23, 1932, 159 Okla. 124, 15 P.2d 65.

They appealed from the judgment to this court. The issues of law presented are identical with the issues presented to this court in Wentz v. Dawson, decided May 19, 1931, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493. The determination of those issues in that cause makes it unnecessary for us to restate them here. They are herein applied.

"The State Highway Commission is created and vested with powers and duties necessary to fully and effectively carry out all of the objects of the act creating it." Wentz v. Dawson, 149 Okla. 94, 299 P. 493, 494; Hawks v. Seay, 150 Okla. 160, 1 P.2d 148. "Rules and regulations adopted by the state highway commission under authority of a statute and not inconsistent with the purpose of such statute are binding and controlling in all transactions had thereunder, and the same rules are applicable thereto in determining whether a duty arising thereunder is discretionary or ministerial as applied to a statute."