Wenc v. City of New London

12 Citing cases

  1. Wenc v. City of New London

    235 Conn. 408 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 30 times
    In Wenc v. New London, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995), the trial court concluded that the allegations in each of the plaintiff's three counts arose out of a "highway defect," a pole in the traveled way, and that the plaintiff's failure to plead a cause of action under the highway defect statute rendered the complaint insufficient.

    It would serve no purpose to repeat what the trial court has already so aptly stated. Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 667 A.2d 87 (1995). To the extent that the plaintiff, on appeal, seeks to argue that the trial court should have denied the motion to strike based upon a claim under General Statutes § 7-232 or § 13a-152, we decline to consider this argument, which should have been addressed in the first instance to the trial court.

  2. Genovese v. Fairfield

    2010 Ct. Sup. 22835 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010)

    " Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Town of Fairfield's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the first count sounds in public nuisance, "even if a complaint does not contain allegations concerning the violation of a statute, that complaint may still contain allegations sufficient to invoke such statute." Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn.Sup. 45, 50, 667 A.2d 87 (1994), aff'd and adopted, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995). "[W]hether the facts alleged would, if true, amount to a highway defect according to the statute is a question of law . . . [A] highway defect is [a]ny object in, upon, or near the traveled path, which would necessarily obstruct or hinder one in the use of the road for the purpose of traveling thereon, or which, from its nature and position, would be likely to produce that result . . . [I]f there is a defective condition that is not in the roadway, it must be so direct a menace to travel over the way and so susceptible to protection and remedial measures which could be reasonably applied within the way that the failure to employ such measures would be regarded as a lack of reasonable repair."

  3. Fair v. Woodstock

    2008 Ct. Sup. 20006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    Put another way, § 13a-149 is the sole remedy against a municipal corporation for injuries related to negligence involving defective public walkways. See Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn.Sup. 45, 50, 667 A.2d 87 (1994), aff'd, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995). Section 13a-149 is a separate and distinct abrogation of governmental immunity; see White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); to which the exception to liability found in § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) does not apply. The defendants have failed to show that governmental immunity under § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) bars the plaintiff's claim.

  4. Terrenzi v. Durham Agricultural Fair Ass'n

    2005 Ct. Sup. 8714 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

    See Salzman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 389, 71 A. 500 (1908). In Connecticut, courts have construed highway defects to include, inter alia; a malfunctioning traffic light, Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 219 Conn. 203, a broken street sign, Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 225 Conn. 330, unsanded ice and snow, Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 294 A.2d 290 (1972), a public utility poles, Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn.Sup. 45 (1994), and potholes, Steele v. Stonington, supra, 225 Conn. 217. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's allegations "satisfy the essential purpose of the statute, which is to address conditions that might expose a person to danger as a traveler upon the highway."

  5. Sumrow-Kovalsky v. New Haven

    2003 Ct. Sup. 7389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

    Even though the plaintiff has not specifically pleaded that the defendant violated § 13a-149, the complaint may, nevertheless, contain allegations sufficient to invoke the statute. See Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 255 Conn. at 340 (action based on nuisance "necessarily invoke[s] the defective highway statute"); Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 50, 667 A.2d 87 (1994), aff'd. on other grounds, 234 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995) ("even if a complaint does not contain allegations concerning the violation of a statute, that complaint may still contain allegations sufficient to invoke such statute").

  6. Beamon v. HNS Management

    2003 Ct. Sup. 2357 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

    The granting of a motion to strike is appropriate where General Statutes § 13a-149 is the plaintiff's sole and exclusive remedy. Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 50-51 (1995), affirmed, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995). The plaintiff in the instant matter concedes that the defendant New Haven correctly characterizes the cause of action alleged in the Fifth Count, as one sounding in common-law negligence.

  7. Szczepanski v. Wolcott

    2002 Ct. Sup. 13604 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    On the other hand, a highway defect under the statute need not consist of a defect in the roadway itself, as long as there is a necessary connection to the roadbed. See Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 219 Conn. 202. See also Wenc v. City of New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 667 A.2d 87 (1994), aff'd, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995) (allegedly improper location and maintenance of utility pole); Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 200-03 (faulty traffic light). In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the Town, by digging up Woodtick Road or by placing "objects" on it or permitting them to remain, "obstructed or endangered" the "passage of travelers" on the highway.

  8. Smigala v. Brookfield

    2002 Ct. Sup. 9024 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    Moreover, many courts have considered the issue of whether § 13a-149 is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy in the context of a motion to strike. SeeDonohue v. Greenwich, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 026082 (August 20, 2001, Booth, J.); Boice v. New Britain, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 504976 (June 29, 2001, Shapiro, J.); Anchini v. Waterbury, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 148208 (November 29, 2000, Weise, J.); Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 667 A.2d 87 (1994), aff'd 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995). In claiming that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under § 13a-149, the defendant is testing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings and should have filed a motion to strike.

  9. Morninstar Robishaw v. N. Eng. C.R.R.

    2000 Ct. Sup. 8350 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)

    In support, the defendants argue that the proviso in General Statutes § 52-557n (a)(1) that "no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149" is not specifically limited to municipalities. The defendants rely on Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 50, 667 A.2d 87, aff'd, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995), and Gerlach v. Town of Brookfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 300493 (April 12, 1994, Moraghan, J.) ( 9 C.S.C.R. 513), where both courts granted the municipalities' and the municipal employees' motions to strike on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to plead their highway defect claims pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-149, which is the exclusive remedy. This court is not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the exclusivity of the highway defect statute should be extended to apply to municipal employees.

  10. Ferreira v. Pringle

    1999 Ct. Sup. 9558 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 568, 569 A.2d 518 (1990)." Wenc v. New London, 44 Conn. Sup. 45, 50, 667 A.2d 87, aff'd, 235 Conn. 408, 667 A.2d 61 (1995). In Wenc v. New London, supra, the plaintiff raised the same argument as the plaintiff does here.