Opinion
HHDCV106012959S(X03)
11-09-2017
D'Anna Welsh v. William V. Martinez, Jr. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AGAINST DEFENDANT WILLIAM V. MARTINEZ, JR. (#229.00) AND ORDER OF CONTEMPT
Ingrid L. Moll, J.
Before the court is the plaintiff D'Anna Welsh's post-judgment Motion for Contempt Against the Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr. (Dr. Martinez), dated May 2, 2017 (#229.00) (motion). The motion seeks an order finding Dr. Martinez in civil contempt of: (1) Judge Graham's Asset Standstill Order, which is described below; and (2) Judge Robaina's Second Asset Disclosure Order, also described below. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 2, 2017, pursuant to Practice Book § 1-13A et seq., the plaintiff filed the instant postjudgment motion for contempt and accompanying memorandum. (##229.00, 230.00.) A request for adjudication was filed on May 9, 2017. (#232.00.) On July 18, 2017, Dr. Martinez filed an objection to the motion. (#244.00.) On August 1, 2017; the plaintiff filed her reply. (#245.00.) An evidentiary hearing, approximately three hours in length, was held on August 2, 2017 (contempt hearing), during which the court heard sworn testimony and admitted into evidence numerous exhibits. The plaintiff called three witnesses David Baker, vice president of corporate security and the custodian of records of Farmington Bank; Jamie Cook, manager of legal service of process and the custodian of records of People's United Bank; and Dr. Martinez. Counsel on behalf of Dr. Martinez did not call any witnesses. On August 3, 2017, following a hearing in a related matter, the court received into evidence an additional exhibit relating to the instant motion, which plaintiff's counsel inadvertently had not moved into evidence. At all relevant times, Dr. Martinez has been represented by counsel, and Dr. Martinez personally appeared at the contempt hearing.
Welsh v. Martinez, No. HHD-CV16-6072658S(X03), judicial district of Hartford, complex litigation docket.
II
FINDINGS OF FACT
Procedural Background
This matter was tried to a jury in 2012. In the operative complaint, the plaintiff asserted four counts against Dr. Martinez, namely, tortious invasion of privacy, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent misrepresentation, arising out of Dr. Martinez's installing electronic surveillance equipment in the plaintiff's home and motor vehicle in order to monitor her activities. On June 25, 2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on all counts and awarded her $2,000,000 in damages. Thereafter, the trial court, Robaina, J., awarded the plaintiff a sum of $360,000 as punitive damages. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, and Dr. Martinez appealed therefrom. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. Welsh v. Martinez, 157 Conn.App. 223, 225, 114 A.3d 1231 (2015). Dr. Martinez is aware of the judgment and its affirmance on appeal.
A recitation of the evidence presented at trial is set forth in Welsh v. Martinez, 157 Conn.App. 223, 225, 114 A.3d 1231 (2015).
On July 9, 2012, the court, Graham, J., entered the following order in the above-captioned matter (herein " Asset Standstill Order"):
The Defendant William Martinez is enjoined from voluntarily transferring or encumbering any assets except business assets in the ordinary course of business and personal assets for ordinary living expenses, including court ordered alimony and child support.(#130.50.) Dr. Martinez became aware of the contents of the Asset Standstill Order shortly after it was entered. He understood that his wages could be used only for ordinary living expenses and family court judgments.
On July 31, 2012, the court, Robaina, J., entered an asset disclosure order, which stated the following:
Plaintiff is allowed to attach up to $2 million of the defendant's property and Defendant is to provide a disclosure of assets by August 10, 2012. No wage garnishment to be sought at this time.(#131.86.) In response thereto, on August 10, 2012, Dr. Martinez's counsel provided a letter to plaintiff's counsel identifying what Dr. Martinez regarded as non-exempt assets. The letter did not disclose, for example, a Charles Schwab pension or IRA account held by Dr. Martinez that contained over $500,000.
On or about April 19, 2013, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion for order of compliance requiring Dr. Martinez to provide a complete asset disclosure under oath. Dr. Martinez objected through counsel, arguing in part that the disclosures did not have to include exempt assets. Thereafter, on or about June 24, 2013, the court, Robaina, J., rejected that argument and entered its second asset disclosure order (Second Asset Disclosure Order), requiring quarterly asset disclosures to the plaintiff by Dr. Martinez under penalty of false statement. (#167.86.) Dr. Martinez reviewed the Second Asset Disclosure Order at the time such order entered. The Second Asset Disclosure Order provides in part that each disclosure must identify:
(a) Any and all real property, personal property, title, rights, and thing of value whatsoever, in which Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr. has an interest from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure;
(b) Any and all wages paid to Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr., including amounts, formulas, and their scheduled dates of disbursement, from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure;
(c) The financial institution, location, account number, and monthly balances of all bank or trading accounts ever held by, in the name of, or for the benefit of Defendant William V. Martinez Jr. from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure; and
(d) Any and all debts due and owing to Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr. from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure.Id. ¶ 1. The order further provides in part:
Upon disclosure, the defendant may claim exemption as to any asset. For any such claim, a hearing shall take place to determine the status of such asset. If such asset has been attached or encumbered in any way by the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to relief as allowed by law.Id., p. 11. Stated differently, Dr. Martinez was required to include in the court-ordered disclosures not only non-exempt assets but also any assets that Dr. Martinez maintained were exempt.
Dr. Martinez acknowledged at the contempt hearing that the requirement to disclose exempt assets, as well as non-exempt assets, is clear.
Because the plaintiff's motion challenges Dr. Martinez's handling of five categories of assets (i.e., wages, three BMWs, a Prudential retirement account, guns, and a $50,000 promissory note), the court's factual findings relating to each category are addressed separately below.
Wages
In October 2012, Dr. Martinez was on the payroll of Cardiothoracic Surgery, P.C., where he enjoyed an annual salary in the range of $800,000 to over $1 million. (He remained on the payroll of Cardiothoracic Surgery, P.C., until he began employment at Saint Francis Hospital, specifically, Saint Francis Medical Group, Inc., in or about January 2015, where his annual salary was and remains fixed at $1.2 million and results in an annual after-tax amount of over $700,000.)
In October 2012, Dr. Martinez was the sole holder of an account at Farmington Bank, into which he had regularly deposited his earnings from Cardiothoracic Surgery, P.C. In October 2012, the account was " frozen" as a result of the collection efforts of counsel for the plaintiff. Immediately upon learning of these efforts, Dr. Martinez deposited his wages into a different account at a different bank under a different name, namely, an account at People's United Bank held solely in the name of his then-wife Cristina Martinez (Cristina). On October 22, 2012, Farmington Bank, having received a writ of attachment served by plaintiff's counsel, informed Attorney Jamie Mills, counsel for the plaintiff, that it was holding $26,717.83 in response thereto. Two days later, on October 24, 2012, Dr. Martinez's Farmington Bank account (of which Dr. Martinez was the sole account holder) received, from a Wells Fargo account, an electronic funds transfer of $46,485.00 (the description for that line item in the account statement is " Cardiothoracic S Payroll"). That same day, the credit to the Farmington Bank account of $46,485.00 was reversed; that is, those funds were electronically withdrawn and reversed back to Wells Fargo. Dr. Martinez acknowledged arranging for the reversal of such deposit and for its subsequent deposit into a People's United Bank account held solely in the name of Cristina. Dr. Martinez had full access to Cristina's People's United Bank account, including the use of an ATM card bearing Cristina's name, as well as possession of the password information to access the account online. Thereafter, Dr. Martinez directed that the entirety of his wages be deposited into that account through early 2017. He directed that his wages be deposited in such a fashion to avoid the freezing of his funds and so that he could still have access to such funds.
Meanwhile, beginning in September 2013, Dr. Martinez's quarterly asset disclosure identified People's United Bank accounts ending 9743 and 7658; however, the disclosure did not indicate that Dr. Martinez was not an account holder. Accordingly, in or about December 2013, plaintiff's counsel served a writ of attachment on People's United Bank directed to Dr. Martinez's purported accounts ending 9743 and 7658. People's United Bank responded that it " found that William Martinez Jr. do[es] not maintain accounts at People['s] United Bank."
The plaintiff moved, and the court admitted, into evidence, among other things, bank records from Cristina's People's United Bank accounts--of which she was the sole account holder--showing Dr. Martinez's wage-related deposits from December 27, 2012 through March 24, 2016. The court has carefully examined Dr. Martinez's quarterly asset disclosures, the aforementioned People's United Bank records, and the Farmington Bank records relating to the October 2012 activity described above. Based on that review and the testimony provided during the contempt hearing, the court has determined that during the period October 24, 2012 through March 24, 2016, on at least forty-six (46) occasions, Dr. Martinez directed the deposit of his wages into a People's United Bank account held in the name of Cristina only, in an amount totaling at least two million two hundred twenty thousand four hundred dollars and sixty-seven cents ($2,220,400.67). The practice continued through early 2017.
In May 2017, Dr. Martinez and Cristina divorced. From March 2017 through the time of the contempt hearing in August 2017, Dr. Martinez has deposited his wages into a Pioneer Valley Credit Union (Pioneer Valley) account in Springfield, Massachusetts, which Dr. Martinez opened in his name. Dr. Martinez does not have a residence or other dwelling in Massachusetts, is not aware of any Pioneer Valley branches in Connecticut, and did not look for a credit union in Connecticut. Moreover, for the period 2010 through his opening of the Pioneer Valley account in 2017, Dr. Martinez had never used an account maintained outside the state of Connecticut for the deposit of his wages.
BMWs
From 2013 to May 2017, Dr. Martinez owned an interest in three BMWs, specifically, (1) a 2008 BMW M5; (2) a 2007 BMW X5; and (3) a 2010 BMW 328X (collectively, BMWs). Although the BMWs are included in Dr. Martinez's August 10, 2012, July 29, 2013, and September 23, 2013 quarterly asset disclosures, Dr. Martinez's disclosures from December 20, 2013 through March 29, 2017 (which is the, last asset disclosure before the filing of the instant motion for contempt) do not identify his ownership interest in any of the BMWs. The 2010 BMW 328X was given to Cristina as part of the divorce between Cristina and Dr. Martinez in May 2017.
Prudential Retirement Account
In July or August 2016, Dr. Martinez opened a Prudential retirement account through his employer, but he did not disclose the account in any of the quarterly asset disclosures supplied to the plaintiff prior to the filing of her motion for contempt. While Dr. Martinez maintains such account is exempt, he also claims that its omission from the asset disclosures was inadvertent.
Guns
From 2013 through at least the time of the contempt hearing, Dr. Martinez has owned a number of guns. The first quarterly asset disclosure to include the guns was July 3, 2017, after the plaintiff filed the instant motion for contempt. Despite his knowledge of the Second Asset Disclosure Order, requiring each asset disclosure to identify not only non-exempt assets but also any assets that he maintains are exempt, Dr. Martinez did not include the guns in any prior asset disclosure because of his belief that the guns are exempt and because of his " distrust" of plaintiff's counsel.
Promissory Note
The court admitted into evidence a $50,000 promissory note dated May 14, 2007 from Cardiac Surgery, P.C. payable to Dr. Martinez ($50,000 promissory note). Dr. Martinez does not know whether the $50,000 promissory note was ever paid. The note was never disclosed on the court-ordered asset disclosures. Prior to any of the quarterly disclosures, Dr. Martinez made no effort to learn whether the note was ever paid. Based on communications with his accountant, Dr. Martinez is of the belief that he is not owed any money by Cardiac Surgery, P.C.
III
LEGAL STANDARD
The following legal principles instruct the court's decision. Practice Book § 1-13A, entitled " Contempt, " provides:
(a) Any person or court officer misbehaving or disobeying any order of a judicial authority in the course of any judicial proceeding may be adjudicated in contempt and appropriately punished.
(b) Contempt may be either criminal or civil. When criminal, it may be summary or nonsummary criminal contempt.
Practice Book § 1-13A. Practice Book § 1-21A, entitled " Civil Contempt, " provides:
The violation of any court order qualifies for criminal contempt sanctions. Where, however, the dispute is between private litigants and the purpose for judicial intervention is remedial, then the contempt is civil, and any sanctions imposed by the judicial authority shall be coercive and nonpunitive, including fines, to ensure compliance and compensate the complainant for losses . Where the violation of a court order renders the order unenforceable, the judicial authority should consider referral for nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings.(Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 1-21A.
The court's analysis consists of two levels of inquiry. First, the court " must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Avery v. Medina, 174 Conn.App. 507, 516, 163 A.3d 1271 (2017). Second, if the court " conclude[s] that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, " it must then determine " whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding." (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also Edmond v. Foisey, 111 Conn.App. 760, 772, 961 A.2d 441 (2008) (alleged contemnor has " the right to demonstrate that [his] noncompliance was excusable").
" Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense . . . Contempts of court may also be classified as either direct or indirect, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the court . . . [C]riminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court, while civil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party . . . A contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public . . . Sanctions for civil contempt may be either a fine or imprisonment; the fine may be remedial or it may be the means of coercing compliance with the court's order and compensating the complainant for losses sustained . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DPF Financial Holdings, LLC v. Lyons, 129 Conn.App. 380, 385, 21 A.3d 834 (2011).
" [C]ivil contempt proceedings may be used to compensate a complainant based on his or her actual loss: 'Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained . . . Where compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence of [ the ] complainant's actual loss, and his right, as a civil litigant, to the compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the basic controversy. Civil contempt proceedings are not punitive--i.e., they are not imposed for the purpose of vindicating the court's authority--but are purely remedial . . .' (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 278-79, 471 A.2d 638 (1984)." DPF Financial Holdings, LLC, 129 Conn.App. at 386-87.
A trial court is " not required to provide the defendant with an opportunity to purge [himself] of [his] contemptuous behavior. 'When a fine is compensatory, the contemnor need not be offered the opportunity to purge [himself] of the contemptuous behavior.' [ Edmond, 111 Conn.App.] at 773, 961 A.2d 441. The opportunity for a contemnor to purge [himself] 'is only a consideration when punishment, such as imprisonment or a noncompensatory fine, has been imposed in accordance with the finding of contempt.' In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 198, 802 A.2d 772 (2002)." DPF Financial Holdings, LLC, 129 Conn.App. at 386.
IV
ANALYSIS
A
The plaintiff first moves for contempt based on Dr. Martinez's alleged violation of the Asset Standstill Order by virtue of his depositing all of his income, for the period October 30, 2012 through March 24, 2016 (i.e., at least $2,402,916.95), into a People's United Bank account held solely in the name of Cristina.
The court first considers whether the Asset Standstill Order is clear and unambiguous with regard to Dr. Martinez's use of his wages. " [T]he construction of [an order or] judgment is a question of law for the court . . . As a general rule, [orders and] judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the [order or] judgment . . . The interpretation of [an order or] judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding [its] making . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed . . . The [order or] judgment should admit of a consistent construction as whole." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Cords, 165 Conn.App. 473, 484-85, 139 A.3d 778 (2016).
As stated above, the Asset Standstill Order provides:
The Defendant William Martinez is enjoined from voluntarily transferring or encumbering any assets except business assets in the ordinary course of business and personal assets for ordinary living expenses, including court ordered alimony and child support.(#130.50.) Such order makes clear that, with regard to personal assets, Dr. Martinez is enjoined from voluntarily transferring or encumbering any personal assets except those necessary " for ordinary living expenses, including court ordered alimony and child support." Dr. Martinez does not claim that the Asset Standstill Order is unclear and/or ambiguous. And there is no dispute that Dr. Martinez's wages are " personal assets" under the Asset Standstill Order. Indeed, Dr. Martinez acknowledged during his testimony at the contempt hearing that, pursuant to the Asset Standstill Order, his wages may be used only for ordinary living expenses and to satisfy family court judgments. The court concludes that the Asset Standstill Order is clear and unambiguous.
The court next examines Dr. Martinez's wages-related conduct based on the factual findings set forth in part II of this opinion. As soon as Dr. Martinez learned that plaintiff's counsel had served a writ of attachment on Farmington Bank, where he had historically deposited his wages into an account under his name only, he arranged for the reversal of an electronic funds transfer of his next payment of wages in the amount of $46,485.00. Continuously thereafter, during the challenged period October 30, 2012 through March 24, 2016, on at least 46 occasions, Dr. Martinez deposited his wages into a People's United Bank account held in Cristina's name only, in an amount totaling at least $2,220,400.67. By directing the deposit of his wages in such a manner, Dr. Martinez made it impossible for the plaintiff to attach the People's United Bank accounts. Indeed, when the plaintiff attempted to serve a writ of attachment on People's United Bank, the bank responded that Dr. Martinez did not maintain any accounts there. Moreover, once his wages were deposited in one of Cristina's People's United Bank accounts, he directed their use for whatever purpose he wished and did not limit such use to ordinary living expenses and family court obligations.
In defense of his wages-related conduct, Dr. Martinez takes the position that the actions he took were necessary in order to provide for his family. This position fails for at least two reasons. First, Dr. Martinez made no effort to limit the use of his deposited wages to ordinary living expenses, including alimony and child support. Instead, he directed expenditures to keep up a lavish lifestyle, including the purchase of diamond earrings, a David Yurman watch, trips to Jamaica, a trip to the Grand Canyon, annual family trips to New York City, at least a partial payment for a BMW, country club membership dues, and dining out approximately five nights per week. Dr. Martinez's testimony that these expenditures constitute ordinary living expenses is readily rejected. See United States SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 546 F.Supp.2d 132, 135-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Second, " [a]n order of the court must be obeyed until it has been modified or successfully challenged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 530, 710 A.2d 757 (1998). Dr. Martinez never sought a modification of the Asset Standstill Order and/or other court approval to permit the handling of his wages in the manner described herein. Instead, he essentially engaged in a gross exercise of self-help, which the law disallows, and wilfully disobeyed the Asset Standstill Order by depositing the entirety of his wages for the period October 30, 2012 through March 24, 2016 into Cristina's bank accounts, outside the reach of the plaintiff. See Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 720, 784 A.2d 890 (2001) (even " where there is an ambiguous term in a judgment, a party must seek a clarification upon motion rather than resort to self-help"). To exonerate Dr. Martinez's wages-related conduct " would be an undue inducement to litigants' exercise of self-help." Eldridge, 244 Conn. at 532.
In sum, Dr. Martinez's construction and/or application of the Asset Standstill Order to permit his deposit of the entirety of his wages into an account in Cristina's name only and to permit his directing the expenditures of such funds in whatever manner he wished is unreasonable as a matter of law because it would render superfluous the Asset Standstill Order's limitation on the transfer or encumbrance of personal assets. See City of Groton v. Yankee Gas Services Co., 224 Conn. 675, 689 n.13, 620 A.2d 771 (1993).
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Dr. Martinez's depositing the entirety of his wages into Cristina's People's United Bank accounts for the period October 30, 2012 through March 24, 2016 constitutes a series of wilful violations of the Asset Standstill Order. Because the entirety of his income was deposited to an account held in the name of Cristina alone, he is deemed to have " voluntarily transferr[ed] or encumber[ed]" his income (i.e., a personal asset) beyond what was necessary " for ordinary living expenses, including court ordered alimony and child support." Dr. Martinez engaged in such conduct knowingly, with full knowledge of the Asset Standstill Order, and for the express purpose of placing the entirety of such funds outside the reach of the plaintiff (i.e., with the intention of depriving the plaintiff of significant statutory postjudgment procedures authorized by chapter 906 of the General Statutes). The court therefore finds Dr. Martinez in civil contempt. The court imposes the compensatory fine described in part V of this decision, which shall serve the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for actual losses.
In making the finding of contempt herein, the court recognizes that " contempt is a drastic remedy . . . that, under normal circumstances, should not be used to enforce a routine monetary judgment or award of costs in lieu of the statutory collection procedures." Pease v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 325 Conn. 363, 370, 157 A.3d 1125 (2017). However, this case, which does not involve the collection of a " routine debt, " falls well outside the parameters of " normal circumstances, " where Dr. Martinez has gone to great lengths to deprive the plaintiff of the ability to use statutory collection procedures. The court concludes that extraordinary circumstances warrant the court's use of the contempt power in the present case. Id. at 378.
B
The plaintiff also moves for contempt based on Dr. Martinez's failure to disclose his ownership interest in the BMWs and his guns, alleging that such omissions are wilful violations of the Second Asset Disclosure Order's requirement that he disclose " [a]ny and all . . . personal property . . . in which Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr. has an interest from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure." Even if the court were to find that such omissions constitute wilful violations of the Second Asset Disclosure Order, there is no factual basis in the record relating to their value to support a compensatory fine in any particular dollar amount. See DPF Financial Holdings, LLC v. Lyons, 129 Conn.App. 380, 386-88, 21 A.3d 834 (2011) (amount of compensatory fine must have factual support in record). Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion with respect to the BMWs and the guns is denied.
C
The plaintiff also moves for contempt based on Dr. Martinez's failure to disclose the Prudential retirement account during the period described above, claiming that such omission constitutes a wilful violation of the requirement in the Second Asset Disclosure Order that he disclose " [t]he financial institution, location, account number, and monthly balances of all bank or trading accounts ever held by, in the name of, or for the benefit of Defendant William V. Martinez Jr. from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure." Based on Dr. Martinez's testimony, the court finds that the omission of the Prudential retirement account from the quarterly asset disclosures resulted from a genuine oversight and does not constitute a wilful violation of the Second Asset Disclosure Order.
D
Finally, the plaintiff moves for contempt based on Dr. Martinez's failure to disclose the $50,000 promissory note, claiming that such omission constitutes a wilful violation of the requirement in the Second Asset Disclosure Order that he disclose " [a]ny and all debts due and owing to Defendant William V. Martinez, Jr. from the period of July 9, 2012 through the date of the disclosure." Based on Dr. Martinez's testimony, the court finds that the omission of the promissory note from the quarterly disclosures did not constitute a wilful violation of the Second Asset Disclosure Order. The court finds that, based on communications with his accountant, Dr. Martinez reasonably believed at all relevant times that he is not owed any money by Cardiac Surgery, P.C., and that, therefore, the $50,000 promissory note was not a debt due and owing to him that had to be disclosed.
V
ORDER OF CONTEMPT
Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to Practice Book § 1-21A and the court's inherent contempt powers, the court finds defendant William V. Martinez, Jr., in civil contempt of the Asset Standstill Order as a result of his wages-related conduct described herein. The court hereby imposes on Dr. Martinez a fine of two million two hundred thousand dollars ($2,200,000), payable directly to the plaintiff, D'Anna Welsh, in an amount of $25,000 per month, until such fine is paid in full. See DeMartino, 192 Conn. at 278-79; Practice Book § 1-21A. Each monthly payment must be delivered on or before the tenth day of each month. Monthly payments shall commence in December 2017. The court finds that Dr. Martinez has sufficient income and other assets that render him financially able to pay the monthly amount ordered herein.
The amount of the fine represents the plaintiff's proven, actual losses as a result of Dr. Martinez's wilful violations of the Asset Standstill Order.
If Dr. Martinez fails to make any of the monthly payments ordered herein in a timely manner, the plaintiff or her counsel may file an " Affidavit of Nonpayment" with a certification that a copy thereof was electronically delivered to counsel for Dr. Martinez. In such event, the court will entertain a motion by the plaintiff for appropriate sanctions, including but not limited to incarceration.
A judgment of contempt is hereby rendered against defendant William V. Martinez, Jr., in accordance with the order herein.