Welsh v. Gist

20 Citing cases

  1. Halldin v. Usher

    49 Cal.2d 749 (Cal. 1958)   Cited 17 times
    In Halldin v. Usher, 49 Cal.2d 749 [ 321 P.2d 746], after reviewing substantial parol evidence introduced relative to the effect of an instrument as a contract or as a testamentary instrument, the Supreme Court commented (at p. 753), "Accordingly it would seem that the words `whole control' in the present document are not so free from ambiguity as to prevent the court from resorting to extrinsic evidence to ascertain their meaning.

    Cases in other jurisdictions are cited by him to the effect that if it had been the intention of the parties to transfer a fee interest more apt language would have been used. On the other hand, in Barnett v. Barnett, 117 Md. 265 [ 83 A. 160, 162, Ann.Cas 1913E 1284], it was held that the words "absolute control" transferred a fee interest, and in Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606 [ 61 A. 665], it was held that the words "full control" also vested a fee interest. Accordingly it would seem that the words "whole control" in the present document are not so free from ambiguity as to prevent the court from resorting to extrinsic evidence to ascertain their meaning.

  2. Taylor v. State of Idaho

    62 Idaho 212 (Idaho 1941)   Cited 5 times

    ) "The phrase 'full control' when unqualified, of necessity implies complete domination," ( Welsh v. Gist, [101] Md. [606], 61 A. 665, 666). In Boyles v. County Court of Barbour County, 116 W. Va. 689, 182 S.E. 868, the court considering "An act . . . . providing, for state control of alcoholic liquors" said:

  3. Farmers Bond Mtg. Co. v. Walker

    207 Iowa 696 (Iowa 1929)   Cited 6 times

    The word "control" has various significations, depending on the circumstances and connection in which it is used. 2 Words Phrases 1549; 1 Idem (2d Ser.) 1021. The word may be so used as, with the context, to imply and confer complete dominion and ownership, with the consequent power of disposition. Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606 ( 61 A. 665). Of itself, however, the word is ordinarily the equivalent of "manage," "direct," "govern," "supervise," as conferring the usual power of a trustee, and, with respect to real property at least, without power of disposition. Bramell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201 (37 S.W. 924, 58 Am. St. 619); Randall v. Josselyn, 59 Vt. 557. (10 A. 577); Wolffe v. Loeb, 98 Ala. 426 (13 So. 744).

  4. Bell v. Forti

    584 A.2d 77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)   Cited 3 times
    Finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether out of wedlock daughter fell within class of testator's "lawful descendants"

    Maryland, however, has long adhered to the doctrine that an "heir is never to be excluded on mere conjecture." Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 611, 61 A. 665 (1905). Although a parent can disinherit a natural child, McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 238, 533 A.2d 690 (1987) (quoting Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 549, 59 A.2d 499 (1948)), the implication that the parent meant to do so "must be obvious, and not merely possible or probable; for the title of the heir at law being plain, no words in a will ought to be construed in such a manner as to defeat it, if they can have any other signification."

  5. Television Arts v. Jerry Fairbanks, Inc.

    164 Cal.App.2d 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 5 times

    Cases in other jurisdictions are cited by him to the effect that if it had been the intention of the parties to transfer a fee interest more apt language would have been used. On the other hand, in Barnett v. Barnett, 117 Md. 265 [ 83 A. 160, 162, Ann.Cas. 1913E 1284], it was held that the words `absolute control' transferred a fee interest, and in Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606 [ 61 A. 665], it was held that the words `full control' also vested a fee interest. Accordingly it would seem that the words `whole control' in the present document are not so free from ambiguity as to prevent the court from resorting to extrinsic evidence to ascertain their meaning.

  6. Crawford v. Crawford

    296 A.2d 388 (Md. 1972)   Cited 5 times
    In Crawford v. Crawford, 266 Md. 711, 715, 296 A.2d 388 (1972), Judge Singley for the Court referred to "the well-settled rules of construction" reviewed extensively by Judge Niles in McElroy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 229 Md. 276, 283-84, 182 A.2d 775 (1962), and said that "the distillation of [them] is that the general intent of the testator is in every case the controlling consideration."

    Francis I clearly intended to create a terminable interest. He did not devise an estate generally or indefinitely, with power to dispose, as was the case in Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 61 A. 665 (1905). Mrs. Crawford's interest lasted only until death or remarriage, with a power to divide between named remaindermen, who would otherwise take undivided interests in the whole.

  7. Fersinger v. Martin

    36 A.2d 716 (Md. 1944)   Cited 13 times

    In cases of repugnancy where the words and clauses cannot stand together and have effect, the subsequent must prevail as denoting a subsequent intention. Hollins v. Coonan, 9 Gill. 62; Manning v. Thruston, 59 Md. 218; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 610, 61 A. 665; Pattison v. Farley, supra; Carey v. Dykes, 138 Md. 142, 146, 113 A. 626. In the case of Pattison v. Farley, supra, the testator devised and bequeathed absolutely unto his wife all of his estate, both real and personal, during the term of her natural life, together with all the appurtenances to the said estate belonging, to have and to hold the said estate in her own absolute right for life. The court in that case held that the wife took a life estate only and not an absolute fee, and at the expiration of her life estate, the testator died intestate.

  8. Darnall v. Connor

    161 Md. 210 (Md. 1931)   Cited 23 times
    In Darnall v. Connor, 161 Md. 210, 155 A. 894, 898, Sallie C. Brown conveyed real and personal property to a trustee for the use of the grantor for her life, and at her death to such persons as she might by will appoint, or, failing such appointment, to her heirs.

    The title, estate, and interest of the grantor as owner in fee simple of the realty and absolutely of the personally conveyed and assigned in trust to a trustee, and then as an equitable life tenant of the trust estate created, with a power of testamentary disposition over the corpus of the trust, are as successive and separate as though the grantor and life tenant were different persons; and, in the absence of fraud, must be here so regarded in the application of the principles of law relative to these titles, estates, and interests. And, similarly, the donor and appointor are to be treated as if they were distinct individuals. Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67; Farlow v. Farlow, 83 Md. 118, 34 A. 837; Nevin v. Gillespie, 56 Md. 320; Benesch v. Clark, 49 Md. 497, 504; Conner v. Waring, 52 Md. 724; Foos v. Scarf, 55 Md. 301, 310; Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 372, 12 A. 11; Ridgely v. Cross, 83 Md. 161, 34 A. 469; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 608, 61 A. 665; Cook v. Councilman, 109 Md. 638, 72 A. 404; Marden v. Leimbach, 115 Md. 206, 80 A. 958; Beranek v. Caccimaici, 157 Md. 144, 145 A. 369. The appeal of Fisher v. State, 106 Md. 104, 66 A. 661, is not a refutation but an illustration of the application of the position taken by this dissent.

  9. Cowman v. Classen

    144 A. 367 (Md. 1929)   Cited 16 times
    In Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 144 A. 367, a testator left property in trust for his wife for life and then for his daughter during her lifetime.

    "This distinction, while it has been said to be a refined one, is, nevertheless, as well established as any in the law; and judges and text-writers alike recognize and adopt it as a principle too firmly settled to be questioned." Foos v. Scarf, 55 Md. 310; Mines v. Gambrill, 71 Md. 35; Smith v. Hardesty, 88 Md. 390; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 608; Roberts v. Roberts, 102 Md. 147; Marden v. Leimbach, 115 Md. 206, 210; Brandau v. McCurley, 124 Md. 250. The remainder to the daughter was not made contingent either by its being subject to a precedent equitable life estate in the mother, since the possibility that the remainder may never take effect in possession is immaterial; or by the granting to the daughter of a power whose exercise might terminate her life estate.

  10. Cadle v. Cadle

    136 A. 895 (Md. 1927)   Cited 5 times

    "This distinction, while it has been said to be a refined one, is, nevertheless, as well established as any in the law, and judges and text-writers adopt it as a principle too firmly settled to be questioned. Anon. 3 Leo. 71; Tomlinson v. Dighton, 1 P. Wms. 149, 171; Bradley v. Westcott, 13 Ves. 445, 453; Jackson v. Coleman, 2 John. 391; Jackson v. Robbins, 16 John. 587, 588; Flintham's Appeal, 11 S. R. 23, 24; 1 Sugd. on Pow. 122-126; 4 Kent, 535, 536." See also Foos v. Scarf, 55 Md. 310; Bentz v. Md. Bible Society, 86 Md. 115; Numsen v. Lyon, 87 Md. 41; Roberts v. Cobb, 89 Md. 165; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606; Welsh v. Davis, 125 Md. 37, in which the above stated principle of law has been recognized and followed. In Benesch v. Clark, supra, where the property was given and devised to the wife "to have and to hold * * * for her benefit, maintenance and comfort during her life," the court held that she did not take a fee simple title to the property, as it was expressly stated and clearly shown by the will that she took but a life estate with the power of disposition annexed.