Opinion
HHDCV106013857
12-01-2015
Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
Before this court are the motion and cross motions for summary judgment filed respectively by the defendant, town of Hebron (Hebron), and the plaintiff, Wellswood Columbia, LLC (Wellswood). This cause of action arises over the defendant town of Hebron's closure of a public road that provided the only means of access to real property owned by Wellswood. Relevant to the motions for summary judgment is a long procedural history, in which the issues in the case began as a zoning dispute in 2005 before the Columbia Planning and Zoning Commission (CPZC) and evolved into an injunction action which was decided by our Supreme Court. The action currently before this court seeks damages pursuant to Connecticut constitutional and state law claims which allege a violation of the just compensation clause of the Connecticut constitution (count four), nuisance (count five), and tortious interference with a business expectancy (count six). Those claims were severed from a federal lawsuit, consisting of claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On April 15, 2015, Hebron moved for summary judgment on the state counts on the grounds that Wellswood's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the relevant statute of limitations, and because municipalities are entitled to governmental immunity for intentional torts. Wellswood filed an objection to Hebron's motion for summary judgment, and a cross motion for summary judgment as to liability on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The parties subsequently filed their respective objections and memoranda of law, as well as reply briefs, and supplemental briefs before and after oral argument heard before this court on July 29, 2015.
DISCUSSION
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried . . . However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).
" The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
" [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " Likewise, [t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn.App. 620, 632-33, 94 A.3d 1267, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930, 101 A.3d 952 (2014). " [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 316 Conn. 820-21.
The undisputed, material facts are as follows. Wellswood is a limited liability company created in and operating under the laws of Connecticut. Wellswood owns real property (the property) in the town of Columbia, and a portion of that property borders Hebron. The only means of access to the property is by an unpaved Columbia town road called Zola Road. At the Hebron border, Zola Road becomes a Hebron town road called Wellswood Road.
Wellswood Road and Zola Road constitute the only access to the property, and are therefore the property's only means of access to the public highway system.
Wellswood has undertaken to develop the property for adult residential use--a project called Wellswood Village--and received a permit from the Columbia Inland Wetlands Commission for that purpose. Wellswood applied to the CPZC for subdivision and special permit approval, the pursuit of which application required access to the property for the purpose of septic system test pits, surveys, inspections, and emergency access in the event of fire or injury.
On September 13, 2005 and on subsequent dates, the CPZC held public hearings on Wellswood Village. Various representatives of Hebron appeared before the CPZC, urging it to deny the application, and threatening litigation and other retaliation if the application was approved. On October 6, 2005, the Hebron Board of Selectmen voted to authorize the Town Manager to close Wellswood Road, and install a barricade at the Hebron border. At a public hearing on October 11, 2005, Hebron representatives again appeared before the CPZC, and reiterated their position, threatening to barricade the road to prevent access to and development of the property. Thereafter, Wellswood brought an action (Wellswood I ) in Superior Court seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent the closure of Wellswood Road. See Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-05-4003914-S.
Wellswood's application was approved by the CPZC on December 27, 2005, and the subdivision map was endorsed by Columbia in April 2006. Hebron did not appeal the CPZC's approval of Wellswood's application. On January 30, 2006, prior to the issuance of a judicial order on Wellswood's request for injunctive relief, Hebron posted a sign at the border of Hebron and Columbia, at the end of Wellswood Road, which read " ROAD CLOSED PER HEBRON BOARD OF SELECTMEN."
At some time subsequent to the filing of the injunction action, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement for a temporary injunction, pursuant to which Hebron was enjoined from obstructing Wellswood's use of Wellswood Road, pending resolution of the injunction action. The road closure sign remained in place.
The Superior Court denied Wellswood's request for injunctive relief on July 21, 2008 . Wellswood appealed that decision, and on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Superior Court with direction to render judgment in Wellswood's favor, concluding that Hebron acted in excess of its delegated powers in closing the road. See Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 992 A.2d 1120 (2010). On July 21, 2010, the Superior Court entered judgment in Wellswood's favor.
Wellswood commenced the present action by service of process on Hebron on August 19, 2010, asserting claims under both federal and state law. On September 15, 2010, Hebron removed the action to federal court. See Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10CV01467 (VLB) (D. Conn.). Thereafter, on September 23, 2010, Wellswood filed an amended complaint, alleging that from January 30, 2006 to July 21, 2010, Hebron interfered with and deprived it of its right, as a landowner that abuts a highway, to access the highway and connecting system of public roads, thereby preventing it from developing the property, and depriving it of the economic value and income that would otherwise have been derived from the property. In addition to the state claims currently before this court, Wellswood's six-count complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (counts one, two, and three).
On January 29, 2013, the District Court dismissed Wellswood's claims on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10CV01467 (VLB), (D.Conn. January 29, 2013). Wellswood filed a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the District Court had misapprehended the nature of its bad faith takings claim in the first count, and that the state law claims should have been remanded to the Superior Court rather than dismissed, as they originated in that court. On September 30, 2013, the District Court granted the motion in part, retaining jurisdiction over count one and severing and remanding counts four, five, and six to the Superior Court.
HEBRON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hebron argues that its motion for summary judgment must be granted because 1) all of Wellswood's claims in the present case could have and should have been brought in Wellswood I and are therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata; 2) Wellswood's claims are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations; and 3) municipalities have governmental immunity for intentional torts. Citing the law of the case doctrine, Hebron also urges the court to adopt the District Court's rationale and grant its motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, consider the District Court's reasoning persuasive.
In response, Wellswood argues that 1) its claims did not accrue until the completion of Wellswood I, and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata based on Wellswood I ; 2) the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the Superior Court granted injunctive relief upon remand by the Supreme Court, and the present action was commenced within two months of the reopening of Wellswood Road; and 3) governmental immunity does not apply to official conduct by a municipality itself. Wellswood disagrees with Hebron's contention that the court should follow the District Court's rationale pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.
A. Res Judicata
" The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction . . . If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made . . . The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 842, 988 A.2d 229 (2010). " We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage . . . In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action." Id., 843.
Our Supreme Court has " stated that res judicata should be applied as necessary to promote its underlying purposes. These purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation . . . The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata . . . [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate . . . Stability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest . . . We review the doctrine of res judicata to emphasize that its purposes must inform the decision to foreclose future litigation. The conservation of judicial resources is of paramount importance as our trial dockets are deluged with new cases daily." Id., 843-44.
In applying the transactional test, this court takes judicial notice of the complaint in this action as well as the pleadings and judgment filed in Wellswood I . In comparing the complaints, not only are the same parties named in both actions, paragraphs one through thirteen in the complaint before this court are virtually identical to paragraphs one through fifteen in Wellswood I, with the exception of those paragraphs referencing individual officials of the Town of Hebron who are not named in this complaint. Thus, as a comparison of the two actions reveals, the alleged offending conduct of the defendant, specifically, the closure of Wellswood Road, whether threatened or actual, is at the heart of both Wellswood I and the action before this court.
As a result, Hebron argues that the court should grant its motion for summary judgment because Wellswood's claims could have and should have been brought in Wellswood I, and are therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, Hebron argues that Wellswood's allegations in the present action, namely that Hebron denied Wellswood its rights under the Connecticut constitution and failed to comply with applicable state law, are duplicative of the allegations Hebron made in Wellswood I . Indeed, this court's review of the complaint in Wellswood I indicates that the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Hebron's actions constituted a seizure of access to its property, that it rendered the property virtually worthless as a result, and that it could not be developed or used for any income-producing purpose. Wellswood had also alleged that its rights under the federal and state constitutions were denied and that it was aggrieved because the defendant's action " will cause the loss of the substantial sums that plaintiffs have expended to purchase and develop the parcel." Significantly, in the action before this court, the plaintiff makes similar claims of injury as its basis for damages asserting that it was " prevented from developing the property and [was] deprived of the economic value and income to be derived from the Property and from said development."
As the allegations in Wellswood I make apparent, the plaintiff not only articulated a cause of action for a wrongful taking, but also identified injuries it sustained or would sustain as a result, claims that were a precondition to our Supreme Court's ruling in its favor on the issue of standing. In finding that the plaintiff suffered injury sufficient to establish standing, our Supreme Court in Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, supra, 295 Conn. 802, quoted at length and cited to longstanding authority as to how the total deprivation of a property owner's right of access entitles the property owner to damages. Id., 811. Specifically, the court, quoting Luf v. Southbury, 188 Conn. 336, 341, 449 A.2d 1001 (1982), observed, " A landowner who, as a result of governmental action, suffers a total and permanent loss of his right of access to the public way adjacent to his land and to the system of public roads is entitled to recover damages. Total deprivation of his right to access constitutes a taking of his property, an inverse condemnation of his property rights, in violation of article first, § 11 of the constitution of Connecticut and of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, supra, 811-12.
In arguing that its current claims did not accrue until the final decision was made in Wellswood I, Wellswood points out Hebron's taking was ultimately a temporary, rather than permanent taking, thus damages were from the outset too speculative. For purposes of res judicata, however, the distinction between a temporary versus permanent taking is irrelevant in determining whether or not a plaintiff can file an action for damages. Instead, as our Supreme Court has made clear in Cumberland Farms v. Groton, 247 Conn. 196, 719 A.2d 465 (2004), the issue is whether and when a taking has occurred.
In Cumberland Farms, the court addressed whether or not a plaintiff was required to await the outcome of an administrative appeal of a zoning board of appeals decision to the Superior Court before it could pursue an inverse condemnation action. The court held that it did not. " [I]n an inverse condemnation action, a plaintiff alleges that a regulatory action constitutes a taking for constitutional purposes and seeks compensation for the alleged taking. An inverse condemnation action does not concern itself with the propriety of the board's action. The only inquiry is whether a taking has, in fact, occurred. If the board's action resulted in a taking, the inverse condemnation action will determine the amount of compensation due. Although action by the Superior Court favorable to the plaintiff in the plaintiff's administrative appeal might eliminate the plaintiff's claim of compensation for a complete taking, the plaintiff might nonetheless be entitled to compensation for the temporary taking that wrongly denied the plaintiff's use of its property while the appeal was pending." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, supra, 247 Conn. 207-08.
While there are factual differences between Cumberland Farms and the present case, the relevant proposition is that a plaintiff's claim for money damages is ripe for adjudication once a regulatory action--here, the Hebron Board of Selectmen's decision to close Wellswood Road in October of 2005--is taken. " [W]here finality of the underlying administrative action is established, a plaintiff may bring a claim for a temporary taking . . . It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to await judicial review of the administrative action." (Citation omitted.) Id., 213.
In an analogous case, the plaintiff in C& H Management, LLC v. Shelton, 140 Conn.App. 608, 59 A.3d 851 (2013) brought a successful mandamus action against a defendant municipality, arguing that the municipality had improperly denied it certain construction permits. Having received the permits as a result of the first action, the plaintiff filed a subsequent action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging inverse condemnation of the property in question. The court determined that " a review of the pleadings from the present action and from the prior mandamus action reveals that both cases arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts. They both contain many of the same factual allegations, and they both are based in relevant part on the refusal of the city through [its employee] and others to issue the necessary permits. We are aware of no case law in this state that allows a subsequent action for damages to be maintained, despite the doctrine of res judicata, simply because the first action sought only a writ of mandamus." Id., 616-17. The court continued: " The Superior Court has jurisdiction to entertain both legal and equitable claims; see General Statutes § 52-1; and a plaintiff may include both types of claims in one complaint. See General Statutes § 52-97. The Superior Court also may order the separation of causes of action for individual trials where warranted; see Practice Book § 15-2; but that does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff bring his claims in one complaint." Id., 617-18.
Like the plaintiff in C& H Management, LLC, Wellswood brought its original action pursuing an equitable remedy in the form of injunctive relief. Given that Wellswood essentially seeks damages resulting from actions arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts, the court finds that Wellswood could have and should have brought these claims in the original action.
Finally, this court agrees with Hebron in that the application of res judicata would not defeat the interests of justice, but rather promote the public policy concerns underlying the doctrine. The court notes that the original action was brought ten years ago in 2005. Rather than subjecting Hebron to two separate lawsuits premised on the same facts, the doctrine of res judicata would promote judicial economy, prevent inconsistent judgments and ensure that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.
CONCLUSION
This court grants Hebron's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata bars Wellswood's claims. Because the granting of this motion is dispositive of the case, the court does not consider the remaining claims of either party.