Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02841-SDG
2022-03-10
WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
Robert Moore, Moore Law Firm, Corinth, MS, for Plaintiff. Seth M. Friedman, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Mid-Century Insurance. James Townshend Budd, Mabry & McClelland, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Peter Coffin Brown, Dan Chapman & Associates, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance.
Robert Moore, Moore Law Firm, Corinth, MS, for Plaintiff.
Seth M. Friedman, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Mid-Century Insurance.
James Townshend Budd, Mabry & McClelland, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Peter Coffin Brown, Dan Chapman & Associates, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance.
OPINION AND ORDER
Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century) and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance, Inc.’s (Philadelphia) (collectively, Defendants) motion to dismiss [ECF 7] Plaintiff Wellstar Health Systems, Inc.’s (Wellstar) complaint. After careful consideration of the record and for the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
For purposes of this consolidated action and unless otherwise noted, the Court cites to the record of the lead case, 1:21-cv-02841-SDG.
The Court treats Wellstar's factual allegations as true for purposes of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc. , 187 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) ("At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.").
On August 5, 2019, non-party Jose Antonio Alfaro (Alfaro) was admitted to Wellstar Kennestone Hospital, where he was treated for injuries resulting from a car accident. Wellstar treated Alfaro at the cost of $87,468.70. Though not expressly pleaded in the complaint, the parties do not dispute that Alfaro did not pay Wellstar for his treatment. Sometime after September 24, 2019, Wellstar filed liens in Cobb County and Cherokee County, Georgia for Alfaro's outstanding medical bill. By February 2021, Mid-Century and Philadelphia, Alfaro's uninsured motorist insurance (UM) carriers, settled Alfaro's claims for benefits "without consent and without payment of Wellstar[’s]" liens.
ECF 1-1, ¶¶ 3–4.
Id.
Id. , ¶ 5. No party disputes that Wellstar perfected its liens, so this Court treats that fact as true for purposes of this Order.
ECF 7-1, at 1.
ECF 1-1, ¶ 6; 1:21-cv-02848-SDG, ECF 1-1, ¶ 6.
On June 14, 2021, Wellstar filed two lawsuits—one against Mid-Century, and one against Philadelphia—to enforce its liens. Defendants removed these cases to federal court on July 16. On July 30, Defendants moved to dismiss. The parties do not dispute that Wellstar's actions against Mid-Century and Philadelphia arise from the same hospital liens emanating from Wellstar's treatment of the same non-party, Alfaro. Defendants’ nearly identical motions to dismiss Wellstar's nearly identical complaints implicate the same issue: whether Defendants are liable for Wellstar's $87,468.70 in hospital liens pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470, et seq. As a result, and because the parties consented, the Court consolidated these cases on January 5, 2022.
See generally ECF 1.
ECF 7; 1:21-cv-02848-SDG, ECF 6.
ECF 13.
II. Discussion
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants’ sole asserted basis for jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "The party wishing to assert diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that diversity exists." Duff v. Beaty , 804 F. Supp. 332, 334 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (citing Cameron v. Hodges , 127 U.S. 322, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888) ). "[F]or purposes of ... subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, the critical time is the date of removal." Leonard v. Enters. Rent a Car , 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002).
ECF 1-1, ¶ 8.
At the time of removal, Defendants—the parties seeking to assert diversity jurisdiction—met their burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Id. ; Duff , 804 F. Supp. at 334. Mid-Century alleges that it is "a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of business in California." Philadelphia asserts that it is "a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania." Defendants claim that Wellstar is a "Georgia corporation with a principal place of business in Georgia." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (A corporation is a "citizen of every State by which it has been incorporated and of the State ... where it has its principal place of business."). The lien amount exceeds $75,000. Therefore, this Court has diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Id. ¶ 7.
1:21-cv-02848-SDG, ECF 1-1, at 7.
ECF 1-1, at 6.
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
1. Legal Standard
At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) ). However, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A complaint is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ " Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co. , 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth. , 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012).
2. Statutory Interpretation
When interpreting Georgia statutes, "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter." O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b). The Court must "avoid constructions that make some language mere surplusage or meaningless, construe a statute in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and construe together and harmonize all statutes relating to the same subject-matter wherever possible." Aimwell, Inc. v. McLendon Enters., Inc. , 318 Ga. App. 394, 397, 734 S.E.2d 84 (2012) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Moreover, "[a] federal court applying state law is bound to adhere to decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive indication that the state's highest court would decide the issue otherwise." Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. , 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir. 1983).
The grounding principal of Georgia statutory interpretation is simple: Courts interpreting Georgia statutes are to "presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." Arby's Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae , 292 Ga. 243, 245, 734 S.E.2d 55 (citation omitted) (2012); Harrison v. McAfee , 338 Ga. App. 393, 397, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).
3. Analysis
Georgia's hospital lien statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470(b) (Section 470 (b)), states in pertinent part:
Any [hospital] ... in this state shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for ... care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the ... care .... The lien provided for in this subsection is only a lien against such causes of action and shall not be a lien against such injured person, such legal representative, or any other property or assets of such persons and shall not be evidence of such person's failure to pay a debt.
Section 470(b) describes how and when hospital liens may attach—"upon causes of action accruing to persons for injuries treated." Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473(a) (Section 473(a)) provides:
No release of the cause or causes of action or of any judgment thereon or any covenant not to bring an action thereon shall be valid or effectual against the lien created by Code Section 44-14-470 unless the holder thereof shall join therein or execute a release of the lien; and the claimant or assignee of the lien may enforce the lien by an action against the person, firm, or corporation liable for the damages or such person, firm, or corporation's insurer.... The action shall be commenced against the person liable for the damages or such person's insurer within one year after the date the liability is finally determined by a settlement, by a release, by
a covenant not to bring an action, or by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 473(a) explains that releases and covenants not to sue are ineffective against a lien unless the lien claimant consents, and then it describes how that lien may be enforced. Id.
The dispute here centers around the parties’ differing interpretations of how these two statutes interact. If the Court presumes—as it must—that the Georgia General Assembly meant what it said with respect to this statutory scheme, then the Court must conclude that hospital liens may be enforced against UM carriers like Defendants and deny their motion to dismiss.
First, Section 470(b)’s provision that hospital liens "shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished" clearly contemplates that hospital liens may attach to any cause of action an injured person might have had. Id. (emphasis added). No language in Section 470(b) limits or qualifies a hospital's lien, except a clause dictating that such a lien shall be against the cause of action, not any party. Cf. Harrison , 338 Ga. App. at 399, 788 S.E.2d 872 ("That the statute does not identify the particular civil defendants against whom it applies does not make it ambiguous, it makes it unlimited. The General Assembly knows how to limit the sort of civil defendants to which a statute applies, when it wishes to do so."). That the Georgia General Assembly contemplated a hospital lien would attach to a cause of action instead of a party counsels that the statutory scheme does not discriminate regarding the relationship between an injured person and the party against which the injured person's cause of action accrues. And, "[i]f the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, the inquiry is over." Athens-Clarke Cnty. Unified Gov't ex rel. Denson v. Fed. Hous. Fin. , 945 F. Supp. 2d 1401, 1405 (M.D. Ga. 2013).
Even if Section 470(b) were ambiguous, which it is not, Section 473(a)’s title makes clear that it deals with a "[r]elease or covenant not to sue," not the creation of a hospital lien or against whom such a lien may be enforced, which are Section 470(b)’s functions. Therefore, Section 473(a)’s provision that "[t]he action shall be commenced against the person liable for the damages or such person's insurer" is not a limitation on the civil defendants against whom a hospital lien may be enforced; rather, it is a description of how the "claimant or assignee may enforce the lien" in the event a party attempts to contract around the lien's enforcement to evade reach.
Moreover, Section 473(a) does not say that UM carriers may never be the "person liable" for the injured person's damages. Though the tortfeasor is often culpable and, with the proper showing, is traditionally "held liable" for the injured person's damages, that culpability is not legal liability. A person is liable when he is "[r]esponsible or answerable in law" or "[l]ikely to be affected by a particular type of problem; possibly exposed to damage, burden, or some other unfortunate consequence." Liable , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Like a tortfeasor's insurer, which might be liable for damages caused by the tortfeasor's conduct, UM carriers might be liable for coverage of an injured person's damages depending on a case's facts and the UM policy's terms. The Supreme Court of Georgia recognized as much in Chatham County Hospital Authority v. Barnes : "[T]he [hospital] would be entitled to collect its debt from the settlement of the insurance claim, should a jury determine that a binding contract was made by [the injured person] to settle his claim [with the UM carrier]." 226 Ga. 508, 510, 175 S.E.2d 854 (1970). No case since Barnes distinguishes the key proposition it advances—that a hospital may enforce a lien against a UM carrier. See also Thomas v. McClure , 236 Ga. App. 622, 624, 513 S.E.2d 43 (1999) ("Thomas contends the trial court erred in ruling that Tanner Medical can enforce its lien against the money paid by his uninsured motorist carrier. The contention is without merit. OCGA § 44–14–470(b) provides that a hospital lien ‘shall be upon any and all causes of action....’ "). Defendants rely on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Adams to support their read of the law. 288 Ga. 315, 318–19, 702 S.E.2d 898 (2010). Though Adams was more recently decided, it did not grapple with Barnes . So, it raises no doubt whatsoever that Barnes ’s controlling proposition remains good law.
ECF 7-1, at 7–8.
At any rate, Section 473(a)—by its own text—defers to the operation of Section 470(b). To find otherwise would render meaningless the latter's promise that a hospital lien may lie against any cause of action. Such a construction would result in surplusage, which this Court is tasked with avoiding. Aimwell , 318 Ga. App. at 397, 734 S.E.2d 84. It would also mean that hospitals would have no recourse to recover if a delinquent injured party has UM coverage, but the tortfeasor is uninsured and could not otherwise pay a judgment.
For these reasons, the Court is persuaded that Wellstar's position is the correct application of Georgia law.
C. Defendants’ Request to Certify Question to Georgia Supreme Court
In lieu of dismissal, Defendants request that the Court certify an issue for the Supreme Court of Georgia: "Whether O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473 creates a private right of action for hospital liens against an injured party's uninsured motorist carrier."
ECF 10, at 7.
As a general rule, this Court may certify a question of Georgia state law to the Supreme Court of Georgia only if it is "determinative of the case and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of [Georgia]." O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9(a). However, "[u]nder this circuit's precedents, [a district court] should certify questions to the state supreme court when [it has] substantial doubt regarding the status of state law." Henry's La. Grill, Inc. v. Allied Ins. Co. of Am. , 495 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (quoting Peoples Gas Sys. v. Posen Constr., Inc. , 931 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2019) ).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court has little doubt that Section 470(b) applies to UM carriers. Accordingly, Defendants’ request to certify is denied.
III. Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF 7] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of March, 2022.