"The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate." Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied.
"When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence." Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
"A modus operandi is ‘a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes are recognized as the handiwork of the same wrongdoer.’ " Wells v. State , 2 N.E.3d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Penley v. State , 506 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 1987) ), trans. denied. [12] Relying on Williams , Brittingham argues his alleged offenses in Case 1 and Case 2 "are connected by a distinctive nature and have a common modus operandi."
One relevant factor in considering the character of the defendant is criminal history. Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. [23] Schmidtz has a criminal record dating back to 1995.
When considering the character of the offender, one relevant factor is the defendant's criminal history. Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
[26] As for Valdez's right to represent himself, that issue is settled by the law of the case doctrine, “a discretionary tool by which appellate courts decline to revisit legal issues already determined on appeal in the same case and on substantially the same facts.” Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ind.2000). We will not revisit the issue because Valdez has failed to show additional information to distinguish this appeal from his first appeal. Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 128–29 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). [27] Moreover, Valdez has conflated the standard for declaring someone mentally incompetent to represent himself and the standard to find someone insane.
As we conduct our review, we consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied.
Atwood's criminal history spans over a period of a decade and includes the following: three convictions of battery; intimidation; failure to return to lawful detention; theft; two convictions of possession of marijuana; public intoxication; two convictions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated; operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license; failure to stop after accident resulting in serious bodily injury; two convictions of operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator; and, two convictions of resisting law enforcement. See Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (when considering the character of an offender, the significance of a defendant's criminal history is a factor, and it is dependent on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense), trans. denied Atwood's criminal history shows that he has particular problems with substance abuse, abiding by this State's motor vehicle laws, and respecting authority, all of which concern his current conviction and are an indication that he has not learned from his previous offenses.
The significance of a criminal history for assessing a defendant's character “varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied; see Keller, 987 N.E.2d at 1122 (noting in assessing defendant's character that a prior conviction was similar to the present offense). Additionally, Lady's juvenile criminal history includes disorderly conduct, leaving home without permission, criminal mischief, and truancy.
Regarding the nature of the offense, one factor in determining the appropriateness of the deviation from the standard sentence is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the typical offense.” Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied.