Wells v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Boykins v. State

    680 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    The state may meet this burden by demonstrating from the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea. Wells v. State, 276 Ga. App. 844 ( 625 SE2d 90) (2005). But once a defendant has been sentenced, "the question of whether he may withdraw his guilty plea is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly abused."

  2. Hollman v. State

    633 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 3 times

    The state may meet this burden by demonstrating from the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea. Wells v. State, 276 Ga. App. 844 ( 625 SE2d 90) (2005). But once a defendant has been sentenced, "the question of whether he may withdraw his guilty plea is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly abused."

  3. Collier v. State

    637 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times

    Price v. State, 280 Ga. App. 869 ( 635 SE2d 236) (2006). The state may meet this burden by showing from the record that Collier understood all of the rights he was waiving and the consequences incurred in entering his guilty plea. Wells v. State, 276 Ga. App. 844 ( 625 SE2d 90) (2005). But because Collier bases his challenge upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he has the burden under the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, of showing "that, had it not been for his attorney's deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial."

  4. Williams v. State

    631 S.E.2d 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times

    OCGA § 17-7-93 (b).Wells v. State, 276 Ga. App. 844 ( 625 SE2d 90) (2005).Smith v. State, 249 Ga. App. 666 ( 549 SE2d 487) (2001).

  5. Burns v. State

    291 Ga. 547 (Ga. 2012)   Cited 6 times

    Id. at 746, n. 3, 683 S.E.2d 586. Since appellant was advised about his right to remain silent or testify on his own behalf at trial, his right to a trial by jury, and his right to cross-examine the State's witnesses, he was made sufficiently aware of his Boykin rights before waiving them. See Davis v. State, 289 Ga.App. 526(3), 657 S.E.2d 609 (2008); Wells v. State, 276 Ga.App. 844, 625 S.E.2d 90 (2005). (b). Appellant opines that since the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination are mentioned separately in Rule 33.8 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, that each right should have been read to him as part his due process rights under Georgia's Constitution. The fact that a trial court does not read every right enumerated in Rule 33.8 does not render the plea involuntary or constitutionally invalid under the Georgia Constitution. Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 614, 556 S.E.2d 435 (2001) ( “This Court has never expressly held that a trial court's failure to comply fully with USCR 33.8 violates the defendant's right to due process guaranteed under the Georgia Constitution.”) The record shows that appellant's plea was valid under both the federal and state constitutions.

  6. Rivas v. State

    743 S.E.2d 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)

    (Punctuation omitted.) Wells v. State, 276 Ga.App. 844, 845–846, 625 S.E.2d 90 (2005). 2.