This is not required. See Wells v. State, 72 Ga. App. 199 (1), (3) ( 33 S.E.2d 563) (1945). Here, the jury was adequately charged on felony murder and on parties to a crime, which was sufficient.
In the instant case the court instructed the jury upon the law of an assault with intent to murder and upon the law of an assault and battery, and the court's failure to charge upon voluntary manslaughter was not harmful to the defendant, as the only possible beneficial effect to the defendant of such a charge would have been that it would have authorized a finding of an assault and battery, and such a finding was already authorized under the court's charge upon an assault and battery. In Wells v. State, 72 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 33 S.E.2d 563), where the accused was convicted of an assault with intent to murder, this court said: "Special ground 4 complains because the court failed to charge on murder, manslaughter, and justifiable homicide, in a manner specified in the ground, and that the charge was erroneous. The court charged specifically and clearly that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault was made with malice, with intent to kill, and with a weapon likely to produce death, before they could convict the defendant of assault with intent to murder.
Such being true, the act of one within the scope of the conspiracy and during its progress was the act of all. See Patterson v. State, 199 Ga. 773 (7) ( 35 S.E.2d 504); Simmons v. State, 196 Ga. 395 ( 26 S.E.2d 785); Screws v. State, 188 Ga. 678 (2) ( 4 S.E.2d 601); McCormick v. State, 176 Ga. 21 (2) ( 166 S.E.2d 762); Wells v. State, 72 Ga. App. 201 (1) ( 33 S.E.2d 563). We are not unmindful of the principle of law, as embodied in our Code ยง 26-1015, that "Parents and children may mutually protect each other, and justify the defense of the person or reputation of each other.