Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Company of Maryland

8 Citing cases

  1. Thompson v. Spikes

    663 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Ga. 1987)   Cited 8 times

    wes the prisoner the duty to exercise ordinary care while driving the vehicle in which the prisoner is required to ride"; sheriff would be held liable on his bond for negligent acts of deputy); Hawkins v. National Surety Corporation, 63 Ga. App. 367, 11 S.E.2d 250 (1940) (bonding company could be held liable where plaintiff's decedent was allegedly falsely arrested, shot, and killed by deputies who, while exceeding authority, were acting within scope of employment); Powell v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 45 Ga. App. 88, 163 S.E. 239 (1932) (bonding company liable where sheriff's deputy assaults and kills prisoner with whom deputy has been entrusted).Culpepper v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 199 Ga. 56, 33 S.E.2d 168 (1945) (sheriff's deputy not liable under official bond for negligently killing pedestrian when injury to pedestrian caused by deputy's violation of traffic regulations while driving to serve jury summons; deputy had no official business with pedestrian); Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 168 Ga. App. 77, 308 S.E.2d 713 (1983) (where sheriff stopped to kill rattlesnake and negligently left automobile jutting into road, officer not performing official duties and therefore bonding company not liable for sheriff's negligence); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Mathis, 82 Ga. App. 421, 61 S.E.2d 422 (1950) (bonding company not liable to plaintiff, where county law enforcement officer drove negligently and struck plaintiff in responding to an emergency call); see generally Johnson v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 93 Ga. App. 336, 339-40, 91 S.E.2d 779 (1956).Meeks v. Douglas, 112 Ga. App. 742, 146 S.E.2d 127 (1965) (petition alleging that county officers wrongfully seized and subsequently damaged property, "although sufficient with respect to all of the defendants individually," could not proceed because ex delicto action against individual officers had improperly been joined with action ex contractu on bond).

  2. Basso v. Export Warrant Co.

    193 So. 654 (La. 1940)   Cited 4 times

    Being an uncompensated surety, plaintiff's contractual obligations must be strictly construed. Article 3039 of the Revised Civil Code. See, also, Old v. Fee, 8 Mart., O.S., 14; Hazard v. Lambeth, 3 Rob. 378; Erwin v. Greene, 5 Rob. 70; New Orleans Canal c. Co. v. Hagan, 1 La.Ann. 62; Diggs v. Staples, 7 La.Ann. 653; Stewart v. Levis, 42 La.Ann. 37, 6 So. 898; Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448; Bickham v. Womack, 181 La. 837, 160 So. 431; McMicken v. Webb, 6 How. 292, 47 U.S. 292, 12 L.Ed. 443. An analysis of the contract between the defendant and Roger E. Simmons, Inc., and the letter of guaranty issued by the defendant in connection therewith, will show that the primary object of executing the assignment by Mrs. Simmons to the defendant was for the purpose of guaranteeing it (defendant) against any loss in connection with the letter of guaranty it had executed in favor of the bank, and the loss contemplated extended only to the discounting of the drafts of Roger E. Simmons, Inc., not promptly paid and for the reimbursement of which the defendant might be called upon by the bank.

  3. Fidelity Homestead Ass'n v. Kennedy Anderson

    105 So. 64 (La. 1925)   Cited 18 times

    The laborers and materialmen cannot suffer by the acts of the owner to which they have not consented; but the owner himself may prejudice his claims by some act of his own. Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448; Savings Homestead Ass'n v. Frank, 146 La. 198, 83 So. 491. This again presents various phases for consideration: (a) If there was such an agreement between the contractors and Mrs. Stackhouse, and if Mrs. Stackhouse actually paid the contractors $1,500 more than the contract calls for, then we cannot see wherein the surety was in any way prejudiced thereby or has anything whatever to complain about.

  4. Coastal Contractors, Inc. v. Tri-City Const. Co.

    238 So. 2d 36 (La. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    The appellant should not be permitted to delay the orderly process of suit for an indefinite period by filing a third party demand against the State, a third party. The appellant has cited in support of its contention Wells v. Fidelity and Deposit Company, 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448. In that case, as pointed out by the Trial Judge, the same defendant was surety of two bonds, one of which was in favor of the plaintiff and the other was for the benefit of laborers and materialmen.

  5. State v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co. of N.Y

    149 So. 2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 11 times

    French Market Ice Co. v. Landauer, 4 Orl.App. 87; Diana Brick Tile Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 8 Orl.App. 76. Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448, is authority for the proposition that in an action by the owner against the surety on the contractor's bond, extensive changes made by the owner involving material departures from the contract plans and specifications, involving increased responsibility and expenditures, without written orders stating the cost thereof, contrary to a contract clause providing that no alterations should be made except upon written order stating the amount to be paid therefor, released the surety from all obligations arising incident to such changes. We note in the Wells case, supra, the following significant language which we herein quote with approval:

  6. Shreveport Laundries v. Sherman

    7 So. 2d 433 (La. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 7 times

    Regardless of this fact, for plaintiff to recover it must show that defendant Sherman bound himself as surety or guarantor on the contract under which it is attempting to recover. Art. 3039, Revised Civil Code; Bell v. Norwood, 7 La. 103; McGuire v. Wooldridge, supra; New Orleans Canal Banking Co. v. Hagan, 1 La.Ann. 62, 66; Grieff v. Kirk, 17 La.Ann. 25, 26; Lachman v. Block, 47 La.Ann. 505, 508, 17 So. 153, 28 L.R.A. 255; Orleans J. Ry. Co. v. International Const. Co., 113 La. 409, 413, 37 So. 10, 11; Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448. The surety has the right to stand upon the very terms of the contract even though he should be benefited by the change.

  7. N. O. Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Wilkerson

    152 So. 157 (La. Ct. App. 1934)   Cited 4 times

    Act No. 224 of 1918, ยง 6, provides, that "the surety on the bond shall be limited to such defenses only as the principal on the bond." Act No. 41 of 1894 provides that the liability of bonding companies on obligations of this kind are as sureties. Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448. Under the law, we look on appellant's defense as limited to that of payment, subject to appellant's right to show that the account sued on is not correct and that proper credits have not been given. The answer alleges that proper credits have not been given, and it may be that under a proper accounting there remains nothing unpaid. Under the defense that the account sued on is not correct, Wilkerson, asked to indicate the items on the account, which were improperly charged thereon, and to name credits to which he was entitled that he had not received, named a few items, claiming that they were improper charges on the account.

  8. Texas Co. v. Couvillon

    148 So. 295 (La. Ct. App. 1933)

    " A contract of suretyship cannot be extended by implication. Stewart v. Levis, 42 La. Ann. 37, 6 So. 898; Wells v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md., 146 La. 169, 83 So. 448. In Lachman Jacobi v. Block Bro., 47 La. Ann. 509, 17 So. 153, 154, 28 L.R.A. 255, the court said: "In ordinary significance, suretyship refers to an existing debt.