To plead a cause of action for conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege the primary tort (for example, fraud) and the following four elements: (i) a corrupt agreement between two or more parties; (ii) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement; (iii) the parties' intentional participation in the furtherance of the plan or purpose; and (iv) damage or injury. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. National Gasoline, Inc., No. 10-CV-1762, 2013 WL 168079, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 16, 2013) (citing Pope v. Rice, No. 04-cv-4171, 2005 WL 613085, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005)); Emerald Asset Advisors, LLC v. Schaffer, 895 F. Supp. 2d 418, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1986);
“The compensable ‘injury’ is ‘the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern.’ ” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l Gasoline, Inc., 10–CV–1762 (RER), 2013 WL 168079, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013) (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). Further, the Supreme Court has held that “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct” of an enterprise “one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.”
” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l Gasoline, Inc., No. 10-CV-1762 (RER), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6668, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013). “The Second Circuit has consistently held that an award of post-judgment interest at the statutory rate is ‘mandatory.'”
(quoting Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F.2d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 1956))); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l Gasoline, Inc., No. 10-CV-1762, 2013 WL 168079, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013). “To state a claim for civil conspiracy under New York law, a plaintiff, in addition to alleging an underlying tort, must plead facts sufficient to support an inference of the following elements: ‘(1) an agreement between
“The compensable ‘injury’ is ‘the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern.’ ” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l Gasoline, Inc., 10–CV–1762 (RER), 2013 WL 168079, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013) (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). Further, the Supreme Court has held that “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct” of an enterprise “one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.”
“The compensable ‘injury’ is ‘the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern.’ ” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l Gasoline, Inc., 10–CV–1762 (RER), 2013 WL 168079, at *5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6668, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013) (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). The Court finds that the Plaintiff has established its RICO claims against the defaulting Defendants and is therefore entitled to the entry of a default judgment against the defaulting Defendants on these claims.