Opinion
No. 15-2123
10-13-2015
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVAN RENE MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 12-C-271
Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.
Order
Our first decision in this case affirmed the district court's judgment. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Moore, No. 14-2644 (7th Cir. Apr. 17, 2015) (nonprecedential disposition). We observed along the way that Wells Fargo Bank had not received full relief but that it had not filed a cross appeal, and we concluded that this did not make the judgment non-final.
After that order was released, the Bank asked the district court for the relief (foreclosure and replevin) that had been omitted from its judgment. It relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), which permits post-judgment relief when a "mistake" has been made. The Bank characterized the incomplete judgment as a mistake. After our mandate issued, the district judge acknowledged that he had made a mistake in drafting the judgment and awarded the Bank the additional relief it had requested.
Moore's second appeal does not contest the substance of this decision. Instead he maintains that the district court lacked jurisdiction to act. Yet the court waited until our mandate had been issued. The principle that only one court at a time has jurisdiction means that, between the filing of the appeal and the issuance of the appellate mandate, the district court cannot act without the court of appeals' permission. Once the mandate has issued, however, the district court's authority resumes. Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes post-judgment relief, and appellate permission is unnecessary. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); LSJL Partnership v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 920 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1990).
The Bank's motion was filed within the year allowed for Rule 60(b)(1) motions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Bank acted within a reasonable time after recognizing the mistake.
AFFIRMED