An entry that merely "stat[es] that it is adopting a magistrate's decision is not a final appealable order." Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Allen, 2012-Ohio-175, 969 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91145, 2008-Ohio-6163, ¶ 1. "To constitute a final appealable order, the trial court's journal entry must be a separate and distinct instrument from that of the magistrate's order and must grant relief on the issues originally submitted to the court."

The rights of the lienholders include the priority of the liens, which is why we have said that, "[g]enerally, 'in a foreclosure action when the trial court fails to make a determination as to the priority of liens asserted against the property, the trial court's order of foreclosure and sale is not a final, appealable order.' " Carolyn Rice, Treasurer v. Osborne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26978, *2 (May 10, 2016), quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 2012-Ohio-175, 969 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). In a recent line of decisions, a majority of this Court concluded that a trial court's original judgment of foreclosure was not a final and appealable order where the court failed to determine the amount of a tax lien, as well as the amount claimed by virtue of a certificate of judgment.

"It is well established that in a matter in which multiple claims or parties are involved, a judgment entry that enters final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, the pending claims is not a final, appealable order in the absence of Civ.R. 54(B) language stating that 'there is no just reason for delay.'" Scanlon at ¶ 6, quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96611, 2012-Ohio-175, 969 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 12. {¶8} In Mosley, supra, this court held that where an action includes claims against John Doe defendants as to which the one-year period for service has not expired and the plaintiff has not expressly abandoned the claims against the John Doe defendants, a judgment in favor of other defendants that does not include the "no just reason for delay" language of Civ.R. 54(B) is not a final, appealable order.

It is well established that in a matter in which multiple claims or parties are involved, a judgment entry that enters final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, the pending claims is not a final, appealable order in the absence of Civ.R. 54(B) language stating that "there is no just reason for delay."Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 2012-Ohio-175, 969 N.E.2d 309, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). The order appealed from does not dispose of all claims in the case or otherwise note why there should be no just reason for delay.