Wellmeyer, Admx., Etc. v. City of Huntingburg

4 Citing cases

  1. Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis

    145 Ind. App. 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 4 times
    In Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 145 Ind. App. 80, 248 N.E.2d 553 (1969), I found myself in disagreement with a decision resting, in my view, almost wholly on stare decisis.

    The Appellate Court has recently held that facts showing the giving of notice required by this action must be alleged in the complaint or it will be insufficient on demurrer. Wellmeyer v. City of Huntingburg (1966), 139 Ind. App. 64, 7 Ind. Dec. 505, 213 N.E.2d 709. Further, the law has developed that the notice required to be given a City constitutes a condition precedent to a right of action against the City, and that 2. facts showing the giving of such required notice must be alleged in the complaint, or it will be demurrable.

  2. England v. City of Richmond

    419 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1969)   Cited 5 times
    Applying Indiana law

    In Touhey v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N.E. 540, 542, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 350 (1911), the Court stated: "Appellant's right to maintain an action must be determined from the sufficiency of his notice, and not by the fact that appellee obtained, from other sources, full knowledge of the time, place, cause, and nature of his injury." In Wellmeyer v. City of Huntingburg, 139 Ind. App. 64, 213 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1966), the Court observed that the holding in Touhey, supra, is still the law in Indiana. It is argued by plaintiff that he had no reason to have known that the installation of the transformer and wires in his employer's premises, and the maintenance of the transmission lines were by the defendant city and not by his employer, and, therefore, that he did not have actual notice of the acts of the defendant as the contributing cause of his injury until September 25, 1967. He points out that the notice to the city was given within sixty days after he had received such information and that, therefore, the notice was given in compliance with Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48-8001, and that under Indiana law this was sufficient notice.

  3. Thompson v. City of Aurora

    313 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 2 times

    The only problem we encounter is that Thompsons did not introduce the notice into evidence in their case in chief as required by law.        In the case of Wellmeyer, Admx., etc. v. City of Huntingburg, et al. (1966), 139 Ind.App. 64, 68, 213 N.E.2d 709, this court was asked to decide whether Aaron, supra, stood for the proposition that a party did not need to allege in its complaint compliance with IC 1971, 18-2-2-1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 48--8001 (Burns 1968 Repl.) supra. Much the same argument was presented in Wellmeyer, supra, as is presented in this case by Thompsons.

  4. Portland Summer Festival & Homecoming v. Department of Revenue

    624 N.E.2d 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    Distinguishing Wilson and concluding that exception did not apply because appellant raised "questions of both fact and law" rather than "a purely legal question"

    We believe that when the legislature empowered the Department with authority to administer I.C. § 4-32, the legislature intended to apply the existing administrative process used to resolve tax-related issues under I.C. § 6-8.1-5-1 to the resolution of fund-raising event licensing issues. See Wellmeyer v. City of Huntingburg (1966), 139 Ind. App. 64, 213 N.E.2d 709 (citing 26 Ind.Law Encyc., Statutes, § 113, p. 314: Intention of the Legislature). Indiana Code § 4-32-8-1 provides that the Department is to apply the decision-making process provided in I.C. § 6-8.1 of the Indiana tax code to determine fund-raising events issues under I.C. § 4-32.