Whatever the merits of the Second Circuit's rule, and we express no opinion on its validity in this circuit, it is premised on the theory that the copyright holder may recover damages that stem from a direct infringement of its exclusive rights that occurs within the United States. See Robert Stigwood, 530 F.2d at 1101; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939) (L. Hand, J.) ("The negatives were `records' from which the work could be `reproduced', and it was a tort to make them in this country. The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as they were made, which attached to any profits from their exploitation. . . ."), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390, 60 S.Ct. 681, 84 L.Ed. 825 (1940); see also Ahbez v. Edwin H. Morris Co., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In these cases, liability is not based on contributory infringement, but on the theory that the infringing use would have been actionable even if the subsequent foreign distribution that stemmed from that use never took place.

In the second place, the Supreme Court did not decide in Mitchell whether federal courts are bound to borrow state statutes of limitations in actions such as this. The Court expressly reserved judgment on that issue and decided only which of two New York statutes a federal court must apply if it chooses to apply one of them in a suit by an employee under Section 301 of the LMRA. 451 U.S. at 60 n. 2. Rather than the 5-year Illinois statute suggested by plaintiffs, the 6-month limitations period contained in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act better serves the federal policy of quickly resolving labor disputes, see Weller v. G.M.W., 548 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.Ill. 1982); Collins v. Car Carriers, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.Ill. 1982); Kaftantzis v. D L Transport Co., 531 F. Supp. 566 (N.D.Ill. 1982), and plaintiffs' claims are at least as analogous to unfair labor practice claims under the National Labor Relations Act as to actions "on awards of arbitration" under Illinois law, see Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 1173-1174 (7th Cir. 1976); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Since plaintiffs' suits were commenced more than 6 months after the Joint Committee's decisions, they would be untimely under Section 10(b) as well.

This assumes that the "six months" language from NLRA § 10(b) is measured by six calendar months, not 180 days. If the latter measurement is used, then, according to the Court's calculations, this action was untimely filed no matter which accrual date is utilized ( see, text, infra). If Defendants date (July 7, 1981) is used, then the action was filed 185 days later; if Plaintiff's date (July 10, 1981) is used, then the action was filed 182 days later. At least one court has held, without citing authority, that in a § 301 suit, the six-month period of NLRA § 10(b) is measured by 180 days. Weller v. G.M.W., 548 F. Supp. 560, 562 (N.D.Ill. 1982). On the other hand, most courts seem to assume, without discussion, that § 10(b) is measured by six calendar months.