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Welch v. Superior Court (Joe Louis Armenta)

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Jan 12, 2011
No. E050535 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2011)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Richard Todd Fields, Judge. Super. Ct. No. RIF147935

Joseph M. Welch, in pro. per, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Richard Blumenfeld for Real Party in Interest.


OPINION

RICHLI, Acting P.J.

INTRODUCTION

In this matter, we are asked to consider the scope of a trial court’s authority to allow a defendant in a criminal case-through his legal representative-to obtain access to a crime scene that, in the period since the crime was committed, has passed to the ownership of a third party. Complicating the matter is the fact that the crime scene, a residence, is now the home of the third party, who objects to entry by a stranger.

We conclude that the trial court has such authority and that the order here was justified based on the facts of this case; however, although we deny the relief sought, we will remand with directions to the trial court that it explore whether an alternative more acceptable to petitioner Joseph Welch (Welch) would adequately protect the rights of real party in interest Joe Louis Armenta (Armenta).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Welch is the homeowner in question. Armenta is the defendant in a criminal proceeding, who is charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and assault with a firearm on a peace officer, along with numerous enhancement allegations. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (d)(1), 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12316, subd. (b)(1), 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The incident took place when officers forcibly entered a home in Riverside County on January 7, 2009. This home was subsequently sold to Welch in November 2009.

After the tentative draft of this opinion was prepared, Welch informed us by letter that he and his family no longer reside in the home, and that the current tenants have been informed that the court may permit defense counsel access to the residence. We have elected to issue the tentative in its current form as the issues of privacy are not unique to Welch. The trial court will be able to consider the matter with respect to the tenant, if any, in possession at the time of the further proceedings.

Our description of the case and the procedural status is taken from what we believe to be undisputed statements in the record before us. Because we do not know which elements, if any, of Arementa’s defense may have already been disclosed, we have elected not to discuss the details of his presentation to the trial court. (See fn. 3, infra.)

On March 26, 2010, Armenta, through counsel, filed an application for an order granting access to the crime scene. The application was not specific, stating only that it was necessary for counsel to “assess the interior and exterior sight lines, the distances between any two or more relevant points inside and out, and to get a three dimensional appreciation of the crime scene generally....” In a sealed affidavit, counsel described his need for specific information about the crime scene in regard to Armenta’s planned defense.

Our subsequent discussion focuses on the order for access to the interior. If only the exterior were involved, in our view, Armenta’s concerns, as expressed in the sealed declaration, could probably have been adequately dealt with through experiments carried out at a similar home. However, access to the perimeter clearly represents a less serious intrusion and, in light of our overall conclusion, we need not discuss this matter further.

We omit this information, although we recognize the disadvantage to which this puts Welch, because Armenta is entitled to keep his defense strategy secure from “undue” intrusion. (See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 255, 263-264, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 77.)

After receiving notice of the application, Welch appeared before the court and objected to the requested order on the basis that it would represent an impermissible invasion of his personal privacy. He also complained about the lack of notice and the lack of time in which to prepare formal objections, but agreed to argue his position. The trial court took the matter under submission and invited the affected parties to return the next day (April 2, 2010), which they did. At that time, Welch repeated his arguments in opposition to Armenta’s request. Following argument by both sides, the trial court found an “appropriate level of necessity” for the access had been shown. The written order directed that only Armenta’s counsel and an investigator should be afforded access to the home, that access be limited to 40 minutes, and that the inspection and photography area should be limited to the outside perimeter of the home, the laundry area, and the area leading into and out of the master bedroom. The court also prohibited the defense representatives from opening drawers or closets and forbade the distribution of any photographs or their use other than for trial.

Welch is an attorney, although he does not practice criminal law. According to verified statements in the response, Armenta’s attorney had attempted to secure Welch’s agreement prior to filing the application and had spoken with him by telephone on March 25, 2010. At that time, Armenta’s attorney provided him with legal authority (see discussion) and informed him that if Welch would not informally consent, counsel would seek a court order. We will briefly discuss this issue post.

The original request asked that Armenta’s father be allowed to attend.

The request was for one hour.

Welch was not satisfied with these restrictions and this petition followed.

DISCUSSION

First, we reject Welch’s argument to the effect that his due process rights were violated by the speed of the proceedings. There is no clear-cut requirement for notice in such cases. A party is not, for example, entitled to any notice of an application for a search warrant. A subpoena may be served at any time allowing the served party a “reasonable” time to prepare and appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987, subd. (a).) In this case, Welch was personally served with Armenta’s application on March 26, 2010, for a hearing on April 1. He had been previously aware that Armenta’s counsel desired access to the home, as counsel had had an “extensive” conversation with him on March 25. After the matter was taken under submission on April 1, Welch was in fact allowed to address the issues further the next day before the trial court made a final decision. Given the paucity of direct authority available for argument, and Welch’s advantageous personal status as an attorney, we conclude he was afforded all due process and was able to present his position fully. In any event, to the extent that Welch was hampered by the speed of the proceedings, any prejudice has been cured by the delay occasioned by this petition and his opportunity to fully brief the issues before this court.

Next, we agree with the trial court that Armenta’s showing was sufficiently detailed and specific to show at the very least “plausible justification” for the access. We recognize that Welch does not have the means to challenge this conclusion (see fn. 2), but we have thoroughly considered defense counsel’s sealed declaration, and we are satisfied that the proffered scenario that Armenta hopes to buttress by his inspection of the residence is both plausible and highly relevant.

The parties extensively discussed post (and discuss here) the only case directly bearing on pretrial access to a residence when demanded by a defendant. In Bullen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 22 (Bullen), the defendant sought access to the crime scene-a home that happened to be the residence of the victim’s widow and where the murder had taken place. The court noted that the petitioner widow had a “fundamental right to privacy free from judicially mandated intrusion into her home, ” which constituted a legitimate government interest (id. at p. 26) but also acknowledged that, as a rule, a criminal defendant has a right to seek information that will assist in preparation of his defense if he shows a “‘plausible justification’” for the discovery. (Ibid.) Ultimately, however, the court did not need to decide the parameters of the defense rights in this respect because it found the showing conclusory and inadequate. (Id. at p. 27.) It also cited existing, uncontroversial precedent to the effect that a defense request for discovery should also be “‘timely, ’” although in Bullen this does not appear to have been a factor. (Id. at p. 26.)

The declaration in Bullen simply stated: “‘It is extremely important that the defense team be allowed reasonable access to the alleged scene of the crime, the residence [of Welch]. This is necessary to view the scene of the crime, observe spatial distance, investigate possible defense theories and to generally prepare examination and cross-examination of key witnesses.’” (Bullen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 26-27.)

Bullen is not, therefore, of great assistance; all that can really be said is that it does not foreclose the possibility of defense access to a private home. We, therefore, turn back to more general principles of criminal defense discovery.

First, we will dispose of the timeliness issue. Welch argues, with reason, that Armenta could have avoided any intrusion into the privacy of Welch and his family had access to the home been obtained before they moved in. At the hearing, Armenta’s attorney indicated that he had attempted to contact the listing agent “at least four months ago” but had been unsuccessful. There is no explanation as to why judicial intervention was not sought at that time instead of being delayed for several months.

Welch purchased the home on November 20, 2009. It is not clear when he and his family moved in-that is, whether counsel’s initial inquiry came before the family occupied the house.

However, we decline to reverse the trial court’s ruling on this issue. It appears to us that the requirement that a defense discovery request be “timely” has to do with the undesirable possibilities of delaying or otherwise interfering with trial. (See Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 626 (Evans).) The fact that earlier judicial intervention might have avoided any invasion of homeowner privacy in this case is really purely fortuitous. That Armenta’s efforts might not have been “timely” with respect to Welch’s occupancy of the residence does not, in our view, implicate the timeliness requirement as generally applied. It is not the third party’s convenience that is concerned, but that of the court and the judicial system. Here, the trial court evidently felt that

Armenta’s request could be accommodated without strain to the orderly process of proceedings. Hence, we disagree that the request should have been denied as untimely.

It is noteworthy, however, that trial was set within about 10 days. Of course, this proceeding has caused substantial further delay.

We are also concerned that a denial of the request on this basis could lead to a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Returning to the merits, the court in Bullen noted, it is well established that a defendant is entitled to seek useful evidence, and indeed may employ the subpoena process to do so. (Bullen, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 26; Pen. Code, § 1326; Pacific Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 552, 562-563.) Thus, arguably, Armenta would be entitled to have a subpoena issue compelling Welch’s attendance at trial, at which time Armenta’s counsel could attempt to elicit testimony from Welch about details of his home that might aid the defense (and being those which are sought to be examined before trial). Additionally, Armenta could issue a subpoena ducestecum directed at any plans, photographs, or blueprints Welch might have of his home. We accept, however, that this option is not necessarily adequate for Armenta-at least, that we cannot determine from the record before us whether it would be adequate. (See infra.)

As did the court in Bullen, we recognize that the requested access seriously impacts Welch’s personal right of privacy. However, the right of privacy is not absolute and must be measured against a defendant’s constitutional rights. (See People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 531-532 [defense right to inspect witness’s mental health records].) It is also beyond question that nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits “the States from issuing warrants to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.” (Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) 436 U.S. 547, 560; see also Gordon v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1551.) And, at least to a substantial extent, what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander-that is, if a discovery or information-gathering option is available to the People, similar options must be available to the defendant. (Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 474-475; Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 623 [prosecution’s right to compel a live lineup extended to defense]; Garcia v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 979, 984-985 [citing and following Evans].) To carry out these principles, with respect to most evidence not in the possession of the People (and therefore not subject to statutory reciprocal discovery pursuant to Pen. Code § 1050 et seq.), the defendant may use the subpoena ducestecum to obtain production of real or documentary evidence, as we have noted ante.

Obviously, a house is not a piece of physical or documentary evidence that can be subpoenaed. However, as intimated in Bullen, fairness and reciprocity would appear to require that a defendant be able to obtain access to a residence similar to that which the People could command by use of a search warrant.

Welch urges that he “purchase[d] a house; not a crime scene.” The truth is-unfortunate as it may be for Welch and his family-the house was a crime scene, and the crime in question was the subject of unresolved criminal proceedings at the time of purchase. Those proceedings-gravely affecting Armenta’s future-remain unresolved. Welch may have a grievance against the real estate agent or agents who neglected to inform him of the house’s history, but any such dereliction can hardly be allowed to trump defendant’s right to prepare a defense.

We note that in People v. Johnson (1933) 219 Cal. 72, 77, the court, although noting the existence of Penal Code section 1119 (see infra), found no error in denying defense counsel’s request to be allowed to enter and inspect the crime scene, a residence. It stated: “[W]e are not advised of any authority in the court to make an order merely on motion and without a sufficient showing, including the consent of the occupant of the premises, permitting counsel for a party to enter the private premises of another for such a purpose.” (Italics added.) However, these comments predate the evolution of criminal discovery under the Constitution as developed in both Zurcher and Wardius. It also appears that defense counsel in Johnson made no effort to explain what he hoped to uncover or discover by his visit, or why other alternatives would not suffice. Thus, we do not read Johnson as a controlling authority for the point that defense access can never be granted unless the property owner consents.

Indeed, although statutory law does not provide the defendant with an explicit right of pretrial access for investigative purposes, it does provide an option to demand such access during trial. Penal Code section 1119 provides that “[w]hen, in the opinion of the court, it is proper that the jury should view the place in which the offense is charged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred... it may order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the custody of the sheriff or marshal, as the case may be, to the place, or to the property, which must be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose....” With, again, apologies to Welch, we can comfortably state that if pretrial access were not granted and, if the testimony at trial goes as Armenta suggests it will, Armenta could well have a very strong case in asking the trial court to permit a jury view of Welch’s home.

Although Penal Code section 1119 begins “[w]hen, in the opinion of the court, ” it is common for one side or the other to “assist” the court in forming this opinion by making a request or formal motion. (See, e.g., People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 156-158 (Lawley).) This is recognized in the rule that the trial court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 158.)

It is very true that courts do not authorize jury views of a crime scene without a substantial showing that it would assist the jury. Obviously, such a procedure is inconvenient for everyone involved, even if there is no aggrieved homeowner. Thus, if alternative evidence can be substituted for the jury view, the court, in its discretion, may deny the request. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)

As the court pointed out in Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 158, “‘[w]hen the purpose of the view is to test the veracity of a witness’s testimony about observations the witness made, the trial court may properly consider whether... there are other means of testing the veracity of the witness’s testimony.’” In Lawley, the court held that the trial court acted reasonably in finding that the defense purposes could be served by existing diagrams and measurements; notably, the court commented that the defendant “was free to send an investigator to the cabin to obtain any measurements he believed essential.” (Id. at p. 159.) In that case, the cabin was owned by the defendant, which of course did not present the access and privacy issues involved here.

Another case demonstrating some antipathy to the concept of jury view-and this time in the context of a third-party residence-is People v. Burciago (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 151 (Burciago). In that case, the reason for requesting a jury view of a witness’s home was to allow it to determine firsthand the reliability of her identification of defendant, made through a peephole in her door, as the person who did in fact come to her door late one evening. (Id. at pp. 156, 168-169.) The trial court had noted the possibility of alternative means of providing the jury with this opportunity, including obtaining a similar peephole and bringing it to court-or removing the actual viewer from the witness’s door and bringing it to court-and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request. (Id. at pp. 168-169.)

It is not at all clear whether the court thought the witness’s consent to the destruction of her door would have been required or whether this could have been done by court order.

With these cases in mind, we need not determine at this point whether such a motion, if made, would have to be granted. Although if pretrial access is not provided, Armenta might reasonably ask for a jury view at trial. Cases such as Lawley and Burciago indicate that a court may require that less disruptive alternatives be pursued. With this in mind, and with the benefit of acting before trial, we reach our conclusion.

For the court, the jury, and any property owner.

First, as we have discussed ante, Armenta is entitled to some avenue in which to obtain the specific evidence he seeks. However, it may be possible for the parties, and the court, to reach an agreement that will not require personal access into Welch’s home. It is possible that accurate measurements and specific photographs would serve Armenta’s purpose (see Lawley, supra) and that Welch might prefer to take such measurements and photographs himself and then authenticate them at trial. Although we believe that the trial court’s limitations and restrictions on the access order were appropriate, we will remand to give the court an opportunity to see if a less intrusive alternative can be arranged.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandate is granted on conditions. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to schedule further proceedings if requested by Welch and to consider whether adequate, less intrusive means exist through which Armenta can obtain the information he seeks. If no such request from Welch is made within 10 days of the finality of this opinion, the order for access shall stand.

That is, if Welch wishes to pursue the possibility of alternative arrangements to provide Armenta with the information he needs.

I concur: HOLLENHORST, J.

KING, J., Dissenting.

The present petition flows from the trial court’s order allowing defense counsel and a licensed investigator to view and take photographs of various portions of petitioner Joseph Welch’s (Welch) home, as part of their pretrial discovery. I agree with much of the majority’s discussion; I would not, however, grant the petition with directions. I believe it should simply be denied.

Whether a defendant is entitled to access to a petitioner’s home for purposes of investigation, “implicates competing fundamental interests involving petitioner’s right to privacy in [his] own home and defendant’s right to a fair trial and a defense informed by all relevant and reasonably accessible information.... [¶] ‘... Disposition of the motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the value to the accused of the information sought against the legitimate interests of others. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Bullen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 22, 25-26.)

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. Its factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and it correctly applied the law in balancing Welch’s right to privacy against real party in interest Joseph Armenta’s (Armenta) right to due process.

“A motion for pretrial discovery by an accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and a writ of mandate will not issue unless it is demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.] ‘“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.”’... [Citations.]’” (Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 156 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)

“‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. [Citations.]’” (People v. Superior Court (Meraz) (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 28, 48.) “A writ of mandate will issue to control the exercise of judicial discretion only when a court has acted capriciously or ‘where, under the facts, that discretion can be exercised in only one way.’” (Langford v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 21, 28, italics added.)

While in the present instance Welch’s right to privacy may not be statutorily protected, a right of privacy in one’s home is protected by both the state and federal Constitutions. (See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130.) “[T]he right to privacy includes the right to be left alone in our homes.” (Coalition Advocating Legal Housing Options v. City of Santa Monica (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 451, 459.) “Nevertheless, one’s constitutional right of privacy is not absolute and, upon a showing of some compelling public interest, the right of privacy must give way.” (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664.) A compelling interest is present as it relates to the protection of the fundamental right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against him. (See Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 315-320.) To this end, “[i]t has been stated that the basis for granting pretrial discovery to a defendant is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial [citations].... ‘Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential, ... the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on the issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.’ [Citations.]” (Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816.)

In balancing these respective interests, “[t]he court must consider the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure and availability of alternative, less intrusive means for obtaining the requested information. [Citation.] Based on an application of these factors, the more sensitive the nature of the personal information that is sought to be discovered, the more substantial the showing of the need for the discovery that will be required before disclosure will be permitted.” (Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004.)

In looking first to the purpose of the information sought, Armenta demonstrated with specificity the justification and need for the discovery. Here, Armenta is charged with four counts of attempted murder of police officers, as well as lesser related offenses of assault on police officers. The alleged wrongful conduct occurred inside premises then occupied by Armenta (now owned by Welch). From the available facts, it appears that Armenta shot at sheriff’s deputies after they entered the house.

1 As indicated in Bullen v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at page 26: “‘[A]n accused’s motion for discovery... must describe the information sought with reasonable specificity, and must present a plausible justification for production of the items requested. [Citations.] Although the accused need not demonstrate the admissibility at trial of all requested items, his showing must be more than speculative and must indicate that the requested information will facilitate ascertainment of the facts and promote a fair trial....’ [Citation.]”

In the moving papers, defense counsel indicates that two deputies testified at the preliminary hearing and that he anticipates that both deputies, as well as other deputies, will testify at trial. Counsel states that entry into the premises is necessary “[i]n order to effectively confront and cross[-]examine the officers, [Armenta’s] counsel must have access to the subject premises to assess the interior and exterior sight lines, the distances between any two or more relevant points inside and out, and to get a three dimensional appreciation of the crime scene generally, something that cannot be gleaned from the photographs supplied by the prosecution.” In a three-page declaration submitted under seal, defense counsel states with specificity exactly what he intends to do, why he wants to do it, and the probative value of the evidence to be obtained. From the documents presented, the justification and need for the discovery is patent.

2 The present showing and offer of proof is very detailed, unlike that made in Bullen v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pages 26-27.

We look next to Welch’s privacy interest, that is, the effect that the inspection will have on Welch and/or his family. I first note that, at the trial level, Welch did not submit a declaration setting forth facts as to the effect an inspection of his house would have on himself or his family. From the reporter’s transcript of the court proceedings of April 1 and 2, 2010, Welch offered the following as to the extent an inspection would infringe on his privacy: “First of all, on November 20, 2009, my wife, and I paid a substantial sum to purchase a house; not a crime scene. A house we later made our home. It has been-through the escrow period, never was disclosed by the seller, Bank of America or their listing agent, that there was any criminal conduct within or around the property. [¶] Furthermore, there was no indicia of criminal activity as the walls were painted. New carpet.... Furthermore, I think case law is clear that a man’s home is his sanctuary, a place free of unreasonable search or an invasion of privacy....” Later, Welch indicates that if the inspection is to occur, he would like the police present and that any public disclosure of photographs taken of the interior of his house be precluded. Lastly, he states: “Although I sincerely want [Armenta] to have a fair trial, I’m compelled by my wife, family, and my constitutional rights of homeowners similarly situated to argue for the sanctity of the home.”

It is understandable that Welch may be somewhat unnerved by the fact that he bought a “crime scene” without being told; that fact, however, has no bearing on whether the present inspection will have an effect on himself or his family. His privacy interest is amply protected in that the court order specifically provides that only defense counsel and a licensed investigator may be present and that the photographs taken may not be disclosed to any individual. Furthermore, it is clear that some photographs of the premises already exist. There simply has been no showing relative to the effect of an inspection on Welch and/or his family, let alone a showing that an inspection would yield sensitive and/or personal information.

Additionally, I see no alternative or less intrusive means of obtaining the information. The investigation and its fruits are attorney work product, and should not at the present time be disclosed to a third person. Having some independent person, i.e., Welch, take the photographs, waives the attorney work product privilege. Also, having a third person take photographs and measurements does not fulfill all aspects of the reason for the inspection. Lastly, counsel for Armenta must lay a foundation for the admissibility of the evidence obtained. To leave the investigation to Welch would, most probably, totally thwart counsel’s ability to lay a proper foundation.

Under the present facts, Armenta’s due process rights clearly outweigh Welch’s claim of privacy. The trial court’s order is well tailored and limits the inspection to the showing made by defense counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The petition should be denied.

3 To the extent possible, the trial court could perhaps preclude, during trial, specific reference to the street address of Welch’s house.

4 The court order specifies that only defense counsel and a licensed investigator may enter the premises. It further states that the inspection is to occur during daylight hours at a mutually agreed upon date and time. The inspection “shall not exceed 40 minutes, ” and the inspection shall be of “the outside perimeter of the premises, laundry room and the area leading into and out of the master bedroom only (that is, the view from the master bedroom out and from outside the master bedroom into the master bedroom).”


Summaries of

Welch v. Superior Court (Joe Louis Armenta)

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division
Jan 12, 2011
No. E050535 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2011)
Case details for

Welch v. Superior Court (Joe Louis Armenta)

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH M. WELCH, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

Date published: Jan 12, 2011

Citations

No. E050535 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2011)