Opinion
C079794
05-02-2017
MELANIE WELCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 34200800007702CUWMGDS)
In this case, plaintiff Melanie Welch objected to certain actions taken by defendant California State Teachers' Retirement Board (CalSTRS) after CalSTRS -- acting under the command of a writ of mandate -- reconsidered (and granted) her application for disability retirement benefits. The trial court overruled Welch's objections and discharged the writ. Because Welch's objections relate to actions taken after CalSTRS fully complied with the terms of the writ, they were beyond the limited scope of the trial court's jurisdiction in this case following issuance of the writ. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We draw the following facts from our prior decision in this case:
In 1998, only a little more than a year after she became a member of CalSTRS, Welch was physically attacked by a group of students while working as a teacher at a middle school in Oakland. (Welch v. State Teachers' Retirement System (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6 (Welch I).) While she was on administrative leave, a CalSTRS representative misinformed her that five years of credited service were necessary to apply for disability retirements benefits. (Id. at pp. 6-7) In fact, however, there was an exception to the five-year requirement that might have applied to Welch (hereafter, the bodily injury exception). (Id. at p. 7.)
Under that exception, "a CalSTRS member who has less than five years of credited service can receive a disability retirement allowance if '(1) [t]he member has at least one year of credited service performed in this state'; '(2) [t]he disability is a direct result of an unlawful act of bodily injury that was perpetrated on his or her person by another human being while the member was performing his or her official duties in a position subject to coverage under the Defined Benefit Program'; and '(3) [t]he member provides documentation of the unlawful act in the form of an official police report or official employer incident report.' " (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-7.) --------
In February 1999, Welch was released from her employment contract. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) In January 2001, a superior court ordered her reinstated. (Ibid.) In June 2001, the school district once again terminated Welch's employment, this time using proper procedures. (Ibid.)
In 2005, Welch learned for the first time of the bodily injury exception and filed an application with CalSTRS for disability retirement benefits on the ground she had been disabled by the attack in October 1998. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.) In February 2006, CalSTRS rejected Welch's application because the medical documentation she provided did not substantiate that she had been disabled since her last day of work. (Ibid.) Welch sought administrative review of the denial, then brought this administrative mandamus proceeding in the Sacramento County Superior Court to challenge the denial of her application. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)
The trial court found CalSTRS had misinformed Welch about the eligibility requirements for disability retirement benefits but also found that the weight of the evidence did not establish that Welch was actually disabled until, at the earliest, August 2005. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 9-10.) Because the Education Code does not authorize disability retirement for delayed onset cases of disability, the court denied Welch's petition for a writ of administrative mandate. (Id. at p. 10.)
On Welch's appeal, this court pointed out that under subdivision (c) of Education Code section 22308, CalSTRS may correct all actions taken as a result of its own errors. (Welch I, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14-15.) In light of this provision, we concluded "the trial court erred in refusing to grant [Welch] any relief based on its finding that CalSTRS misinformed her in 1999 about the eligibility requirements for disability retirement benefits." (Id. at p. 22.) In our view, "[i]t was abuse of discretion for CalSTRS not to consider whether to apply section 22308 to this case, and if so how." (Id. at p. 28.) Thus, we concluded "[t]he matter must be remanded to CalSTRS for CalSTRS to consider, in the first instance, the proper application of section 22308 here." (Ibid.) Our disposition of Welch's appeal read in its entirety as follows: "The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment granting Welch's petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The writ shall direct CalSTRS to vacate its decision denying Welch's application for disability retirement benefits and to reconsider whether to grant that application under section 22308, consistent with this opinion." (Id. at -pp. 28-29.)
We issued our opinion in January 2012. On June 7, 2012, the trial court entered a new judgment granting Welch's mandamus petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of mandate. In the judgment, the court expressly "reserve[d] jurisdiction in this action until there has been full compliance with the writ." On the same day, the court clerk issued a writ of mandate in compliance with the judgment that commanded CalSTRS to: (1) "vacate the decision denying [Welch]'s application for disability retirement benefits," (2) "reconsider whether to grant [Welch]'s application for disability retirement benefits under Education Code, section 22308," and (3) "make and file a return within 60 days after issuance of this writ setting forth what you have done to comply with this writ."
On August 6, 2012, CalSTRS filed a return to the writ stating that CalSTRS had set aside its decision denying Welch's application for disability retirement benefits and was "in the process of reconsidering whether to grant [Welch]'s application." CalSTRS further explained that, "[t]o this end, [CalSTRS] will be scheduling one or more independent medical evaluations . . . of [Welch]," and following those evaluations, CalSTRS would "issue a new decision regarding [Welch]'s application for disability retirement benefits."
In December 2012, Welch filed a motion to vacate the new judgment and the writ of mandate. In the course of that motion, Welch referenced the return filed by CalSTRS and complained about CalSTRS's stated intent to subject her to further medical evaluations.
In January 2013, the trial court denied Welch's motion to vacate and noted that "[i]f [Welch] is attempting to object to [CalSTRS's] Return, her objection appears to be premature" because the return was "merely an 'intermediate' Return, in that [CalSTRS] has not yet completed its administrative proceeding and issued a new decision."
For reasons that we need not concern ourselves with, nearly two years passed before CalSTRS finally did issue its new decision. In a letter to Welch dated December 23, 2014, CalSTRS notified her that her application for a disability benefit had been approved effective July 1, 2001. In that same letter, CalSTRS notified Welch that "follow up medical examinations may be required," and "[i]f you are no longer medically disabled, your disability benefit will stop." In a follow-up letter dated December 29, 2014, CalSTRS notified Welch of the amount of her disability retirement benefit ($1,859.21 per month) and also notified her that she would be receiving a retroactive payment of accrued benefits in the amount of $268,199.84 and an interest penalty in the amount of $321,576.88.
On January 20, 2015, CalSTRS filed its final return to the writ of mandate, stating that it had set aside its decision denying Welch's application for disability benefits and had approved Welch's application effective July 1, 2001. In addition, the return provided information about how CalSTRS had determined the amount of Welch's retirement benefit and the amount of interest owed to her. In closing, CalSTRS explained that while it "endeavored to reach agreement with [Welch] so that no future legal challenges by [her] would be necessary," "[t]hese negotiations have proved unsuccessful as [Welch] disputes [CalSTRS]'s: a) monthly benefit compensation calculation; b) interest calculations; c) annuity determination; and d) [Welch]'s continuing obligation to cooperate in providing information regarding her continuing future disability status."
On March 13, 2015, Welch filed her objection to CalSTRS's return to the writ of mandate. In her objection, she requested that the court "require CalSTRS to amend its Return with additional explanations and information that w[ould] enable [her] to learn the legal authority for their calculations and interpretations of the sections of the California Code that theoretically govern their agency." She further requested that the court "order CalSTRS to file an amended Return that explains what basis, legal authority, and fiduciary interest they are basing each component of this benefit package being offered."
A hearing on Welch's objection to the return was set for June. CalSTRS filed a response and its own objections to Welch's objection, and Welch filed a reply. Following a hearing on June 26, the trial court found that Welch's objection to the return lacked merit and therefore approved the return and discharged the writ. Welch timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
"On appeal from an order discharging a writ, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the respondent . . . complied with the writ." (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355.) As we have noted, the writ here commanded CalSTRS to: (1) "vacate the decision denying [Welch]'s application for disability retirement benefits," (2) "reconsider whether to grant [Welch]'s application for disability retirement benefits under Education Code, section 22308," and (3) "make and file a return . . . setting forth what you have done to comply with the writ."
The record here demonstrates unequivocally that CalSTRS fully complied with all of the terms of the writ in that CalSTRS: (1) set aside its decision denying Welch's application for disability benefits, (2) reconsidered whether to grant that application (and upon reconsideration approved the application effective July 1, 2001), and (3) filed a return setting forth what it had done to comply with the writ. Those three actions were all that were necessary for full compliance. Welch's complaints in her objection to the return about (among other things) the amount of her monthly disability retirement benefit, the amount of interest CalPERS paid her on her retroactive disability retirement payments, and CalPERS's assertion that she may be subject to further evaluations in the future to determine whether she remains disabled are simply beyond the limited scope of the trial court's jurisdiction in this case following issuance of the writ of mandate. "The trial court that issues a writ of mandate retains continuing jurisdiction to make any orders necessary for complete enforcement of the writ." (Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) Indeed, the trial court here specifically recited in the judgment on remand that it "reserve[d] jurisdiction in this action until there has been full compliance with the writ." Once CalSTRS set aside its initial denial of Welch's application for disability retirement benefits, reconsidered that application -- whatever the outcome of that reconsideration -- and filed a return advising the court that it had done both of these things, CalSTRS fully complied with the writ, and the trial court retained no jurisdiction except that necessary to acknowledge CalSTRS's compliance and discharge the writ. The trial court properly exercised that jurisdiction, leaving nothing for Welch to (validly) complain about. Any challenge Welch might have to what CalSTRS did after it reconsidered her application would have had to be the subject of a separate proceeding -- not this one.
DISPOSITION
The order approving the return and discharging the writ is affirmed. CalSTRS shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Mauro, J. /s/_________
Renner, J.