Opinion
1:19-CV-00322-SPB
09-23-2024
WELCH FOODS, INC., A COOPERATIVE, d/b/a WELCH'S Plaintiff v. GENERAL TEAMSTERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 397, Defendant
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RE: ECF NOS. 51, 56
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
The pending cross motions for summary judgment are before the Undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 72.D. It is respectfully recommended that Defendant General Teamsters Union Local 397's motion (ECF No. 56) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff Welch Foods Inc.'s motion (ECF No. 51) be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Welch Foods, Inc. (Welch Foods) commenced this action to vacate a labor arbitration award entered pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C § 185 et seq. See ECF No. 1. Welch Foods and Defendant General Teamsters Local Union No. 397 (Union) are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). On January 21, 2019, following an internal investigation, Welch Foods notified Pat Woodward (Grievant), a male employee and member of the Union, that it was terminating his employment as the result of his conduct in an employee breakroom on January 11, 2019. Welch Foods' January 21, 2019 termination letter advised Grievant that his discharge was based upon his engaging in “threatening and intimidating behavior and language” in violation of Welch Foods' workplace conduct rules and his having created “a hostile work environment.” ECF No. 1- 2, p. 3. The termination letter further specified that Grievant had used language toward a female employee (and women in the workplace generally) that was “abusive, sexually explicit, and derogatory.” Id. Specifically, Welch Foods' investigation revealed that during the incident, Grievant “referred to his female co-workers as ‘self-serving vagina bitches,” and “f**king worthless”; he pointed to his groin area and stated, “if you don't have one of these you are no good”; and he called the female co-worker involved in the incident a “f**king no good vagina bitch” and repeatedly used the term “f**king bitch.”
The Union filed a grievance challenging the Grievant's termination and requesting that he “be reinstated to full time employment.” The grievance was processed through the procedures outlined in the CBA and ultimately proceeded to an arbitration hearing conducted before Arbitrator Michelle Miller-Kotula on April 26, 2019. On October 26, 2019, the Arbitrator issued her Opinion and Award in which she concluded that Welch Foods “had just cause to discipline the grievant” but “the discipline imposed on the grievant was too harsh in this instance.” The Arbitrator reduced Grievant's discipline to a ten-day suspension and directed Welch Foods to make him whole for losses incurred.
On October 31, 2019, Welch Foods filed this action to vacate the reinstatement Award on the grounds that it violated a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. The Court denied the Union's motion to dismiss the Complaint. ECF Nos. 4, 21. After the Union answered the Complaint, it and Welch Foods filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 24, 33. Upon review, the Undersigned concluded that the Arbitrator's award was ambiguous as to whether she had found that Grievant had engaged in sexual harassment such that the arbitration award reinstating him violated the well-defined policy against sexual harassment. See ECF No. 38, pp. 6-8; Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Loc. 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that “an award which fully reinstates an employee accused of sexual harassment without a determination that the harassment did not occur violates public policy”). A remand to the Arbitrator was recommended with instructions that she clarify her factual findings regarding sexual harassment. Id., p. 8. It was also recommended that the competing motions be dismissed without prejudice to their refiling upon the Arbitrator's clarification. Id. The District Court adopted these recommendations and ordered the matter remanded to the Arbitrator for clarification on August 12, 2021. ECF No. 42.
On May 8, 2023, the Court conducted a status conference and asked the parties for an update regarding the Arbitrator's clarification of her award. ECF Nos. 44, 46. At the conclusion of the status conference, the parties were ordered to contact the Court upon receipt of the Arbitrator's clarification. ECF No. 46 (text order). On August 7, 2023, counsel for the Union filed a status report indicating that the Arbitrator had completed a clarification of her prior decision. ECF No. 47. The Court then reopened the case and set deadlines for filing renewed motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 50. Welch Foods renewed its motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) as did the Union (ECF No. 56). The Undersigned conducted oral argument on the motions on March 14, 2024. See ECF No. 60 (minute entry). The cross-motions are ripe for decision.
B. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the district court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070,1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
The district court's standard of review is further circumscribed in this case by the well-established policy favoring resolution of labor disputes by arbitration. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts “play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.” Id.; see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983). “Courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 36. To do otherwise would undermine “the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration ... [by giving] courts [] the final say on the merits of the awards.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, a district court may vacate an arbitration award only in exceedingly narrow circumstances. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 1995) (“District courts have very little authority to upset arbitrators' awards.”). “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. Indeed, an arbitrator's “‘improvident, even silly, factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.” Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Major League Umpires Assoc, v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2004)).
The policy favoring enforcement of labor arbitration awards, however, is not absolute. Courts may refuse to enforce an arbitration award where it interprets a collective bargaining agreement in a manner that violates “some explicit public policy” that is “well defined and dominant...” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). Well defined and dominant public is discerned “‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766). This public policy exception is “slim indeed.” Kinder Morgan Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, & Its Local 1, 9 F.Supp.3d 507, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2014). It applies only where the “award create[s] an explicit conflict with an explicit public policy.” United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1995). That is, in determining “whether an award violates public policy, the analysis turns on whether the arbitrator's award ‘created any explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents rather than an assessment of general considerations of supposed public interests.'” D.A. Nolt, Inc. v. Local Union No. 30 United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & Allied Workers, 661 Fed.Appx. 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766). Thus, “[a]pplication of the public policy exception requires a two-step analysis.” Exxon, 73 F.3d at 1291-92. “The threshold question is whether a well-defined and dominant public policy can be identified [and], [i]f so, the court must determine whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in his or her interpretation of the agreement, violated the public policy.” Id.
C. Discussion and Analysis
1. The well-defined and dominant public policy concerning sexual harassment As discussed in the Undersigned's prior Report, the first element of the public policy exception is satisfied. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized “a well-defined and dominant public policy concerning sexual harassment in the workplace which can be ascertained by reference to law and legal precedent.” Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441. This public policy derives from several sources, including:
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which prohibits employment discrimination because of sex;
• Supreme Court precedent such as Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67, (1986), which interprets Title VII's prohibition to include sexual harassment in the workplace that creates a hostile or offensive work environment; and
• EEOC regulations defining sexual harassment as including “verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” that “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991) (footnote omitted).See also Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 1993 WL 244063, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 1993) (“There is a well-defined and dominant public policy concerning sexual harassment in the workplace.”).
2. The Arbitrator's award, as clarified, does not violate public policy.
Welch Foods argues that the Arbitrator's award, even as clarified, violates the well-defined and dominant public policy concerning sexual harassment in that it fully reinstates Grievant without a determination that the harassment did not occur. The Court is constrained to disagree.
The Arbitrator's initial award carefully reviewed the testimony and other evidence adduced during the arbitration proceedings, including the testimony of the female co-worker with whom Grievant had the verbal exchange in the company breakroom. The award did not include findings regarding that evidence, including any findings whether Grievant engaged in the specific conduct described by the co-worker or whether Grievant's actions constituted sexual harassment. The clarification sufficiently resolves this ambiguity. Although the findings of the Arbitrator's clarification remain less than the picture of clarity, she “determined ... that both the grievant, and [the co-employee] engaged in inappropriate language in the workplace and that [the co-employee] was the instigator in the incident that occurred.” ECF No. 54-4, p. 3. She further found that the Grievant “was not determined by [Welch Foods] to be the aggressor” and that, although “[h]is language was not appropriate when he raised his voice and used inappropriate words during the argument,... his actions were the same as [the co-employee's] actions because she raised her voice and also used inappropriate language.” Id. “Ultimately, the “arbitrator did not find sexual harassment occurred during this incident in the workplace...” Id. at p. 4.
The Arbitrator's clarification also stated that the “arbitrator did not find sexual harassment to be one of the charges [Welch Foods] outlined against the grievant” and that sexual harassment “was not included in the discharge letter provided to the grievant.” Id., p. 3. Welch Foods strenuously disagrees with this conclusion, noting that its termination letter specifically charged Grievant with “threatening and intimidating behavior and language” that was “abusive, sexually explicit, and derogatory” and that created “a hostile work environment.” ECF No. 52, pp. 3, 11-12; ECF No. 1- 2, p. 3. Welch Foods is correct that the absence of the words “sexual harassment” does not preclude a finding of such where the conduct alleged and proven fits the definition. But here, read it their entirety and with due deference to the Arbitrator, the award and clarification reflect her finding that Grievant's conduct did not rise to the level of sexual harassment. This conclusion is not plainly inconsistent with her factual findings. Sexual harassment is present where the conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). See also Valenti v. Triangle Circuits of Pittsburgh, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 701 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (granting summary judgment in favor of employer on determining single incident where vice president showed employee a picture of a naked woman on a motorcycle was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employee's employment, and thus did not create hostile work environment under Title VII). The Arbitrator's ultimate assessment was that the Grievant's conduct, while offensive and inappropriate, did not constitute sexual harassment warranting dismissal and that a suspension identical to the suspension imposed upon the female co-worker was the appropriate discipline for the Grievant under the CBA. As clarified, this conclusion does not violate the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. See ITT Engineered Valves, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO CLC, Loc. 36M, 2021 WL 3362060, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2021) (holding that vacatur of arbitration award was not authorized where arbitrator reduced discipline for grievant's alleged harassing conduct from discharge to suspension and thereby did not permit conduct to go “unpunished”). See also Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467, 468 (10th Cir. 1989) (declining to vacate arbitration award imposing suspension without pay rather than discharge where employee had committed sexual harassment only one time, was penitent and apologetic, and his record was otherwise unblemished).
III. Conclusion
Welch Foods' desire to keep its workplace free of conduct such as allegedly committed by Grievant is understandable. Because the Arbitrator's clarification of her award disavows any finding that Grievant engaged in sexual harassment, the Court has no authority to vacate the award. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Union's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and that Welch Foods' motion for summary judgment be DENIED. A judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be entered accordingly.
IV. Notice to Parties Concerning Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).