Thus Adams v. McAlpine, 303 Mich. 375; 6 N.W.(2d) 551, refers to the ‘Right to repurchase premises.‘ In James A. Welch Co. v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85; 294 N.W. 377, after stating that after the expiration of the period of redemption the plaintiff ceases to have any more interest in the title than any stranger, the court adds: ‘The State, however, granted to it a right or privilege for a 30-day period after the sale of the land at the so-called scavenger sale, to acquire title by meeting the 'highest bid.‘ Later, the court terms the right or privilege as ‘not a present vested right or a present interest; it is a mere contingent right which may or may not happen.

Accordingly, like any other creditor, defendants were required to return the surplus.Krench v. Michigan , 277 Mich. 168, 179, 269 N.W. 131 (1936) (holding that a tax-foreclosure sale divests the former owner of title and vests title with the state in fee simple with a new chain of title being formed); James A. Welch Co., Inc. v. State Land Office Bd. , 295 Mich. 85, 93-95, 294 N.W. 377 (1940) (holding that after the state received absolute title to land that was sold for delinquent property taxes, the former owner held no greater interest in title to the land than any other stranger); Meltzer v. State Land Office Bd. , 301 Mich. 541, 545, 3 N.W.2d 875 (1942) (affirming Krench and Welch and concluding that once absolute title to a tax-foreclosed property vests with the state, the former owners hold "no interest in the land at the time of the tax sale").Welch , 295 Mich. at 92, 294 N.W. 377 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).

For three years she paid a charge for living in her house and still did not bring an action until 1972. In James A Welch Co, Inc v State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85; 294 N.W. 377 (1940), plaintiff owned property in Flint which was sold for delinquent taxes and not redeemed. Under the statute, the city requested that the land be withheld from public sale.

In upholding the new legislation, it was decided, inter alia, that the right of redemption is not a constitutional right but exists only as permitted by statute, that such rights as arose under the provisions of the statute governing sales for tax delinquency are subject to abridgment by the legislature for the reason they are remedial in nature, and that no vested rights arise out of redemption provisions of a decree entered pursuant to a remedial statute governing tax sales. In James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board (1940), 295 Mich. 85, the Court approved the contention of defendant that (p 93): "`Upon the vesting of title absolute in the state, the state's sovereign power of imposing and enforcing the collection of taxes thus reached its completion and fruition, and the particular parcels of land ceased to be amenable to the tax laws of the state, as state-owned land is not taxable. * * * Such land can be disposed of only on conditions prescribed by the legislature.'"

In addition, the general nature of tax statutes supports the conclusion that the plaintiffs had no vested right in a foreign tax credit. The statutes imply no contractual obligations between taxpayers and the state, James A Welch Co, Inc v State Land Office Bd, 295 Mich. 85, 91; 294 N.W. 377 (1940); Muirhead v Sands, 111 Mich. 487, 491-492; 69 N.W. 826 (1897), and because any "rights" that arise under a tax statute are purely a result of legislative "grace," the Legislature is free to take such a "right" away at any time, as it did here. Rookledge v Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 457; 65 N.W.2d 785 (1954); Wylie, supra, pp 588-589.

Such public property belonging to the State is exempt from property tax. CL 1929, § 3395, as last amended by PA 1946 (1st Ex Sess), No. 24 (Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp § 7.7). Auditor General v Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich. 467; 47 N.W. 440 (10 LRA 376) (1890); City of Detroit v George, 214 Mich. 664; 183 N.W. 789 (1921); People, for use of Regents of the University of Michigan v Brooks, 224 Mich. 45; 194 N.W. 602 (1923); James A. Welch Co, Inc, v State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85; 294 N.W. 377 (1940)." Rockwell Co v Romulus Township, 365 Mich. 632, 640; 114 N.W.2d 166 (1962).

The Supreme Court of Michigan has laid down rules interpreting the State Statutes as to who has the necessary qualifications to meet the highest bid at so-called scavenger sales. Piotrowski v. State Land Office, 302 Mich. 179, 4. N.W.2d 514; Redford Union School District No. 1 v. State Land Office Board, 297 Mich. 535, 298 N.W. 124; James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85, 294 N.W. 377. Appellant urges that there are other issues raised by appellee's petition, which the court should, in its discretion, require the trustee to have determined in a plenary state court suit.

In commenting on the above statute the Michigan Supreme Court had the following thing to say in Municipal Investors Ass'n v. City of Birmingham, 298 Mich. 314, 299 N.W. 90 (1941): "The clear import of the language of the foregoing amendatory enactments, and the obvious intent and purpose of the legislature to relieve owners from the weight of accumulated obligation, [ James A.] Welch [Co., Inc.] v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85, 294 N.W. 377, must lead one to the conclusion that when title to the lots here in question became absolute in the State of Michigan upon expiration of the period of redemption provided by the tax law free of all taxes and other liens and incumbrances of whatever kind or nature, future and deficiency as well as past assessments and taxes were cancelled. . . ." p. 325, 299 N.W. p. 94.

Such public property belonging to the State is exempt from property tax. CL 1929, § 3395, as last amended by PA 1946 (1st Ex Sess), No 24 (Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp § 7.7). Auditor General v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 83 Mich. 467 (10 LRA 376); City of Detroit v. George, 214 Mich. 664; People, for use of Regents of the University of Michigan, v. Brooks, 224 Mich. 45; James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85."

Plaintiff McCreary thereafter had no more interest or right in said property than a stranger. James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board, 295 Mich. 85; Meltzer v. State Land Office Board, 301 Mich. 541. If, as stated by Mr. Justice REID, said plaintiff became the equitable owner of said house and lot in 1925, and the legal owner thereof by adverse possession in 1940, said title, both equitable and legal, became and was extinquished when the title of the State became absolute in 1941. At the so-called scavenger sale in 1947, the State land office board sold and deeded said house and lot to defendant Shields. Mr. Justice REID would now take away that record title from defendant Shields and decree it to plaintiff McCreary in exchange for plaintiff's title to the vacant lot which all the time since 1925 has stood in the plaintiff.