If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 731 (2), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018). In its order denying Taylor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the trial court found:

And we leave any challenges to any conviction entered on the felon-in-possession count for any future motion for new trial or appeal, as necessary. See Welbon v. State, 304 Ga. 729, 730 (1) n.2 (822 S.E.2d 277) (2018) ("[A] criminal defendant in a second, postremand appeal may raise issues relating to a new trial court order on remand, or may raise issues - such as ineffective assistance in this case - that were raised but not decided in the first appeal.").

"To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different." Welbon v. State, 304 Ga. 729, 781, 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018). "If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two-prong test, then the other prong need not be reviewed by the Court."

At Allaben's third trial, the State was required to present evidence of his guilt again, and because Allaben raised sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to review the evidence from the third trial, although the differences between that evidence and the evidence presented at the first and second trials are very slight. Cf. Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 730 (1), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) ("[W]hen an appellate court determines that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a jury's guilty verdict, but the case is remanded for reconsideration of a different issue, the sufficiency of the evidence may not be raised again in a second appeal unless a new trial was held.") (emphasis supplied).

What remained of the mandamus claim for the trial court to resolve was whether the Board members had exercised that discretion in a manner that was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. See Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 729-730 (1), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) ("Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, which is applicable to rulings made by appellate courts in both civil and criminal cases, any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. OCGA § 9-11-60 (h)." (citations and punctuation omitted)).

But even assuming that Carson used a preemptive strike to remove the prospective juror, he cannot show harm. See Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 732 (2), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) (if trial counsel had moved to strike the prospective juror, any error by the trial court in denying the motion to strike would have been harmless because the appellant "used one of his peremptory strikes to remove that same prospective juror from the panel from which the twelve-person jury was chosen, and he [did not show] that any challenged juror who served on his jury was unqualified").--------

These claims can be addressed, if necessary, in an appeal from the trial court’s ruling on remand. See Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 730 n.2, 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) ("[A] criminal defendant in a second, post-remand appeal may raise issues ... that were raised but not decided in the first appeal.").The shootings occurred on March 11 and 21, 2013.

Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails.Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 732 (2), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018).

SeeBordeaux , 355 Ga. App. at 690-91, 845 S.E.2d 408.SeeWelbon v. State, 304 Ga. 729, 729-30 (1), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) ("Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, which is applicable to rulings made by appellate courts in both civil and criminal cases, any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. OCGA § 9-11-60 (h)."

Because we remanded Bettis’ case for a new trial which resulted in a new evidentiary record, we will address this enumeration of error. See Welbon v. State , 304 Ga. 729, 729-730 (1), 822 S.E.2d 277 (2018) (explaining that when an appellate court determines that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction but the case is remanded for other reasons, the sufficiency of the evidence may not be raised in a second appeal unless a new trial is held). On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.