Opinion
No. 369 C.D. 2012
09-20-2012
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
Jacquelin Weiskopff (Claimant) petitions pro se for review of the October 14, 2011 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), which affirmed and adopted a referee's decision denying Claimant benefits pursuant to section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). We affirm.
Documents in the certified record identify Claimant as both "Jacquelin" and "Jacqueline."
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b).
Claimant worked for Mansfield University (Employer) as a Pell verification specialist from February 4, 1996, to May 13, 2011, when she voluntarily quit her position. Claimant subsequently filed for unemployment compensation benefits. The local service center denied her claim, finding that she quit because she did not receive a promotion. (Record Item No. 4.) Claimant appealed.
By letter dated July 16, 2012, the Board advised the Court that it would not be filing a brief in this matter.
At an August 3, 2011 referee's hearing, Claimant testified that, several months prior to her separation, she had begun performing the tasks and duties of Employer's assistant director of financial affairs in addition to her usual duties. (N.T. at 6.) In the meantime, Employer conducted a job search to permanently fill that position. Id. Although Claimant was one of three individuals being considered for the assistant director position, a different candidate ultimately was chosen. (N.T. at 7.) Claimant subsequently resigned from her position. Id.
"N.T." refers to the notes of testimony of the August 3, 2011 hearing.
Relying on Claimant's testimony, the referee found that Claimant quit because she was passed over for the promotion, which does not constitute a compelling and necessitous reason to terminate employment. (Findings of Fact 1-7.) Therefore, the referee held that Claimant is ineligible for benefits pursuant to section 402(b) of the Law. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the referee's decision and adopted the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Record Item No. 13.) Claimant now petitions this Court for review.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §704.
Initially, we note that Claimant's brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in significant respects. This Court will quash appeals when substantial defects in a brief impede us from conducting meaningful appellate review. Pa. R.A.P. 2101; Shaffer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 928 A.2d 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Even where an appeal is not quashed, no question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby. Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a).
Claimant failed to set forth the order verbatim immediately following the statement of jurisdiction as required by Pa. R.A.P. 2115(a); Claimant's statement of questions involved contain considerable superfluous information and no indication of how the Board answered each question in violation of Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a); Claimant's statement of the case fails to include the names of the judges or other officials whose determinations are to be reviewed, a closely condensed chronological statement of the necessary facts in narrative form, and a brief statement of the order under review as required by Pa. R.A.P. 2117(a); and Claimant's argument consists of one section, rather than being divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued with appropriate headings and citations as required by Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a).
We decline to quash Claimant's appeal in order to address the following issue: whether the referee erred in finding that Claimant's reason for quitting was that she was passed over for the promotion. Claimant argues that, contrary to the referee's finding, her primary reason for quitting was poor working conditions.
Claimant phrases this question as follows: "Difficult working conditions from verbally abusive employer has been the primary reason for my decision to leave employment, why has this not been considered in any of my appeals?" (Petitioner's Brief.) Claimant sets forth four other questions from which we are unable to discern any appealable issues:
Do you believe that the decision of the Referee and Unemployment Compensation Board of Review gave me a fair decision for denying unemployment benefits?
Why when being a "team player" at my former place of employment, Mansfield University, am I denied the right of unilateral modification by the employer? Are people expected to willing [sic] or voluntarily work out of classification without additional compensation?
My initial appeal was approved for unemployment compensation at the time of application, why is it now denied?
Why as I [sic] resident of the State [sic] of Pennsylvania paying taxed and at my first attempt to secure financial assistance from my home state am I denied unemployment benefits when I clearing [sic] identified mitigating circumstances to leave my place of employment?
In unemployment compensation cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder; the Board's findings are conclusive on appeal so long as the record, taken as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support those findings. Carson Helicopters, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 960 A.2d 524 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a conclusion. Popoleo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 777 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
Here, the Board's finding that Claimant quit because she was passed over for a promotion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. At the hearing, Claimant testified that, although there was a time when she did not have a good relationship with her direct supervisor, their issues were subsequently resolved and their relationship improved. (N.T. at 6.) Moreover, it was only after she was passed over for the promotion that she decided to resign. (N.T. at 7.) On her benefits claim form, Claimant stated that she quit because she "was discriminated against when promotion became available within my Dept." (Record Item No. 2.) In her Petition for Appeal from Determination, Claimant further explains that she felt "discriminated against when a lesser person from outside the Mansfield network was hired." (Record Item No. 5.) Thus, the record provides substantial evidence to support the finding that Claimant quit because she was passed over for the promotion.
We previously have held that mere dissatisfaction with working conditions and failure to receive a promotion does not provide a compelling and necessitous reason to quit employment. Neaus v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 645 A.2d 356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Therefore, the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant is ineligible for benefits under section 402(b) of the Law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of September, 2012, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated October 14, 2011, is affirmed.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge