For example, a trustee may not be entitled to full compensation for duties performed if the trustee is guilty of a breach of trust. La Salle National Bank v. Macdonald, 27 Ill.2d 171, 188 N.E.2d 664 (1963); Ward v. Shire, 23 Ky.L.Rptr. 1279, 65 S.W. 8 (1901); Stone v. Stone, 230 Md. 248, 186 A.2d 590 (1962); Lipic v. Wheeler, 362 Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43 (1951); Katz v. Katz, 104 N.H. 478, 190 A.2d 425 (1963); Dufford v. Smith, 46 N.J. Eq. 216, 18 A. 1052 (Prerog.Ct. 1890); In re James' Trust, 23 A.D.2d 529, 256 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965); In re Welling's Estate, 51 A.D. 355, 64 N.Y.S. 1025 (1900); In re Patton's Estate, 170 Or. 186, 132 P.2d 402 (1942); Weinstein v. Union Trust Co., 313 Pa. 280, 169 A. 101 (1933); Reich's Estate, 230 Pa. 55, 79 A. 151 (1911); Kilgore v. Hoffman, 5 Sadler's Cases 306, 8 A. 441 (Pa. 1887); In re Norris' Estate, 153 S.C. 203, 150 S.E. 693 (1929); G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 980 (Rev.2d ed. 1983); 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243 (1959). W. Va. Code, 44-4-11, for example, provides:
Until today, in no area of the law has specific performance been granted to a party who has tainted the contract with illegality. The law of Pennsylvania has long embraced the common-law rule that one in the private sector who has breached a duty to discharge his responsibilities with fidelity is subject to a forfeiture of compensation. See, e.g., Peniston v. John Y. Huber Co., 196 Pa. 580, 46 A. 934 (1900) (properly discharged agent "forfeited by his misconduct" any claim to final lump-sum payment pursuant to employment contract); Weinstein v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 280, 169 A. 101 (1933) ("faithless" trustee " 'forfeited the right to any compensation, whether as commissions or otherwise' "). Accord, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 456 (1958).
For where a fiduciary either by words or deeds creates a basis for a reasonable belief that compensation will not be sought, a beneficiary should be entitled to rely on such a belief. The orphans' court did not rule and appellee does not argue that the present claims should be disallowed because the Bank has breached any fiduciary duty to her. Compare Lewis Estate, 349 Pa. 455, 461, 37 A.2d 559, 562-63 (1944); Commonwealth Trust Company Case, 331 Pa. 569, 582, 1 A.2d 662, 668 (1938); Weinstein v. Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 280, 169 A. 101 (1933); Kline's Estate, 280 Pa. 41, 49, 124 A. 280, 283-84 (1924); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243 (1959). Although appellee's petitions before the orphans' court alleged that her relatives have controlled the trustee Bank to her detriment and that the Bank had withheld information from her, no evidence to support these claims was produced and the orphans' court made no findings on these issues.
Cf. Jones Estate, supra. Misconduct which has moved this Court to disallow compensation has included supine negligence, see Kline's Estate, 280 Pa. 41, 49, 124 A. 280 (1924), faithlessness and mismanagement, see Weinstein v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 280, 169 A. 101 (1933); and repeated failures to perform fiduciary duties, see Commonwealth Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 1 A.2d 662 (1938). See Jones Estate, 400 Pa. 545, 564, 162 A.2d 408, 417 (1960).
Unless the court's discretion has been abused, the determination of the Orphans' Court should stand: Strickler Estate, 354 Pa. 276, 47 A.2d 134; Faust Estate, 364 Pa. 529, 73 A.2d 369; Bennett Estate, 366 Pa. 232, 77 A.2d 607. The court below approved commissions for these executors in the amount of $4500. On occasion we have disallowed any commission for fiduciaries who have been guilty of supine negligence ( Kline's Estate, 280 Pa. 41, 49, 124 A. 280), of faithlessness and mismanagement ( Weinstein v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 280, 284, 169 A. 101), of repeated failures to perform fiduciary duties ( Commonwealth Trust Company Case, 331 Pa. 569, 582, 1 A.2d 662), of negligence ( Lewis Estate, 349 Pa. 455, 461, 462, 37 A.2d 559). While we might have reached a different conclusion than the court below in the allowance of any commissions, yet we are not prepared to overrule the court's exercise of its discretion in this instance. See: Landis Trust, 382 Pa. 486, 506, 507, 115 A.2d 167.
The present controversy concerns its claim for the terminal commission. The beneficiaries contend that it is not entitled to any commissions at all, pointing to the decisions in Kline's Estate, 280 Pa. Pa. 41, 49, 124 A. 280, 283, that compensation for services to the trust should not be allowed to a trustee adjudged guilty of supine negligence; in Weinstein v. Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 280, 284, 169 A. 101, 102, that a trustee forfeits his right to compensation if surcharged for loss to the trust estate caused by his faithlessness and mismanagement; in Commonwealth Trust Company Case, 331 Pa. 569, 582, 1 A.2d 662, 668, that a trustee should not be allowed compensation if he has failed in many instances properly to perform its fiduciary duties; and in Lewis Estate, 349 Pa. 455, 461, 462, 37 A.2d 559, 562, 563, that a trustee guilty of gross irregularities in investments and negligence in administration of the trust is not entitled to any commissions. The beneficiaries urge that the derelictions of the substituted trustee were such as, under the rulings of those authorities, to disentitle it to compensation, pointing out the surcharges that have been made against it; they claim that it administered the trust primarily for its own benefit and only cursorily for the benefit of the cestui qui trustents. The court, however, found that the Bank as trustee had not been guilty of any fraud or bad fai
In Marlowe v. Travelers Insurance Co., 313 Pa. 430, 169 A. 100 (1933), our Supreme Court stated, "It is manifestly improper for a court, as here, to submit to a jury, for their determination, a point which the evidence does not warrant." Id. at 432, 169 A. 101. Under the circumstances and the evidence in this case, it would have been error to charge the jury as Mrs. Morgo requested since under the evidence the only issue was whether the fire truck's lights were on. After a short period of deliberations, the jury wrote a note to the court and asked, "Will you please interpret the phrase, due cause, for us?