Weinstein v. Cohen

9 Citing cases

  1. Agoglia v. Sterling Foster Company, Inc.

    237 A.D.2d 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 11 times

    On this record, the appellants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them should have been granted. CPLR 3212 (f) does not countenance the postponement of summary disposition where, in opposing the defendants' motion, the plaintiff merely speculates that "discovery might uncover * * * that [the injuries sued upon] resulted from the defendant's negligence" ( Wood v Otherson, 210 AD2d 473, 474; Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810, 811; European Am. Bank v Lofrese, 182 AD2d 67, 74; Weinstein v Cohen, 179 AD2d 806, 807; Plotkin v Franklin, 179 AD2d 746). We note that in opposing the moving defendants' showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the Plaintiff's submitted only a hearsay affidavit relating rumors heard from other individuals, none of whom witnessed the decedent's accident ( see, e.g., Rosenthal v Village of Quogue, 205 AD2d 745, 746; Mackay v Starrett City, 177 AD2d 620).

  2. Miller v. O'Mara Family Farms, Inc.

    2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 33242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)

    A negligent entrustment claim requires the defendant to have control over a chattel (Camillone v Popham, 157 A.D.2d 816, 817 [2d Dept 1990]) and a special knowledge that the party entrusted with such chattel will use it in a way that creates a foreseeable risk resulting in harm (Cook v Schapiro, 58 A.D.3d 664, 666 [2d Dept 2009]; see Zara v Perzan, 185 A.D.2d 236, 237 [2d Dept 1992]). Specifically, in motor vehicle incidents, a claim for negligent entrustment can be made against a vehicle owner when they were aware the party they entrusted their vehicle to, had a "propensity to drive recklessly" (Weinstein v Cohen, 179 A.D.2d 806, 807 [2d Dept 1992]). Although when the vehicle owner is an employer, '"where an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, the employer is liable for the employee's negligence under a theory of respondeat superior and no claim may proceed against the employer for negligent hiring, retention, supervision or training'" (Quiroz v Zottola, 96 A.D.3d 1035, 1037 [2d Dept 2012]; quoting Talavera v Arbit, 18 A.D.3d 738, 738 [2d Dept 2005]).

  3. Grandelli v. City of New York

    2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 32856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    "With respect to motor vehicles, an owner may be liable if [they] had control over the vehicle and if [they were] negligent in entrusting [the vehicle] to one who [they] knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, was incompetent to operate [the vehicle]" (Graham v Jones, 147 AD3d 1369, 1371 [4th Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] [summary judgment denied to car rental company where fact issue raised as to whether rental company had special knowledge that non-renter operator would drive car without a license]). "New York courts have consistently considered the operator's possession vel non of a legally valid New York State driver's license to be relevant to the material issue whether he was competent to be entrusted with an automobile by the owner" (Calhoun v Allen, 38 Misc 3d 171, 179 [Sup Ct, Allegany County 2011]; see also Byrne v Collins, 77 AD3d at 784; Weinstein v Cohen, 179 AD2d 806, 807 [2d Dept 1992]; Linsalata v. Berry, 39 Misc 3d 1207(A) * 7 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2013]). In evaluating the operator's competency, "courts have distinguished between the relevance of license revocations or restrictions for reasons pertaining to the safe operation of vehicles ... and those unrelated to that objective" (Linsalata v Berry, 39 Misc 3d 1207(A) * 7 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see e.g. Martin v Alabama 84 Truck Rental, 38 AD2d 577, 578 [2d Dept 1971] [license restricted to driving with eyeglasses related to safe operation]; Conte v Aprea, 23 AD3d 225, 227 [1st Dept 2005] [license suspended for failure to pay traffic ticket not related to safe operation]).

  4. Myers v. Happy Time Truck

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)

    See generally, Byrne v Collins, 77 AD3d 782 (2nd Dept. 2010); Burrell v Barreiro, 83 AD3d 984 (2nd Dept. 2011); and Cook v Schapiro, 58 Ad3d 664 (2nd Dept. 2009); and there is no dispute that the driver of the leased vehicle had a valid driver's license. Weinstein v Cohen, 179 AD2d 806 (2nd Dept 1992) and (49 USC 30106).

  5. Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jimmy Martins Auto

    2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 32804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)

    Here, there is no. showing that Jimmy Martins had reason to suspect any incompetency on the part of Reddin, who possessed a valid New York State driver's license. See Byrne v. Collins, 77 A.D.3d 782, 910 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2d Dep't 2010); Weinstein v. Cohen, 179 A.D.2d 806, 579 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1992). Accordingly, summary judgment on the claim based upon common law vicarious liability is granted.

  6. Linsalata v. Berry

    39 Misc. 3d 1207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    To establish a cause of action under a theory of negligent entrustment, the defendant must either have some special knowledge concerning a characteristic or condition peculiar to the [person to whom a particular chattel is given] which renders [that person's] use of the chattel unreasonably dangerous ... or some special knowledge as to a characteristic or defect peculiar to the chattel which renders it unreasonably dangerous' “ (Byrne v. Collins, 77 AD3d 782, 784 [2d Dept 2010], quoting Cook v. Schapiro, 58 AD3d 664, 666 [2d Dept 2009] ). “[O]n the issue of negligent entrustment, New York courts have consistently considered the operator's possession vel non of a legally valid New York State driver's license to be relevant to the material issue whether he was competent to be entrusted with an automobile by the owner” (Calhoun v. Allen, 38 Misc.3d 171, 179 [Sup Ct, New York Co 2011]; see also Weinstein v. Cohen, 179 A.D.2d 806 [2d Dept 2011] ). And in deciding such competency, “courts have distinguished between the relevance of license revocations or restrictions for reasons pertaining to the safe operation of vehicles ... and those unrelated to that objective” (Calhoun v. Allen, 38 Misc.3d at 180).

  7. Portnova v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 34054 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    In a viable cause for negligent entrustment "the defendant must either have some special knowledge concerning a characteristic of condition peculiar to the [person to whom a particular chattel is given] which renders [that person's] use of the chattel unreasonably dangerous . . . or some special knowledge as to a characteristic or defect peculiar to the chattel which renders it unreasonably dangerous." (Cook v Schapiro, 58 AD3d 664, 666 [2009] quotingZara v Perzan, 185 AD2d 236, 237 [1992]; see also, Weinstein v Cohen, 179 AD2d 806 [1992]). It therefore follows that plaintiff was required to plead that TMCC had reason to know that Mario Rodriguez and/or Sara Rodriguez were likely to use its vehicle in an unsafe manner or that TMCC had knowledge that the vehicle in question possessed a defect which rendered its use unreasonably dangerous.

  8. Calhoun v. Allen

    38 Misc. 3d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    d 1274, 930 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.)citing Phass v. MacClenathen, 274 A.D. 535, 85 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3rd Dept.1948) However, on the issue of negligent entrustment, New York courts have consistently considered the operator's possession vel non of a legally valid New York State driver's license to be relevant to the material issue whether he was competent to be entrusted with an automobile by the owner: Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 385 N.E.2d 1268 (1978); Alfano v. Marlboro Airport, 85 A.D.2d 674, 445 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2nd Dept.1981); Cone v. Williams, 182 A.D.2d 1102, 585 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dept.1992); Byrne v. Collins, 77 A.D.3d 782, 910 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2nd Dept.2010); Guay v. Winner, 189 A.D.2d 1081, 593 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3rd Dept.1993); Hummel v. County of Nassau, 57 A.D.3d 485, 869 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2nd Dept. 2008); Faller v. A.Drive Auto Leasing Sys., 47 A.D.2d 530, 363 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2nd Dept.1975); Cook v. Schapiro, 58 A.D.3d 664, 871 N.Y.S.2d 714 (2nd Dept.2009); Weinstein v. Cohen, 179 A.D.2d 806, 579 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2nd Dept.1992) Moreover, in deciding whether an unlicensed driver was competent, New York courts have distinguished between the relevance of license revocations or restrictions for reasons pertaining to the safe operation of vehicles, Martin v. Alabama 84 Truck Rental, 38 A.D.2d 577, 328 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2nd Dept.1971), and those unrelated to that objective, e.g., Conte v. Aprea, 23 A.D.3d 225, 803 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st Dept.2005); White v. Molinari, 160 A.D.2d 302, 553 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept.1990).

  9. Pinkerton v. Pinkerton

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 30453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    Significantly, even if this Court were to accept plaintiffs' definition of inexperienced and dangerous, there is no evidence that Crummell was aware that Pinkerton was inexperienced and a dangerous driver. See, Weinstein v. Cohen, 179 A.D.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1992.) See, also, Mimoun v. Bartlett, 162 A.D.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990)