Opinion
Argued October 31, 1972
Decided November 30, 1972
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, MARIO PITTONI, J.
William E. Seward and John A. Anderson for appellants.
Stanley Beals and Albert M. Goldberg for respondent.
Order reversed, with costs in all courts, and the case remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs in all courts, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied. The proof of notice of redemtion did not comply with the amended section 5-51.0 (subd. c) of the Nassau County Administrative Code in that it did not disclose the "means by which the last known address was ascertained". Strict compliance with the proof of notice provision was required before the tax deed could be executed (Nassau County Administrative Code, § 5-53.0, subd. 4). It makes no difference that the parties and even the courts below were understandably not aware of the amendment to the applicable statute. All were charged with the law extant. See, generally, as to strict compliance with statutes of like kind ( Clason v. Baldwin, 152 N.Y. 204, 210; Matter of Vivenzio v. City of Utica, 58 Misc.2d 571, 572, affd. 33 A.D.2d 657).
Concur: Chief Judge FULD and Judges BURKE, SCILEPPI, BERGAN, BREITEL, JASEN and GIBSON.