Opinion
A21-0560
01-21-2022
Andrew Lee Weiland, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Crow Wing County District Court File Nos. 18-CR-19-2333, 18-CR-19-3695
Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
RENEE L. WORKE JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that appellant Andrew Lee Weiland committed second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Weiland admitted to committing fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and was adjudicated delinquent and placed on supervised probation in June 1994.
2. In 1994, the Minnesota legislature amended the predatory-offender-registration statute to require that juvenile offenders register as predatory offenders (the 1994 amendment). 1994 Minn. Laws, ch. 636, art. 4, § 5, at 2255 (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. lb(a)(1) (2020)).
3. When Weiland was released from prison in 2000 after an unrelated, adult offense, the state required him to register as a predatory offender. But Weiland never completed his registration period. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(a) (2020) (stating that person required to register who is incarcerated because of a new conviction must continue to register for ten years after most recent release).
4. In 2019, Weiland failed to complete weekly check-ins and notify law enforcement of a change of address as required under the registration statute. In two separate complaints, the state charged Weiland with three counts of noncompliance with the registration statute under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2018). Weiland pleaded guilty to two counts. The district court accepted his pleas and convicted him, sentencing him to two concurrent 24-month prison terms.
5. Weiland then filed petitions for postconviction relief, arguing that he is not required to register as a predatory offender and that his guilty pleas therefore were not accurate. The postconviction court denied Weiland's petitions, relying on State v. Lilleskov, 658 N.W.2d 904 (Minn.App. 2003), and Weiland appealed.
6. Weiland first argues that the 1994 amendment does not retroactively apply to him. We addressed this retroactive-application argument in Lilleskov. We reasoned that the 1994 amendment merely extends the scope of an already-retroactive statute to encompass a new class of offenders. Lilleskov, 658 N.N.2d at 908; see also 1991 Minn. Laws, ch. 285, § 13, at 1329 (stating that any offender released from prison on or after August 1, 1991, the effective date of registration statute, must register). We therefore concluded that the amendment applied to the Lilleskov defendants even though they committed their offenses before the effective date of the amendment. Lilleskov, 658 N.W.2d at 909.
7. Our decision in Lilleskov controls in this case. Although Weiland, like the defendants in Lilleskov, committed his offense before the 1994 amendment's effective date, he is subject to the retroactive effect of that amendment. And we decline to reconsider our decision in Lilleskov. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn.App. 2021) (stating that we follow our binding decisions), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021).
8. Weiland's reliance on our decision in State v. Davenport, 948 N.W.2d 176 (Minn.App. 2020), is unavailing because that case is distinguishable. There, the defendant's sentence expired before his offense became a registrable one. Id. at 178. Here, in contrast, Weiland's sentence had not expired at the time his juvenile offense became registrable.
9. Weiland next argues that even if the 1994 amendment applies to him, he was not notified that he must register. But nothing in the registration statute suggests that a failure to provide notice relieves an offender of the duty to register. See generally Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2018). And Weiland cites to no such authority, thereby forfeiting this argument. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn.App. 2017) (stating that arguments based on mere assertion and unsupported by legal authority are forfeited), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).
10. Weiland finally argues that, under State v. Martin, the state's charging documents were insufficient because they do not cite to legal authority requiring him to register. 941 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 2020). But Martin does not stand for the proposition that the state must always cite a specific legal basis for a defendant's registration requirement in its complaint. Instead, Martin's discussion of the state's complaint and the state's failure to contest the defendant's motion to dismiss is dicta explaining the complex history of the case and why various statutory provisions were relied on by the lower courts. Id. at 122. Thus, Martin does not support Weiland's argument that the state is required to cite in its complaint a specific provision requiring a defendant to register.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order denying Weiland's petitions for postconviction relief is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.