Mrs. Smith argues that this case is controlled by this Court's decision in Ex parte Harrington, 450 So.2d 99 (Ala. 1984). With equal vigor, Mr. Smith contends that this case is controlled by our recent decision in Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1987), along with our decision in Jackson v. Hall, 460 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1984). In Ex parte Harrington, supra, we allowed a wife to file a suit for assault and battery in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, although she had filed a divorce complaint in Elmore County in which she had described the same operative facts concerning the violence perpetrated on her by her husband as were alleged in the tort action.
"The present state of the law in Alabama concerning the issue of whether a wife is barred from bringing a tort action against her former husband for acts that occurred during their marriage is gleaned from a well-established line of cases. See Ex parte Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984) ; Jackson v. Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1984) ; Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1987) ; and Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala. 1988)."In Ex parte Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984), we permitted a wife to file a tort action for assault and battery in one county, even though she had filed a divorce complaint in another county.
"The present state of the law in Alabama concerning the issue of whether a wife is barred from bringing a tort action against her former husband for acts that occurred during their marriage is gleaned from a well-established line of cases. See Ex parte Harrington, 450 So.2d 99 (Ala. 1984); Jackson v. Hall, 460 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1984); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1987); and Smith v. Smith, 530 So.2d 1389 (Ala. 1988). "In Ex parte Harrington, 450 So.2d 99 (Ala. 1984), we permitted a wife to file a tort action for assault and battery in one county, even though she had filed a divorce complaint in another county.
The wife argues that, on the authority of our supreme court's opinion in Ex parte Harrington, 450 So.2d 99 (Ala.1984), her civil action must be allowed to proceed. The husband, on the other hand, argues that our supreme court's opinion in Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala.1987), requires a determination that the doctrine of res judicata bars the wife's assault-and-battery claim in the civil action.In Ex parte Harrington, supra, Margaret Harrington ("Margaret") filed an action in Montgomery County seeking to divorce her husband, James Harrington ("James").
Several Alabama Supreme Court cases cited in Williams' brief and by the district court below have held that a subsequent tort action, brought by one former spouse against the other and based on conduct that occurred during the marriage, was barred by the res judicata effect of a prior divorce judgment. See Smith v. Smith, 530 So.2d 1389 (Ala. 1988); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1987); Jackson v. Hall, 460 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1984). These cases, however, do not require us to alter our view that, under Alabama law, Abbott's claim is not necessarily barred by res judicata.
Id. Similarly, in Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1987), this Court held that a former wife's fraud claim against her former husband was barred. This Court reasoned that because the former wife had "asserted the alleged fraud and misrepresentation of her husband in support of her claim for alimony," she could not "thereafter bring an action for damages based upon the same allegations."
The settlement agreement between the parties was a very detailed and lengthy settlement agreement of some eleven pages. "The opinion in the case of Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830 (Ala. 1987), states: " 'With the merger of law and equity, and given the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no reason why all known claims between spouses in a divorce action should not be settled in that litigation.'
(Doc. 47, Ex. C). It is well established that such proceedings are equitable in nature to which there is no entitlement to a jury trial. See Evans v. Evans, 547 So.2d 459, 461 (Ala. 1989) (where facts and issues in case emanated from parties' divorce proceedings and involved marital property "nature of action was essentially an equitable proceeding" not triable to a jury); Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482, 485-86 (Ala. 1990) ("trial by jury is not provided for in divorce actions in Alabama"); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1987) (Adams, J., concurring) (same); see also Shelton v. Shelton, 376 So.2d 740, 741 (Ala. 1979) ("[w]here a plaintiff's claim is equitable in nature there is no right to a jury trial."). Therefore, because the Trustee's action involves the transfer of real property and stock, and also because the transfers occurred pursuant to a divorce action and in accordance with a martial settlement agreement, the Court finds this to be an equitable proceeding in which Frazier has no right to a jury trial.
See e.g. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985); Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 605 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988). Other states require joinder of the two actions. See, e.g. Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1987). We believe that the best approach lies between these two extremes.
Shires v. Shires, 471 So.2d 437, 440 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). This Court, in Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1987), stated that "[w]ith the merger of law and equity, and given the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no reason why all known claims between spouses in a divorce action should not be settled in that litigation." Therefore, we hold that all the issues are rooted in the interpretation of the judgment in the divorce proceeding, a traditionally "equitable" proceeding.