If a judge is unable to adequately familiarize him or herself with a case based upon the record, the appropriate course of action is to conduct a new hearing or trial. Weigel v. Weigel, 1999 ND 55, ¶ 9, 591 N.W.2d 123. Here, Judge Hager was not a successor judge.

If persuasive, the advisory committee's notes also may provide guidance. Jenkins, at 70 n. 4; see also Weigel v. Weigel, 1999 ND 55, ¶ 7, 591 N.W.2d 123. We consider whether the transcript of Trevino's plea hearing is sufficient to preserve her issue for review.

Our rule is derived from the corresponding federal rule, and although we are not compelled to interpret our rules in the same manner as federal courts interpret the federal rule, decisions of the federal courts may be persuasive in interpreting our rule. Weigel v. Weigel, 1999 ND 55, ¶ 7, 591 N.W.2d 123. Rule 63, F.R.Civ.P., provides authority for substituting one judge for another judge who is unable to proceed, thus enabling an ongoing civil trial or hearing to proceed. 12 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 63.02[1] (2005).

Additionally, the reasons for a judge's substitution must be stated on the record. Weigel v. Weigel, 1999 ND 55, ¶ 8, 591 N.W.2d 123. A successor judge "must read and consider all relevant portions of the record" to certify familiarity. Id. at ¶ 9 (citing 12 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 63.04[3] (1998)).

However, the documents were improperly signed by a judge who had not presided over the trial or certified familiarity with the record under Rule 63, N.D.R.Civ.P. Robert Weigel appealed to this Court, arguing he was denied due process. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings in compliance with Rule 63, N.D.R.Civ.P. Weigel v. Weigel, 1999 ND 55, 591 N.W.2d 123. After remand, a newly assigned judge reviewed the record and certified familiarity under Rule 63, N.D.R.Civ.P. Finding it unnecessary to retry the case, the trial court entered judgment on July 29, 1999.

Id. ’ "Weigel v. Weigel, 591 N.W.2d 123, 126 (N.D.1999) (construing Rule 63, Fed.R.Civ.P., which is substantially similar to Rule 63, Ala. R. Civ. P.). Hence, we reject the husband's primary argument on appeal that Judge Morgan could order a new trial only upon finding that the evidence and equity did not support the custody and property awards. Under Rule 63, Judge Morgan could also order a new trial based upon his determination that he could not decide those issues based on his review of the record.