[t]o consummate an offense of misdemeanor obstruction, some form of knowing and wilful opposition to the officer sufficient to constitute obstruction or hindrance is required, but actual violence or threat thereof is not.Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 S.E.2d 18) (1996) (citations omitted); see also Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 675, 676 ( 516 S.E.2d 537) (1999) (argument, flight, and stubborn obstinance are examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element). Russell fled, failed to stop when ordered, and refused to show his right hand while held down by police.
” In order to show misdemeanor obstruction, “the act constituting obstruction or hindering must be knowing and wilful, and ... the officer must be lawfully discharging his official duties at the time of such act. [Cit.]” Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga.App. 796, 797(2), 476 S.E.2d 18 (1996) (full concurrence in Division 2). “The statute was made purposefully broad to cover actions which might not be otherwise unlawful, but which obstructed or hindered law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties.” (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.)
Applying the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, we find no merit in Mayhew's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.Imperial v. State, 218 Ga. App. 440, 441 ( 461 SE2d 596) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted); see Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996) ("Whether the evidence in a particular case establishes that the actions taken hindered or obstructed the officer . . . is for the trier of fact to decide.") (citation omitted). Supra.
(Emphasis supplied.)Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996). Reddick asserts that there was no evidence of a knowing and wilful obstruction.
Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 712 ( 634 SE2d 842) (2006); Eichelberger v. State, 252 Ga. App. 801, 803-804 (2) ( 557 SE2d 439) (2001). See OCGA § 16-10-24 (a) ("person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor"); Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 798 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996) (misdemeanor obstruction conviction affirmed where, among other things, defendant resisted officer's attempt to place her in patrol car and then tried to exit the vehicle). See Boone v. State, 282 Ga. App. 67, 71 (2) ( 637 SE2d 795) (2006).
It is unclear whether such clear signal is required for a conviction for obstruction of a police officer under OCGA § 16-10-24 (a). See generally Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996); but see Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 619, 631-632 (11) ( 604 SE2d 520) (2004). However, Bradford was not charged under this Code section.
(Citations omitted.) Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996) (full concurrence in Division 2). "Argument, flight, stubborn abstinence, and lying are all examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element. Whether a defendant's conduct has the effect of hindering or obstructing the officer in making his arrest is for the trier of fact to decide.
Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689 ( 423 SE2d 427) (1992).Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
(Punctuation omitted.) Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 798 (2) ( 476 SE2d 18) (1996). Contrary to Glenn's argument, a review of the transcript reveals ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Brucz was in the lawful discharge of his official duties when he arrested Glenn. Officer Brucz testified that he initiated the traffic stop because he observed Glenn drive erratically out of the Checkers' parking lot by making an improper right turn across three lanes of traffic and that, as he was following immediately behind Glenn, he observed Glenn making a right-hand turn without a signal.
This court has held several times that flight from police apprehension is sufficient opposition to support an obstruction charge. Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 797(2) ( 476 S.E.2d 18) (1996) (full concurrence as to Div. 2). See, e.g., O'Neal v. State, 211 Ga. App. 741, 743(2) ( 440 S.E.2d 513) (1994). "Whether the defendant's actions actually hindered or impeded officers is a decision for the jury.