Opinion
CASE NO.: CV 10-09376 SJO (CWx).
May 13, 2011
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT [Docket No. 15]
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Carolina Weidler, Francis Weidler, and Adele Weidler's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Motion to Remand Case to California Superior Court ("Motion"), filed January 6, 2011. Defendant Wood Group Turbopower, LLC ("Defendant Wood Group") filed an Opposition on April 18, 2011, to which Plaintiffs replied. A hearing was held on May 9, 2011. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.
In addition to Defendant Wood Group, Plaintiff also alleged claims against Defendants Professional Aircraft Maintenance, Pratt and Whitney Engine Services, Inc., Pratt and Whitney Services, Inc., and Hartzell Engine Technologies, LLC (collectively, "Defendants").
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in California Superior Court on October 28, 2010. Plaintiffs allege two claims against Defendants: (1) negligence; and (2) products liability. ( See generally Compl.) On November 3, 2008, James Weidler, deceased husband of Plaintiff Carolina Weidler, was operating an aircraft from Punta Chivato Airstrip in Baja California, Mexico. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Just after take off, the airplane allegedly lost airspeed, stalled, and subsequently crashed. ( Id.) As a result, James Weidler was fatally injured. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that because of Defendants' negligent, careless, reckless, wanton and unlawful actions with regard to the airplane and components, Defendants caused James Weidler's death. ( Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs seek damages.
Defendant Wood Group asserts that it is a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") certified repair station. (Decl. of James L. Doyle in Supp. of Def.'s Opp'n ("Doyle Decl.") ¶ 3.) The FAA issued Air Agency Certificate No. NE4D385M to Defendant Wood Group permitting its employees to certify aircraft component parts as airworthy pursuant to the standards of the FAA. ( Id. Ex. A.) Defendant Wood Group unilaterally removed the action from state court on December 7, 2010. Plaintiffs then filed this Motion to Remand on January 6, 2011.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard for Removal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the Federal Officer Removal Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1442 permits "any agency," "officer," or "any person acting under that officer" engaged in "[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in State court" to "[remove] to the district court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a), (a)(1). In order to determine whether the federal officer removal statute applies, Defendant Wood Group must satisfy three elements: (1) it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute; (2) it acted under the direction of a federal officer by demonstrating a causal nexus between plaintiffs claims and acts it performed under color of federal office; and (3) it has raised a colorable federal defense. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969); Watson, 551 U.S. at 145.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, "federal officers can remove both civil and criminal cases." Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, "a federal officer can remove a case even if the plaintiff couldn't have filed the case in federal court in the first instance." Id. Removals under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 are not subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. (citing Jefferson Cnty, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999)). And ultimately, "[w]here as all defendants must consent to removal under section 1441 . . . a federal officer or agency defendant can unilaterally remove a case under section 1442." Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253 (internal citation omitted) (citing Ely Valley Mines, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 644 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
B. Federal Officer Removal Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
Here, Defendant Wood Group argues that the federal officer removal statute applies and thus federal jurisdiction exists. ( See generally Def.'s Notice of Removal.) Specifically, Defendant Wood Group has established that it is a private corporation and that a private corporation is a "person entitled to invoke the Federal Officer Removal State." In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d at 124. Defendant Wood Group also demonstrated that at all times relevant to the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint, it was "acting under" an officer of the United States as required for section 1442(a)(1) removal. (Notice of Removal ¶ 9.) Defendant Wood Group was acting pursuant to an Air Agency Certificate issued by the FAA under 14 C.F.R. section 145. Under its 14 C.F.R. section 145.201 authority, Defendant Wood Group claims that it performed maintenance, preventive maintenance and alternations in accordance with 14 C.F.R. section 143 and returned to service any work it performed and certified planes as airworthy under the authority of the FAA. ( Id.) As to the third element, Defendant Wood Group proffered a colorable defense that it complied with the federal standards and regulations established by the FAA (Notice of Removal ¶ 13) and that the subject engine and any relevant component parts would have been maintained, repaired, serviced, licensed and otherwise certified as airworthy pursuant to the Air Agency Certificate and as supervised and overseen by the FAA. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that federal jurisdiction is improper because Defendant Wood Group cannot demonstrate that it was "acting under" a federal officer. However, 49 U.S.C. section 44702(d) explicitly grants the Administrator of the FAA the power to "delegate to a qualified private person" matters relating to examination, inspection, and certification. 49 U.S.C. §§ 44702(d)(1)(A), (B). Plaintiff also does not dispute that Defendant Wood Group's Air Agency Certificate number NE4D385M was issued by the FAA, and empowered Defendant Wood Group to operate a repair station and certify aircraft components' "airworthiness" under the direction of the FAA. (Doyle Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. A); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44702(a). Because the FAA delegated that power to Defendant Wood Group through an Air Agency Certificate, Defendant Wood Group has sufficiently demonstrated that it was "acting under" the authority of the FAA. See AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 2003 WL 257702, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2003). As such, Defendant Wood Group has provided sufficient evidence to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.