Summary
applying the jurisdictional-priority rule in granting writ of prohibition to prevent court of common pleas from proceeding in declaratory-judgment action regarding the same pool of money at issue in earlier filed municipal-court actions by creditors
Summary of this case from State ex rel. Tri Eagle Fuels, L.L.C. v. DawsonOpinion
No. 31343
Decided November 17, 1948.
Writ of prohibition — Inferior courts prevented from encroaching upon jurisdiction of other tribunals, when — Court first acquiring jurisdiction entitled to adjudicate issues, when — Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction may not interfere, when.
1. The purpose of the remedy of prohibition is to keep inferior courts within the limits of their own jurisdiction, and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals.
2. As between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the one whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.
3. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, its authority continues until the matter is completely and finally disposed of, and no court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to interfere with its proceedings.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga county.
The city of Cleveland, hereinafter called city, entered into a concession contract with the Diamond D Corporation, hereinafter called Diamond, whereby the former leased to the latter certain parts of the city's public auditorium for the purpose of holding and producing therein a rodeo.
By the terms of the contract, the city was to conduct the sale of all tickets, collect the proceeds of such sales, and have possession and custody of all money received from admissions to the rodeo, which money was to be the rightful property of the city for the purpose of applying it in accordance with the terms of the contract toward the payment of all amounts due the city under the contract. Diamond was not to be entitled to any part of such money unless and until all sums due the city were first fully paid.
The city has in its hands certain funds derived from the sale of such admission tickets, which funds it claims by virtue of the terms of the contract between itself and Diamond. The relators, appellees herein, The John Weenink Sons Company and Chicago Car Advertising Company, hereinafter called relators or, respectively, Weenink and Chicago, together with divers other creditors of Diamond, claim rights to portions of such funds.
To assert such rights, a number of actions were instituted in the Municipal Court of Cleveland by Diamond's creditors against Diamond for money which they claim was due them from Diamond for merchandise and services furnished it in connection with the rodeo enterprise. Judgments were obtained in the Municipal Court of Cleveland in certain of such cases and some of the cases are still pending therein. In some cases, wherein judgments were obtained by creditors of Diamond, the city was named as garnishee. The city, as garnishee in such cases, filed answers denying that it had any money then remaining in its hands which was due the judgment debtors, and that all such money belonged to it by virtue of the terms of the contract.
It appears from the record in the instant case that Weenink, as one of such creditors, filed an action directly against the city and others in the Municipal Court of Cleveland in which a money judgment was sought against the city for the value of merchandise sold and delivered for the purpose of protecting the floor of the auditorium. The city filed an answer in that action, which action is pending.
It appears from the record in the instant case also that Chicago, as another of such creditors, instituted an action in the Municipal Court of Cleveland against Diamond to recover a judgment on certain bank checks which had been given to Chicago by Diamond, but which were not paid because of insufficient funds. The city, named as garnishee in that action, filed its answer denying liability. The case was tried and the Municipal Court rendered judgment in favor of Chicago against Diamond, sustained the attachment and ordered the city to pay the amount of the judgment to such relator as plaintiff therein. Thereafter, Chicago instituted another action in the Municipal Court of Cleveland against the city for a judgment based upon the order of the attachment previously allowed by the court in the original action of Chicago against Diamond. The city filed an answer and the case is still pending in the Municipal Court.
While these actions were so pending in the Municipal Court of Cleveland, the city brought an action in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga county, case No. 560248, in which Weenink, Chicago and 27 other parties alleged to be creditors of Diamond were made defendants. In that action, the city prayed for a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the city in the fund in its hands, and that the various actions instituted by such defendants in the Municipal Court of Cleveland against the city be dismissed. The city, plaintiff in that action, secured a temporary restraining order enjoining the relators in this action and other parties defendant in its declaratory judgment action as well as their counsel from proceeding with the trial of their respective causes which were instituted and are at issue or which are in judgment, until the declaratory action in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga county, hereinbefore described, was determined.
Thereupon, Weenink and Chicago brought the present action in prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga county, setting out the facts concerning the previous litigation hereinbefore described, and claiming that the cases instituted by Weenink and Chicago in the Municipal Court of Cleveland were properly within the jurisdiction of that court; that the respondent Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga county has no jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment action; and that the temporary restraining order allowed in such Common Pleas Court against Weenink and Chicago was unlawfully granted. Their prayer is that the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga county and the judges thereof be prohibited and enjoined from exercising jurisdiction in such declaratory judgment action and especially from exercising or attempting to exercise any jurisdiction over the actions hereinbefore described and pending in the Cleveland Municipal Court.
A demurrer was filed to the petition in the instant action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. An answer was then filed by the respondent admitting substantially the facts set out in relators' petition but alleging that the declaratory-judgment action was properly brought, and that in its petition in such action a justiciable right and claim has been set forth which arises because of the pendency of a multiplicity of suits in the Municipal Court, in all of which suits the conflicting rights of the various parties to the fund in the hands of the city are involved.
In the present action, the Court of Appeals, two judges concurring, granted an order of prohibition finding that the respondent Common Pleas Court is without jurisdiction to try and determine issues made in the pending Municipal Court actions, and that it is without jurisdiction to enjoin, restrain or otherwise interfere with the prosecution of such actions by relators or their counsel.
One judge of the Court of Appeals dissented from the allowance of the writ on the ground that "there is a plain and adequate remedy at law by way of appeal in the event of an adverse decision in the Common Pleas Court," and on the ground that the relators have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court by filing a demurrer and answer, and on the further ground that the Common Pleas Court has jurisdiction to try the issues raised by the petition and pleadings for a declaratory judgment.
A motion for new trial was overruled and the case is now in this court on appeal of the respondent as a matter of right.
Mr. Arthur P. Gustafson and Mr. Herbert L. Wright, for appellees.
Mr. Robert J. Selzer, for appellant.
The ultimate question in this case is: Did the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga county have jurisdiction under the facts presented to it in the action pending therein for a declaratory judgment to temporarily restrain the relators herein from proceeding further in certain actions pending in the Municipal Court of Cleveland, until there is a determination of the action for a declaratory judgment?
Some preliminary observations will be appropriate. The suit of Weenink, as plaintiff in its action in the Municipal Court of Cleveland, is one for a money judgment against the city itself and does not involve any question as to the right of the city to hold and control the rodeo funds in its hands under the terms of its contract with Diamond. The case of Chicago, as plaintiff in its action in the Municipal Court, was one for a money judgment for money claimed to be due it from Diamond, in which suit the city was named as garnishee and in which suit there was a finding that the city was indebted to the debtor of Chicago. There was a supplementary action against the city on such finding. There is no claim made that the Municipal Court did not have complete jurisdiction in those actions. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals prohibited the Common Pleas Court from "exercising or attempting to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the matters, issues and facts set forth in the petition filed by the city of Cleveland in cause No. 560248, aforesaid, insofar as said matters, issues and facts relate to and affect the claims, causes of action, and obligations asserted by relators * * * in the aforesaid Municipal Court actions; and from exercising or attempting to exercise any jurisdiction designed or intended to interfere, or which would interfere with the prosecution of said actions by the relators and their counsel, or the determination thereof by said Municipal Court, or the enforcement of any judgment or judgments which might be rendered in said actions * * *."
In other words, the order of the Court of Appeals did not deprive the Common Pleas Court of any jurisdiction in the declaratory-judgment action, except so far as its exercise of jurisdiction would constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court in matters already pending in and within the jurisdiction of the latter court.
In 32 Ohio Jurisprudence, 568, Section 6, it is said:
"In Ohio the purpose of the writ [of prohibition] is to keep inferior courts within the limits of their own jurisdiction, and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals." (Italics ours.) See State, ex rel. Nolan, v. ClenDening, 93 Ohio St. 264, 112 N.E. 1029; State, ex rel. Garrison, v. Brough, 94 Ohio St. 115, 113 N.E. 683; State, ex rel. Cleveland Telephone Co., v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 98 Ohio St. 164, 120 N.E. 335; State, ex rel. Carmody, v. Justice, Judge, 114 Ohio St. 94, 150 N.E. 430; State, ex rel. Burtzlaff, v. Vickery et al., Judges, 121 Ohio St. 49, 166 N.E. 894.
When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, its authority continues until the matter is completely and finally disposed of, and no court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to interfere with its action. 14 American Jurisprudence, 435, Section 243.
This court in the case of Miller v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 143 Ohio St. 68, 54 N.E.2d 130, quoted from 14 Ohio Jurisprudence, 410, Section 30, as follows:
" 'It is a fundamental rule that, as between courts of concurrent and coextensive jurisdiction, the one whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings and the service of the required process acquires the right to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties to the exclusion of all other tribunals.' " See 11 Ohio Jurisprudence, 726, Section 81. See, also, Kane v. Kane, 146 Ohio St. 686, 67 N.E.2d 783.
"The courts will ordinarily refuse to entertain an action for a declaratory judgment as to questions which are determinable in a pending action or proceeding between the same parties. A declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of determining the sufficiency of legal defenses to a pending action." 16 American Jurisprudence, 295, Section 22.
In this connection, it is stated in Borchard on Declaratory Judgments (2 Ed.), 350:
"Where an action or proceeding is already pending in another forum involving the same issues, it is manifestly unwise and unnecessary to permit a new petition for a declaration to be initiated by the defendant or the plaintiff in that suit. * * * It would include cases in which the petitioner for a declaration should legitimately be relegated to advance his claim or assertion as a defense to the action at law * * *."
The respondent claims that the relators are estopped to question its jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment action for the reason that they entered their appearance and filed defensive pleadings in that action. Although such conduct constitutes an entry of personal appearance in that action, it clearly does not constitute a waiver of lack of jurisdiction as to the subject matter of the action. The respondent also makes claim that it has power to determine its own jurisdiction, and, if error is committed in such determination, the relators have an adequate remedy by appeal from any adverse judgment. This claim disregards the fact that the relators' complaint not only goes to the question of the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court in the declaratory judgment action but to such court's alleged interference with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court whose acts and proceedings it attempts to stay and enjoin. Besides, in the opinion of this court, the remedy of appeal in the declaratory judgment action, involving as it would a great number of parties and a great variety of facts and issues with the attendant expense of trial and making a record, does not afford the relators a practical or adequate remedy for the reasons herein stated.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
TURNER, MATTHIAS, ZIMMERMAN, SOHNGEN and STEWART, JJ., concur.