Opinion
23A-CR-1504
06-05-2024
Alonzo Weekly, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Joel M. Schumm Carter Gallagher, Certified Legal Intern Appellate Clinic Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Miami Superior Court The Honorable J. David Grund, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 52D01-2205-F6-149
Attorney for Appellant Joel M. Schumm Carter Gallagher, Certified Legal Intern Appellate Clinic Indiana
University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KENWORTHY, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Alonzo Weekly appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. He raises two issues for our review: (1) Did the trial court admit evidence in violation of Weekly's rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution?; and (2) Did the trial court violate Weekly's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? We affirm.
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16(a)(1) (2015).
We held oral argument in this case on May 21, 2024, at Mississinewa High School in Gas City, Indiana. We extend our appreciation to the Mississinewa High School staff for the invitation and hospitality. We also thank the students for their attention and thoughtful questions. Lastly, we thank counsel for both parties for the quality of their arguments and for remaining after the arguments to answer the students' questions.
[¶2] On May 26, 2022, Indiana State Police Trooper Andrew Baldwin was patrolling southbound U.S. Highway 31. Around 6:45 that evening, Trooper Baldwin observed a black SUV's right-side tires "go onto the fog line." Tr. Vol. 2 at 105. Although Trooper Baldwin believed he could have stopped the vehicle at that point, he did not because he thought it would be an unsafe area for a stop. Instead, Trooper Baldwin followed the vehicle.
[¶3] While driving behind the vehicle, Trooper Baldwin conducted a BMV search of the vehicle's license plate number. Based on his search, Trooper Baldwin discovered the vehicle had two registered owners: one male and one female. The search included pictures of both owners, each of whom was African American. The check also revealed the male owner-Weekly-was a habitual traffic violator and both owners' licenses were suspended. Now believing he had two valid reasons to do so, Trooper Baldwin initiated a traffic stop.
[¶4] Trooper Baldwin approached the vehicle and based on the BMV photos, confirmed Weekly was driving the vehicle and the female owner was the passenger. When Trooper Baldwin requested Weekly's license, Weekly handed him an ID card and shared that he did not have a license. About ten minutes after pulling Weekly over, Trooper Baldwin arrested him.
[¶5] The State charged Weekly with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. Before trial, Weekly unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop. At trial, twenty-six of the forty jurors summoned for Weekly's trial reported for jury duty. All twenty-six prospective jurors were white. Weekly objected to the composition of the venire panel. In rejecting Weekly's challenge, the trial court referenced the Indiana Supreme Court's Order Approving the 2023 Master List for Jury Pool Assembly and discussed the process by which a jury pool in Miami County is created.
The trial court explained Miami County utilizes an impartial and random computerized jury selection system, made available to trial courts through INcite, which complies with Indiana Code Section 33-28-5-10 (authorizing a computerized jury selection system that provides for the impartial and random selection of prospective jurors).
[¶6] An all-white jury found Weekly guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to one and one-half years imprisonment.
1. The trial court did not admit evidence in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[¶7] Weekly first claims he was unreasonably seized by Officer Baldwin; thus, the trial court admitted evidence in violation of his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution. Trial courts have discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and although "we assess claims relating to admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion, to the extent those claims implicate constitutional issues, we review them de novo." Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (noting the "ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo").
On appeal, Weekly does not raise a claim under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[¶8] The pertinent portion of Section 11 states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]" Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although the language of Section 11 is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, our courts interpret the state provision "independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances." Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191. In doing so, we use the framework set forth in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). We determine the reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: "1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs." Id. "When weighing these factors as part of our totality-of-the-circumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure occurs." Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied.
[¶9] We begin by evaluating the law-enforcement officer's "degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred." Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We consider all the information available to the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943. In Weekly's view, Trooper Baldwin had "no legitimate reason to target Weekly" because Weekly's "mere contact with the fog line was neither a traffic violation nor evidence of his impairment." Appellant's Br. at 9, 13. According to Weekly, the traffic stop was unreasonable because he was "arbitrarily" targeted. Id. at 17. The State counters, claiming whether Weekly drove on or over the fog line is "ultimately irrelevant to the validity of the stop," because Trooper Baldwin had a high degree of suspicion Weekly was violating the law after he conducted a BMV search of the vehicle's license plate and discovered both registered owners' licenses were suspended. Appellee's Br. at 11.
To support his claim that he was arbitrarily targeted by Trooper Baldwin, Weekly directs our attention to what he believes to be a logo "associated with the 'Three Percenters,' a 'far right, anti-government extremist group,'" pasted on the back of Trooper Baldwin's mobile data terminal. Appellant's Br. at 15-16 (citation omitted). But Weekly did not mention or present evidence or argument about the logo during his trial. Weekly has therefore waived this argument. See Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 198 (noting issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived).
[¶10] Based on his BMV search, Trooper Baldwin had a high degree of knowledge Weekly was operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator ("HTV"). In other words, Trooper Baldwin acted with a great degree of suspicion that Weekly was violating the law when he began the traffic stop. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) ("A police stop and brief detention of a motorist is reasonable and permitted under Section 11 if the officer reasonably suspects that the motorist is engaged in, or about to engage in, illegal activity."). Weekly spends significant time arguing his contact with the fog line was not a traffic violation. But even if Weekly is correct, it does not alter our analysis under the first Litchfield factor. Prior to being pulled over, Weekly had neither been searched nor seized. See Maloney v. State, 872 N.E.2d 647, 651-52 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (explaining a suspicionless check of license plate numbers is not an improper search). So even if Trooper Baldwin mistakenly believed Weekly committed a traffic violation by contacting the fog line, he still had a valid basis to stop Weekly when he did-i.e., operating a vehicle as an HTV. Therefore, we cannot agree with Weekly that he was "arbitrarily" targeted by Trooper Baldwin. Instead, Trooper Baldwin had a high degree of suspicion or knowledge Weekly had or was violating the law before stopping him.
[¶11] Next, we consider "the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities." Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. We measure the degree of intrusion from the defendant's point of view, considering the "intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy." Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944. Additionally, we focus on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of search or seizure. Id. at 945. Generally, a short traffic stop represents a minimal intrusion. See Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019) (holding a traffic stop for speeding amounted to a small intrusion).
[¶12] Trooper Baldwin stopped Weekly around 7:00 p.m. on a public highway. After stopping Weekly, Trooper Baldwin asked Weekly for his license and registration. Weekly gave Trooper Baldwin his ID card and explained he did not have a driver's license. In total, the stop lasted around ten minutes and consisted of routine procedures. The seizure amounted to a small intrusion on Weekly's ordinary activities.
Weekly challenges only the constitutionality of the traffic stopi.e., the seizure. He does not challenge the brief search of his vehicle conducted by Trooper Baldwin.
[¶13] Under the final Litchfield factor, we review the extent of law-enforcement needs "to act in a general way" and "to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did." Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946-47. The purpose of the HTV law is "not to impose punishment" but rather "to remove from the highway those drivers who have proven themselves to be unfit to drive, and who pose a substantial threat to the safety of others." State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 713-14 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. McNeil, 931 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied). Law enforcement has "at least a legitimate, if not a compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws[.]" Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262. The extent of law-enforcement needs was significant.
[¶14] On balance, Trooper Baldwin's stop of Weekly was reasonable and did not violate Section 11. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence derived from the traffic stop.
2. Weekly's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was not violated.
[¶15] Next, Weekly contends his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when he was found guilty by an all-white jury, selected from an all-white venire. In other words, he claims his jury was not chosen from a venire representing a fair cross-section of the Miami County community, which has an African-American population of about six percent.
On appeal, Weekly also contends his rights under Article 1, Section 13 of Indiana's Constitution were violated. Section 13 provides, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury." Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13. An argument raised by a party for the first time on appeal, however, has been waived. See Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 198. In his brief, Weekly acknowledges "Defense counsel did not make a Section 13 argument in the trial court[.]" Appellant's Br. at 27 n.5. Weekly has therefore waived appellate review of his Section 13 claim.
[¶16] The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a "fair cross section of the community." Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010); U.S. Const. amend. VI (providing the accused in all criminal prosecutions "shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury"); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (describing this right as "fundamental to the American system of justice"). The purpose of a jury is "to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power [by] mak[ing] available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. This purpose is not fulfilled when the "jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool." Id.
[¶17] But "the mere absence of [Black people] from the venire does not establish a violation of constitutional rights." Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (Ind. 1997) (quotation omitted); see also Daniels v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Ind. 1980) (explaining jurors need not be mathematically proportioned to the character of the community, and there is no requirement that any particular class be represented on every jury). Rather, to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the underrepresentation is due to "systematic exclusion" of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). "The first showing is, in most cases, easily made; the second and third are more likely to generate controversy." Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 319.
[¶18] Because African Americans constitute a distinctive group in the community, Weekly readily satisfies the first Duren requirement. See Fields, 679 N.E.2d at 1318 ("Clearly, African-Americans constitute a distinctive group in the community."). But Weekly offers no evidence that an underrepresentation of African Americans in his jury venire was caused by systematic exclusion. See Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (holding a defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated failed because he could not provide evidence the jury selection process systematically excluded African Americans), trans. denied; cf. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366 (concluding defendant's "demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic-that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized"). Accordingly, Weekly concedes his claim cannot prevail under Duren. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 12 ("[T]he State is correct that Mr. Weekly concedes that, under Indiana's current interpretation of Duren's third prong, he cannot make a prima facie challenge under the Sixth Amendment."). Weekly's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was not violated.
Conclusion
[¶19] The trial court did not admit evidence in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of Indiana's Constitution, and Weekly's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States were not violated.
[¶20] Affirmed.
May, J., and Felix, J., concur.