Opinion
No. 99-CV-6482L.
August 30, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
Preliminary Statement
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Marriott Corporation and E.J. Delmonte Corporation. (Docket #39). Plaintiff Catalina Reichman Weddle ("Weddle") opposes the motion and oral argument was heard on March 24, 2004. In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for dispositive motions. (Docket #47). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Factual Background
Plaintiff's complaint asserts three causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) a violation of General Business Law § 349; and (3) negligent misrepresentation. At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel conceded that the General Business Law and negligent misrepresentation claims were not legally viable. Hence, all that remains unresolved in the present motion is whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence cause of action.Plaintiff's negligence claim arises from a fall she suffered on November 11, 1995 while a guest at the Rochester Thruway Marriott Hotel. Plaintiff made a reservation at the hotel because she was planning to attend a wedding reception that weekend at the hotel premises. (See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Moving Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, Docket #44, p. 5, ¶ 3). Plaintiff alleges that she requested a room with handicapped access, although the hotel's reservation confirmation only shows that a smoking and king sized room were requested. (Id., p. 5, ¶ 4). Plaintiff has scoliosis which effects her ability to rapidly ambulate. (See Plaintiff's Answer #8 to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories annexed as Exhibit "D" to Docket #42). However, plaintiff testified at her deposition that she enjoyed hiking, was quite active and occasionally used a cane when "walking for an extended period of time." (Weddle Deposition at pp. 42-44).
Defendants argue that plaintiff could not have requested a smoking and handicapped accessible room as all of the hotel's handicapped rooms are non-smoking. For purposes of this motion, it is assumed that plaintiff did make the request.
The complete deposition of plaintiff is annexed as Exhibit "F" to Docket #42.
When plaintiff arrived at the hotel late on the evening of November 10, 1995, she was told that no handicapped accessible rooms were available. (See Amended Complaint, ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges that she then requested a first floor room and a wheelchair, but was not provided with either of these accommodations. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that she made it known to defendants that she had a handicap that limited her mobility and was concerned about being able to quickly exit her room in case of an emergency. (Id. at ¶ 17).
After refusing one room on the third floor, plaintiff ultimately accepted another room on the same floor. Prior to retiring for the evening, plaintiff and her companion walked to the hotel bar for a drink. (Weddle Deposition at pp. 59-60). Plaintiff then returned to her room and went to sleep. Plaintiff was awakened at approximately six o'clock the next morning by the hotel fire alarm. Plaintiff put on a robe and her hiking boots, grabbed her cane and exited the room. (Weddle Deposition at pp. 63-64). Upon exiting the room, she fell down in an area between the room door and hallway and was injured. (See Amended Complaint at ¶ 29). Plaintiff concedes that there were not any noticeable defects or conditions in the hallway that caused her to fall, but rather, she fell because of the stress and anxiety caused by the fire alarm and "maybe [being] more asleep than awake". (See Plaintiff's Answers to Moving Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, Docket #44, p. 4, ¶ 13; Weddle Deposition at pp. 69-71). After falling, plaintiff got up "right away", walked to the exit, descended the stairs, went through the hotel lobby and outside of the building. (Weddle Deposition at pp. 72-73).
In opposing summary judgment, plaintiff has submitted the report of an expert which alleges that defendants "failed to fulfill their duty in accordance with their own procedural standards, with acceptable hotel industry operating practices and with the requirements and guidelines of the Americans with Disabilities Act." (Docket #44, Exhibit 1, p. 3). The expert opined that the hotel (1) failed to effectively handle and confirm the reservation request; (2) failed to adhere to policies and procedures for a guaranteed reservation; (3) failed to meet minimum ADA room count requirements; (4) failed to manage inventory of accessible guestrooms in accordance with ADA guidelines; (5) failed to provide a wheelchair upon request; and (6) failed to respond to a specific call for help from a handicapped guest during an emergency. (Docket # 44, Exhibit 1).
Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard: Summary judgment is appropriate only when the submissions of the parties, taken together, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Nordic Leasing, Inc., 42 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A plaintiff must "come forward with enough evidence to support a jury verdict in [his] favor, and the motion will not be defeated merely . . . on the basis of conjecture or surmise."Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1992). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest on the pleadings but must further set forth specific facts in the affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions showing a genuine issue exists for trial." Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996). "[I]n order to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must offer enough evidence to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor," and "the non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation."Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
B. The Cause of Action Based on Negligence: The premise of plaintiff's negligence cause of action is two-fold. First, plaintiff claims the defendants breached a duty of care owed to her by failing to provide a handicapped room on the first floor of the hotel. Second, plaintiff claims negligence because the defendants' employees failed to provide timely assistance to her after the fire alarm was sounded.
As to all negligence claims made under New York law, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a cognizable duty of care, that the defendant breached this duty, and that the plaintiff sustained damages as a proximate result of the breach. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Port Authority, 178 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1999) ("to prevail in a negligence action under New York law, the plaintiff must prove (1) that there was a duty owed to the plaintiff, (2) lack of due care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4) the injury was proximately caused by the defendant's breach of duty.").
The problem with plaintiff's negligence cause of action lies with the fourth required element of her claim: proximate cause. "Though negligence and probable cause frequently overlap in the proof and theory which support each of them, they are not the same conceptually. Evidence of negligence is not enough by itself to establish liability. It must also be proved that the negligence was the cause of the event which produced the harm sustained by one who brings the complaint." Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 501 (1976). See Swauger v. White, 1 A.D.3d 918, 920 (4th Dept. 2003) ("A showing of negligence is not enough; there must also be proof that the negligence was a proximate cause of the event that produced the harm."). "Where a plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of fact as to defendant's proximate causation of plaintiff's injuries, summary judgment is appropriate."Wasserman v. City of New York, 802 F. Supp. 849, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]o escape summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the injury.").
Here, plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence in the record even suggesting that her room placement on the third floor of the hotel proximately caused the injuries suffered when she slipped and fell in the hallway outside the room. Plaintiff complains that defendants did not place her in a handicapped accessible hotel room, yet concedes that the features available in such a room (wider doors to accommodate a wheelchair, bathroom adaptations) would not have prevented her fall or injuries. The fall did not occur due to any obvious or latent defect in the hotel room or the adjoining hallway. Plaintiff simply fell as she exited her room. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that her fall would not have occurred had the fire alarm sounded while plaintiff was leaving a first floor hotel room as opposed to her third floor room.
The fact that plaintiff has retained an expert who has identified policies and procedures that should have been followed with respect to providing handicapped accessible guestrooms does not create a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment. "[P]roximate cause is no less an essential element of liability because the negligence charged is premised in part or in whole on a claim that a statute or ordinance . . . has been violated."Sheehan, 40 N.Y.2d at 501. Put simply, neither the location of plaintiff's room, nor the absence of handicapped features in the room, were substantial factors in causing plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff's claim that the defendants were negligent in not providing her timely assistance in leaving her room once the alarm sounded is similarly without factual merit. Indeed, plaintiff conceded at her deposition that she did not wait for assistance to arrive to help her exit her room. Rather, both plaintiff and her companion testified that once the alarm sounded, plaintiff immediately put on her robe and hiking boots and exited her room. (Weddle Deposition at pp. 63-64, 67-68; Haverfield Deposition at p. 135). Thus, any failure by defendants to provide timely assistance was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. See Siegell v. Herricks Union Free School District, 7 A.D.3d 607, 609 (2nd Dept. 2004) ("Where an accident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury.") (internal quotations omitted).
Counsel's suggestion at oral argument that after the alarm sounded plaintiff asked for assistance and was refused by the hotel finds no support in the record.
Finally, plaintiff concedes that she fell because of the anxiety caused by a sounding fire alarm and perhaps being "more asleep than awake" as she exited her room. Both reasons are not unique to plaintiff and are not indicative of any negligence by the defendants. Even assuming her anxiety over the alarm sounding was elevated by her handicap, given the facts presented here, including her apparent mobility, her immediate exit from the room when the alarm went off and the lack of any defect in either the hotel room or the hallway in which she fell, any incremental enhancement of her anxiety was not the proximate cause of her fall.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.