Opinion
No. 346, 2003.
Submitted: November 25, 2003.
Decided: December 23, 2003.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, and STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 23rd day of December, 2003, upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Daniel Webster, was convicted by a Superior Court jury of stalking in violation of 11 Del. C. § 1312(A), for which he was sentenced to three years' incarceration at Level V with credit for 412 days previously served, followed by six months at Level IV Work Release. Webster appeals from his conviction and sentence on the ground that he was improperly deprived of a possible mental illness defense. For the reasons set forth below, Webster's appeal lacks merit and his conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
(2) Before the trial, Webster's counsel moved the trial court to order a mental evaluation of his client. That motion was granted, but Webster thereafter refused to be examined unless his attorney was present. That position resulted in the trial court modifying its order to clarify that the sole purpose of the examination was to determine Webster's competency to stand trial, and to assure Webster that he would not be asked about his alleged participation in the stalking offense. Despite that, Webster persisted in his refusal to be examined.
(3) Although Webster's counsel took the position that Webster's irrational conduct did not preclude his being examined by other methods, the trial court determined that by not cooperating with the examiner, Webster had waived both the issue of his competency to stand trial and any mental illness defense. Specifically, the trial court found that Webster was "as smart as a fox" and "unreasonably manipulative." The trial court deemed Webster competent to stand trial, and the trial then proceed without Webster testifying or presenting any evidence regarding his mental state at the time of the incident or at the time of trial.
A-24.
(4) On appeal Webster does not attack the trial court's factual findings but instead asserts, without evidentiary support, that it is common knowledge that persons with paranoia or schizophrenia may be hostile or delusional, or may act in a bizarre manner. Even if that were the fact, there is no evidence of record that Webster was paranoid or schizophrenic.
(5) Webster also asserts, again without evidentiary support, that the Delaware State Hospital was capable of performing a mental evaluation with an uncooperative subject. Even if that were so, Webster not only refused to cooperate on both occasions where a mental evaluation was ordered, but also his defense counsel never requested the court to order a third evaluation at the State Hospital.
(6) Although Delaware law affords a defendant an insanity defense in a criminal proceeding, the defendant must comply with the rules and procedures that provide for a court-ordered mental examination and that require timely notice of a defendant's intention to rely upon that defense. Failure to comply with those rules, including that which governs a court-ordered mental examination, can result in the exclusion of any opinion testimony on the defendant's mental condition. Procedural requirements that condition or limit a defendant's right to raise an insanity defense do not unconstitutionally burden a defendant's right to present that defense.
See Del. Super Ct. Crim. R. 12.2; State v. Grossberg, 1998 WL 117976 (Del. Super).
See, e.g., People v. Toma, 613 N.W.2d 694, 699-700 (Mich. 2000); State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 197-99 (Minn. 1992) (sanctions that precluded defendant from asserting insanity defense after defendant failed to cooperate with court-appointed psychiatrist held not to violate due process).
(7) Although Webster's brief obliquely suggests that Webster's non-cooperation may have been caused by mental illness, the record does not support that suggestion; nor does it come to grips with the trial court's finding that Webster's refusal to cooperate was voluntary and manipulative. The testimony of the forensic psychiatrist, that Webster understood the purpose and ramifications of the mental examination but nonetheless refused to cooperate and undergo the evaluation, supports the trial court's determination.
(8) For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.