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discussing the court's broad discretion in deciding whether to convert a motion
Summary of this case from Hopkins v. Bd. of Wilson Cnty.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-2554-KHV
May 24, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Rebecca Webster brings suit against Golden Star, Inc., her former employer, and Mike Julo and Ben Sowers, its representatives, alleging that defendants discriminated against her because she was pregnant. This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To FRCP12(b)(6) For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. #4) filed February 20, 2001 and Plaintiffs Motion To Strike Defendant's [sic] Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To FRCP12(b)(6) For Failure To State A Claim (Doc #18) filed May 4, 2001. For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules both motions.
In substance, plaintiffs motion to strike is a response to defendants' motion to dismiss. The more appropriate procedure would have been for plaintiff to denominate her pleading a response or a memorandum in opposition, instead of filing it as a separate motion. Calling her response a motion to strike makes it appear procedurally, on the Court's docket, as though plaintiff has not filed any opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss.
Factual Background
Plaintiffs complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of this motion: On June 27, 1994, plaintiff began working for Golden Star, Inc. as a finishing operator and a looped end auto sewer. Plaintiff eventually became a spinning frame operator and her job responsibilities consisted of walking, pushing barrels and pushing a 10 pound package onto a conveyor belt. On January 4, 1999, plaintiff informed her supervisors that she was pregnant and requested that her work week be temporarily reduced to 32 hours a week. Plaintiff made this request pursuant to doctor's orders. Defendants had previously accommodated the pregnancies of other employees in a similar fashion. Plaintiff continued working full time until January 20, 1999. On January 21, 1999, defendants told plaintiff that she could either leain how to perform a new job or take a leave of absence and receive unemployment benefits. While the proposed new job had the same base pay as plaintiffs current position, she believed that she would not earn the same incentive pay. Mike Julo, vice-president of manufacturing for Golden Star, Inc., told plaintiff that she needed to "start thinking about her baby instead of herself" Petition (Doc. #1) at 3. Plaintiff did not want to leave her current position and she obtained an opinion from a physician who said, "There is no medical reason to remove Rebecca S. Webster from her normal job." Id. Plaintiffs supervisor told her, however, that "no pregnant women should be allowed to do her job or any job in the Yarn Mill." Id.
Plaintiff obtained this order on December 22, 1999. The doctor stated," Rebecca Webster is pregnant and is limited to 32 hours per week because of the problems she is having." Petition (Doc. #1) filed December 12, 2000 at 3.
On January 21, 1999, defendants laid plaintiff off from work. They have not re-employed her. On October 4, 1999, the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) issued plaintiff a probable cause finding. The EEOC also issued plaintiff a right to sue letter. Plaintiff now brings suit against Golden Star, Inc., Julo, and Ben Sowers, manager of Golden Star's Yarn Mill. She alleges that defendants discriminated against her due to gender and the fact that she was pregnant, in violation of Title VTI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (Count IX the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count 2), and the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, KLS.A. § 44 — 1001 etseq. (Count 3). Defendants assert that the parties settled plaintiffs claim during a KHRC conciliation meeting and that the terms of their oral settlement preclude plaintiff from pursuing further legal action against them
Defendants also state that plaintiff refused to either sign the settlement documents which they had agreed upon or accept the settlement check. According to defendants, the KHRC administratively closed plaintiffs case because of her failure to cooperate. Defendants apparently remain willing to deliver the settlement check to plaintiff Aside from assertions in their motion to dismiss, however, defendants do not provide any documentation of these matters.
Legal Standard
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to plaintiff Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). The Court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff and liberally construe the pleadings. See Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Lafoy v. Homology., 988 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir. 1993). The Court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her theories of recovery that would entitle her to relief See Jacobs. Visconsi Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of her claims, she must plead minimal factual allegations on material elements that must be proved.See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).Analysis
The gist of defendants' motion to dismiss is that plaintiffs suit is barred because the parties entered into an oral settlement agreement during the KHRC conciliation. Defendants motion refers to documents which allegedly substantiate their claim, but neither documents nor affidavits regarding the conciliation are attached to their motion. Defendants do not address the facts alleged in plaintiff s complaint.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may not consider evidence outside the pleadings unless it converts the motion to a motion for summary judgment. See GRGE Inc. v. Thomas Aircraft Sales, Inc., No. 00-2510-KHV, 2001 WL 474306, at *2 (D. Kan. May 4, 2001) (citingParger v. LaFaver. 180 F.3d 1 185, 1 188-89 (10th Cir. 1999)). The Court has broad discretion to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment in order to consider matters outside the pleadings. See id. The Court declines to do so, however, in this case. The parties have not asked the Court to convert the motion, and the Court has not notified the parties that it will apply a summary judgment standard. Moreover, while defendants refer to matters outside plaintiffs complaint, their motion to dismiss does not contain the concise statement of material facts which is required by D. Kan. Rule 56. 1. In other words, defendants' motion cannot properly be considered a motion to dismiss because it relies on matters outside the pleadings. At the same time, defendants motion does not meet the standards for a motion for summary judgment. The Court overrules defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to comply with procedural rules. Plaintiff s motion to strike defendants motion to dismiss is therefore moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To FRCP12(b)(6) For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. #4) filed February 20, 2001 be and hereby is OVERRULED IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion To Strike Defendant's [sic] Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To FRCP12(b)(6) For Failure To State A Claim (Doc. #18) filed May 4, 2001 be and hereby is OVERRULED as moot.