Opinion
No. 1D21-3496
06-17-2022
Sean Webking, pro se, Petitioner. Jill W. Warren of The Virga Law Firm, P.A., Pensacola, for Respondent.
Sean Webking, pro se, Petitioner.
Jill W. Warren of The Virga Law Firm, P.A., Pensacola, for Respondent.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to quash the circuit court's ruling on Respondent's motion to prohibit either party from obtaining mental health treatment for their minor child without the other party's consent. As the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, we grant the petition and quash the order.
Our previous case 1D21-2971 involved a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the Petitioner. See Webking v. Webking , 335 So.3d 768 (Fla. 2022). There, Petitioner sought to prevent certain discovery in an ongoing dissolution of marriage action between the parties. On October 1, 2021, we issued an order in case 1D21-2971 which stayed most of the proceedings before the circuit court in the dissolution of marriage case. Nonetheless, at a previously scheduled hearing on October 4, 2021, the circuit court considered the Respondent's motion and ruled on it. In granting the motion, the circuit court acted beyond what was permitted by the stay imposed by this court and therefore acted without jurisdiction. See Stokes v. Jones , 317 So. 3d 262, 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (granting petition for writ of prohibition and quashing discovery order where lower tribunal lacked jurisdiction because appellate court issued a show cause order in a separate prohibition case that stayed proceedings below); see also Plavnicky v. Deluicia , 954 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
As a result, we GRANT the petition for writ of prohibition and QUASH the challenged order.
Bilbrey and Long, JJ., concur; Winokur, J., concurs with opinion.
Winokur, J., concurring.
As the majority correctly concludes, the lower tribunal violated a stay imposed by this Court and therefore acted without jurisdiction. As such, I concur in the decision to grant the petition for writ of prohibition and quash the challenged order. I write separately because I believe one of Petitioner's related arguments should be addressed.
In support of the petition, Petitioner argues that the trial court disregarded section 61.13(2)(b)3.a., Florida Statutes, which requires the court, if it orders shared parental responsibility over health care decisions in a parenting plan, to provide in the parenting plan "that either parent may consent to mental health treatment for the child." I agree. This provision, enacted by the Legislature in 2016 as part of a comprehensive law concerning mental health and substance abuse, recognizes the importance of mental health treatment for children whose parents are involved in a family law dispute. The trial court's failure to apply it here should not go unnoticed.
See Chapter 2016-241, Laws of Fla.